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1 General Introduction 
“Th r   s       l f r d v l pm    m r   ff c  v   ha   h  
 mp w rm     f w m  .”  
— Kofi Annan  
 
Th   d a  f w m  ’s  mp w rm        r d  h  ma  s r am d v l pm    a   da     h  la   
1990s. R    d    w m  ’s m v m   s     h  1980s,  h    rm      ally symbolized a radical 
 ra sf rma      f p w r r la    s    fav r  f w m  ’s r  h s, as w ll as s ruc ural cha    
regarding equality between men and women (Kabeer, 1994; Sen, 1997). Feminist movements in 
developing countries challenged not only patriarchal values, but deeply rooted structures such 
as class or ethnicity, functioning as mediator for the subordination of women in developing 
societies. Evolving from discourses between various social movements, it followed a widespread 
ad p      f  h  c  c p   f w m  ’s  mpowerment and by the mid-1990s, it finally entered the 
development sector. For instance, it was part of the 1995 Beijing Platform of Action, adopted at 
the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women, and emphasized as one of three pillars in tackling 
poverty in  h  2000 W rld Ba k r p r  (Calvès, 2009). T day, w m  ’s  mp w rm    has 
become one of the core international development concerns (Batliwala, 2007; Cornwall & Eade, 
2011).   
Since then, much of the literature that has evolved around this subject focused on the 
  s rum   al  a  s: w m  ’s  mp w rm    has b     d    f  d    var  us s ud  s as a 
prerequisite for poverty reduction (United Nations (2005); World Bank (2012)).  In addition to 
dr v     v rall  c   m c  r w h (Klas   a d Lama  a, 2009), w m  ’s  mpowerment has been 
found to have beneficial effects on fertility rates, child health and education outcomes, as well as 
community development (e.g. Amzat, 2017; Prennushi, 2014).  
This instrumental view has been criticized by various feminist thinkers, stressing that not 
   u h  ff r   s plac d       r  s c   als, s  ak       d r  ssu s as “Tr ja  h rs ”      
mainstream development issues, based on efficiency arguments (Cornwall and Anyidoho, 2010; 
Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Batilwala, 2007). They claim that ignoring structural causes of 
w m  ’s    qual  y 
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   ma  s r am d v l pm    l m  s pr  r ss    ac ual ach  v m   s    w m  ’s  mp w rm    
(Cornwall and Edwards, 2014).1  
The importance of differentiating between instrumental and intrinsic values is also stressed by 
S  ’s w d ly k  w  capab l  y appr ach. Pu  s mply,   v s      n e.g. education is essential to 
wha  S   r f rs    as “   ’s ab l  y    d  a d b ” a d  h    c ss  y    c  s d r development 
objectives fr m a br ad r “capabil  y” p rsp c  v  wh ch places value on indicators for their 
intrinsic significance (Sen, 1997). 2 
I  2015, w m  ’s  mp w rm    has b    ack  wl d  d as a   mp r a     d      s lf, by 
placing it on the development a   da as ‘a s a d-alone objective’      al 5  f  h  Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).  
This thesis follows the approach that values empowerment as an end in itself by looking at what 
dr v s  r h  d rs pr  r ss    w m  ’s  mp w rm   , bu  als  f cus         s   s rum   al 
effects on other development ends. Within this framework, this thesis aims to explore various 
fac  rs  ha  f s  r w m  ’s  mp w rm   , as w ll as l  ka  s b  w    d ff r    d m  s   s  f 
w m  ’s  mp w rm   .  
Since the term empowerment lacks a unique conceptualization in research, we follow the 
definition of Kabeer (2001), (also taken up by the World Bank), throughout the three chapters.  
H  c f r h,  h    rm  mp w rm      c rp ra  s w m  ’s   cr as d c   r l  v r  h  r  w  
l v s, b d  s, a d   v r  m   s. Sp c f cally  mphas z d ar  “w m  ’s d c sion-making roles, 
their economic self-reliance, and their legal rights to equal treatment, protection against all 
forms of discrimination, in addition to the elimination of barriers of access to resources such as 
 duca     a d   f rma    ”. Ov rall,  h    rm empowerment reflects a multi-dimensional 
process that can be categorized into economic, socio-cultural, and political empowerment, 
among others (Kabeer, 2001). 
                                                        
 
 
1 For instance, putting too much emphasis on the synergy effects of women’s empowerment does only 
lead to partial improvements instead of progress in structural transformation in society. 
2 In addition, Sen's capability provides a view to assess the general process of empowerment. According to 
h s appr ach,  h    rm d scr b s  h  pr c ss  f   cr as    “individual's well-being, freedom or set of 
valuable capabili   s”.  
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This thesis focuses on the social and economic dimensions. It consists of three essays, which will 
be summarized below in more detail. Each of these chapters addresses specific research 
questions in order to contribute to a better understanding of the processes underlying social and 
 c   m c d m  s   s  f w m  ’s  mp w rm    at the micro and macro level. In particular, the 
f rs  chap  r s ar s by pr v d    a br ad r p rsp c  v      h  caus s  f w m  ’s  mp w rm    
at the macro level, by investigating the factors correlated with the closing of gender gaps in 
education across regions during the last 30 years. More specifically, we ask what economic, 
political or institutional changes are the drivers of progress in gender parity in education. 
This explorative study paves the way for a more detailed analysis at the micro level. As the first 
chapter identifies conflict as one of the determinants impeding empowerment at the macro 
l v l, w   xpl r      h  s c  d pap r h w w m  ’s  c   m c  mp w rm    r ac s    r fu    
shocks triggered by conflict at the micro level. We do this by asking whether refugee shocks 
 mpac   h  h s  p pula          rms  f w m  ’s lab r f rc  par  c pa     a d s c al c h s       
Uganda. 
The third chapter focuses on the instrumental view by asking whether economic empowerment 
itself can have instrumental effects on social dimensions of empowerment, namely domestic 
v  l  c .   v    ha   c   m c  mp w rm    ca  b  a p w rful m a s     mpr v  w m  ’s 
welfare by reducing domestic violence in the context of developed countries, we investigate if 
this link can be carried  v r     h  d v l p    c u  ry’s c    x , wh r   mp r cal f  d   s sh w 
mixed results.  
This thesis has two main contributions. F rs , by a alyz    var  us dr v    fac  rs  f w m  ’s 
empowerment, this thesis contributes to the overall understanding of the factors that play a key 
r l  f r w m  ’s  mp w rm   .  S c  d,  h   h s s sh ws  ha  w m  ’s  c   m c 
empowerment can have positive instrumental effects across other dimensions, such as freedom 
from domestic violence, even when measured by neoclassical approaches.  
Each summary below introduces the general idea, estimation strategy and gives some policy 
recommendations based on the findings of the respective analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
1.1 Synopsis of Chapter 1: The Drivers of Gender Gaps in Education in 
Developing Countries 
Some existing studies to date focus on the instrumental rationale for advocacy on gender 
equality, such as the impact of gender gaps in education on economic growth (Klasen & Lamanna 
2009; Hakura et al. 2016; Knowles, 2002;). Yet, this study focuses on female empowerment via 
education considering both of them as intrinsic values. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate long-run trends such as economic prosperity, structural 
changes in the economy or changes in institutions, which may explain the achievement of gender 
parity in one dimension of gender equality, namely education. Within this overall framework, we 
target one fact r sp c f cally:     r a    al a r  m   s    w m  ’s r  h s. Th  C  v       
against Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) enacted in 1979, was the first legal response to 
   qual    s    w m  ’s s a us,   clud    m asur s     mpr v  f mal   duca     d r c ly. This 
chapter explores whether these international attempts to raise awareness for female education 
in the international arena and to put pressure on national governments was successful.  
To this end, we implement various random effect models on 98 countries over the period 1980-
2010. While doing so, we account for potential time trends by applying placebo tests and 
controlling for regional time trends, which are often neglected in studies on the effectiveness of 
human rights treaties (Simmons, 2011). Since many processes such as modernization processes 
and democracy transformations took place in the same period as the CEDAW ratification, we 
need to an apply instrumental variable approach to disentangle the effect of this international 
treaty from confounding factors. Thus, we instrument our main variable of interest, the 
ratification to the CEDAW, with three other human rights treaties to rule out potential threats 
through reverse causality or omitted variables bias.  
We conclude that institutions are successful for primary educational attainment by using 
international agreements, pushing governments to implement certain policies to achieve equity 
in education. The results suggest that economic growth, the share of Protestants in a country, 
some social institutions and years of interstate conflict are correlated with changes in education 
gap outcomes. Yet, many factors we tested are found not to be associated with gender inequality 
in education, such as trade openness and structural transformation. Policy implications would, 
therefore, suggest that recent processes linked to globalization such as a higher integration into 
the world market and structural changes of the economy need to be supported and accompanied 
by gender strategies to effectively contribute to improvements in gender equality, at least in the 
dimension of education.  
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1.2 Synopsis of Chapter 2: The Impact of Congolese Refugees on 
Female Labor Market Outcomes and Social Cohesion 
The past decade has experienced significant growth in the global population of forcibly displaced 
people. As of today, one out of every 110 people in the world is displaced, compared with one in 
157 a decade ago, with much of this increase having occurred over the last five years. The large-
scale numbers of refugees mostly, but not solely, escaping from intense civil-conflict situations 
has brought attention to the responsibility shouldered by hosting countries and communities, 
with most of them (84%) being developing regions. 
While the impacts of voluntary labor migration have been widely explored- to a large extent 
focusing on developed countries-, the link between various aspects of forced migration on a host 
c u  ry’s p pulation remains poorly understood. This is despite a general increase in protracted 
r fu    s  ua    s  ha  ca  b   xp c  d     mpac  a c u  ry’s p pula        var  us pr f u d 
ways. Few studies though investigate the effects on labor market outcomes and we have not 
come across any study focusing on social effects, in response to large refugee increases in 
communities.  
Gender issues in this context are particularly under-researched. Yet, this is of utmost importance 
since women often carry a double burden in terms of unpaid domestic and care work, such as 
child-rearing, while they belong to the most vulnerable individuals in the society (Manyire, 
2013).  Th  s c  d chap  r  xpl r s  h   ff c   f   cr as d r fu      fl ws    w m  ’s lab r 
market outcomes and social cohesion in Uganda. This research question is particularly 
interesting in the context of Uganda, since the government introduced a unique legal framework 
regarding the economic and social integration of refugees. Refugees are entitled to move around 
freely, work and build their own shelter, amongst others freedoms. This offers various ways of 
economic and social interaction between refugees and the Ugandan host population. 
 
The empirical framework to answer this question is based on up to 5 waves from three different 
sources, covering the years 2000-2012. By using a difference-in-differences approach, we 
compare regions that experienced high refugee inflows to those exposed to fewer refugees, 
while taking into account the distance of the Ugandan communities to the refugee settlements.  
We find that Ugandan women living closer to the settlements and thus exposed to higher refugee 
numbers benefit in terms of increased labor force participation rates, particularly in agricultural 
self-employment. In addition, we show that overall household welfare increases, as well as 
nutritional outcomes of children of the women under study. With respect to social cohesion, 
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greater refugee presence seems to enhance perceived equality within the host population, as 
well as increase the sense of belonging to the Ugandan nationality compared to other ethnic 
groups. Indicators of both institutional and interpersonal trust are not altered as result of 
increased refugee inflows. 
Our results suggest a positive effect of the integrative Ugandan refugee policy on female labor 
mark   par  c pa     w  h subs qu     mpr v m   s  f  h  h us h ld’s  c   m c s a us. Th  
‘s c al  lu ’ am     h  h s  p pula      s aff c  d amb  u usly by  h  r fu    s  ua     a d 
needs to be considered carefully. Particularly, increases in adherence to the national identity 
over the ethnic identity can hint at an out-group discrimination against the refugee population. 
Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between refugee 
inflows and concerns about gender issues and forced displacement, by focusing on the host 
p pula    ’s p rsp c  v . 
 
1.3 Synopsis of Chapter 3: Does Female Labor Force Participation 
Reduces Domestic Violence? Evidence from Jordan 
The incidence of violence against women is still a pandemic problem, given that one in three 
women (35%) worldwide have experienced violence in their lifetime (WHO report, 2017). Yet, 
this phenomenon is equally persistent in both developed as well as developing countries. Men 
experience higher levels of physical violence than women as, e.g., a result of war or disputes 
between gangs, while almost one third (30%) of violent acts women suffer (globally) come from 
either physical and/or sexual violence perpetrated by their intimate partner in their own home.3 
Th  c  s qu  c s  f d m s  c v  l  c     w m  ’s l v s, as w ll as c s s     h  s c   y a d  h  
economy, are well acknowledged in international reports (World Bank, 2016). In 2010, Fearon 
and Hoeffler calculated that the annual international costs of domestic violence amount to 4.3 
trillion USD. However, effective strategies or at least promising concepts to reduce intimate 
partner violence, are still debated. The United Nations strongly advocate economic 
empowerment of women as a protective factor against domestic violence in its Beijing 
                                                        
 
 
3 The emotional and economic dependence on the partner makes efforts on prevention even more 
complex. 
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declaration (United Nations, 2015), mainly based on studies from industrialized countries 
(Aizer, 2010; Anderberg et al., 2016).  
Yet, empirical evidence from developing countries on the impact of labor force participation on 
domestic violence provides two conflicting views. One strand of literature finds that improved 
bargaining power due to economic empowerment can increase independence, decision-making 
power and outside options among women, leading to less spousal violence (Bowlus and Seitz, 
2006; Kim et al. 2007). In contrast, another strand of literature finds that an increase in 
bargaining power through higher income can trigger domestic violence, for instance when 
trad     al    d r r l s     h  h us h ld ar  chall    d. Th s  “mal  backlash” s ud  s f  d a 
positive impact between labor force and the prevalence of domestic violence as a reaction of the 
husband to regain power over his wife (Hjort and Villanger, 2011; Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011). 
Given the mixed results, this chapter contributes to the literature by investigating the link 
b  w    w m  ’s  c   m c  mp w rm    du     par  c pa         h  lab r f rc  a d d m s  c 
violence in the context of Jordan. This is an interesting case to study, as labor force participation 
amongst women is very low in Jordan, and qualitative evidence hints at mainly traditional 
a    ud s, pr scr b    w m  ’s ma   r l  as uph ld     h  fam ly a d m   as pr mary 
breadwinner of the family. Yet, recent studies report a shift towards more progressive attitudes 
towards gender roles, at least for the younger generation (Shteiwi, 2015).  
In this analysis, we analyze DHS data from 2007, providing information on 10,867 ever-married 
women. The use of instrumental variable estimation helps us to address the problem of 
  d       y  ssu s    a l d     s  ma      h   ff c   f w m  ’s lab r f rc  par  c pa        
d m s  c v  l  c . W  f  d  ha  w m  ’s par  c pa         h  lab r f rc  r duc s  h  r sk  f 
sexual violence amongst Jordanian women, but does not significantly affect physical or 
psychological violence. The policy implications would, therefore, recommend strategies to get 
women into the labor force as a tool to protect women at least from spousal sexual violence.  
With respect to the methodology, future research should address challenges inherent in the 
estimation of domestic violence, such as underreporting and measurement error. To overcome 
potential problems from underreporting, new research points to the solution of combining 
‘ rad     al’ da a, such as DHS   clud    s lf-reported violence, with experiments providing 
better privacy to women (Aguero, 2017). Overall, this chapter contributes to a better 
u d rs a d     f  h  c  s qu  c s  f w m  ’s par  c pa         h  labor force on domestic 
violence in the context of a developing country where attitudes are shifting slowly from 
 rad     al v  ws    w m  ’s r l     s c   y   wards    d r  qual  y. 
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2 The Drivers of Gender Gaps in Education in Developing 
Countries 
Abstract4 
In recent decades, the gender gaps in education have rapidly closed in many regions of 
the world, while progress in other dimensions, such as political empowerment, health or 
domestic violence, has been much slower or even stagnated.  
This paper investigates the potential drivers of these changes in gender equity in 
education by exploring the effects of economic growth, structural changes in the economy, 
social institutions, religion and political factors using a panel of 98 developing countries 
covering the period of 1981-2010. Given that there is little consensus on the impact of 
international agreements targeting gender equality in education, we specifically look at a 
c u  ry’s c mm  m        h  C  v           h  El m  a      f All F rms  f D scr m  a  on 
a a  s  W m   (CEDAW). W  us   x     us var a         h  dura      f a c u  ry’s 
ratification of the CEDAW generated by commitment to other UN Human Rights Treaties to 
identify a local average treatment effect (LATE). Our estimation results imply that 
educa      aps,    av ra  ,  mpr v d wh   a c u  ry’s   v r m    ra  f  d  h  CEDAW 
and placebo tests confirm that these positive findings are not driven by an omission of time 
trends. However, after correcting for endogeneity through instrumental variable 
estimation, this effect only holds for primary education and becomes non-significant for 
secondary and higher education.  
We also find that the reduction of the gender gaps in education is correlated with growth 
in GDP, religion, informal institutions such as the absence of land inheritance rights, and 
fewer years of civil conflict in a country. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
4 This is joint work with Amy Alexander, Stephan Klasen and Chris Welzel. 
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2.1 Introduction  
All over the world, particularly in developing countries, women are exposed to extreme gender 
inequality. This is unacceptable from a human rights perspective, as gender equality constitutes 
a fundamental right in itself according to international and national bills (UN Women report, 
2015). In addition, several studies indicate that such inequality hinders economic growth and 
exacerbates poverty as formal or informal institutions deny women access to own assets or 
income producing labor.5 A central theme that emerges is the question of why gender inequality 
still exists in some dimensions but has already disappeared in others. Despite the convergence in 
f mal  a d mal ’s  duca    al s a us, r ma       aps    h al h, l f   xp c a cy, wa  s, 
employment or occupations seem to be persistent. 
 Yet, looking at gender gaps in education is of utmost importance, not only because there is a 
consensus that they are a barrier to economic growth (e.g., Licumba et al., 2015; Klasen & 
Lamanna, 2009), but also as they significantly affect other dimensions of gender gaps in female 
lab r f rc  par  c pa      r w m  ’s r  h s. Th s  s supp r  d by var  us  mp r cal and 
theoretical studies on interrelations between education gender gaps and gender gaps in other 
dimensions (Seguino, 2000a, 2000b). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we elaborate potential factors that are correlated with 
improvements in female education and thereby may explain the substantial reduction of 
education gaps, over the last 30 years, in developing countries. Amongst these are economic 
factors (economic growth, structural transformation), political and institutional factors, conflict, 
dev l pm    a d a d w m  ’s p l   cal r pr s   a    . W  d      a m a   s abl sh    causal 
relationships here. 
Second, we then provide a closer perspective by looking at the role of formal institutions and, 
specifically, international agreements in promoting female education and thereby potentially 
contributing to the closing of the education gap. In the last decades, several international human 
rights initiatives have called for collective action to push the basic right of w m  ’s  duca    . 
Amongst them, the Millenium Development Goals, the Education for ALL (EFA) Dakar 
                                                        
 
 
5 This phenomenon of women being disproportionally affected by poverty has been introduced as 
“f m   za      f p v r y” (UN W m   r p r , 2000). 
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Framework for Action and, in our focus, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) place equal educational attainment of women and men as the primary 
goal on th  r a   da. F r   s a c , Ar  cl  10  f  h  CEDAW s a  s  ha  “S a  s Par   s shall  ak  
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them 
 qual r  h s w  h m       h  f  ld  f  duca    …”   v r m   s ar  ask d  o meet a set of 
requirements to ensure a c mparabl  qual  y  f  duca     f r   rls a d b ys    “all  yp s  f 
schools, in rural, as well as in urban areas, in pre-school, general, technical, professional and 
higher technical education as well as in all types  f v ca    al  ra     ”.  
Yet, such international agreements have been subject to controversial debate as critics claim 
that they have virtually no effect on practice and implementation due to, e.g., a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms (Kevane, 2003), or commitments to them are considered to be a 
rational to receive more development aid (Hathaway, 2007; Magesan, 2015)6, or they serve as a 
vehicle for interests in international cooperation (Chayes & Chayes, 2009). Empirical evidence, 
however, finds that international agreements improve equality across several gender 
dimensions, such as economic and political rights (Cho, 2014). 7 Besides this debate, there is 
scarce empirical literature on the effectiveness of CEDAW on education. Recent literature has 
mainly f cus d     h   mpac   f CEDAW    a  r  a  d w m  ’s r  h s  u c m s such as  h  
Gender Empowerment Index (GEI) (Simmons, 2009) or the CIRI Index (Cho, 2014). Yet, to our 
k  wl d  ,  h  l  k b  w    a c u  ry’s CEDAW ra  f ca     a d  mpr v m   s       d r 
equality in education (measured by female-male ratios in educational attainment) has not been 
investigated. 
We contribute to the existing literature by conducting panel analyses across a large number of 
developing countries, and expanding the time-period under consideration from 1980 up to 
2010. Prior cross-national research on gender differences in education has mostly been 
constrained by data limitations to one point in time, whereas studies of long-term trends in the 
differences in education between men and women tend to focus on the sub-national level 
(Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006; Charles & Bradley, 2002; Marks, 2008; Van Hek, Kraaykamp, & 
Wolbers, 2015).  
                                                        
 
 
6 Or, alternatively, having a bad human rights reputation increases the fear of getting less development aid 
through aid sanctions (Hamilton Spence, 2004). 
7 CEDAW has been adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly 
resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 and entered into force 3 September, 1981. 
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We further contribute to the empirical discussion by devoting special emphasis to the omission 
of time trends and the potential endogeneity challenges in analyzing the causal effects of human 
rights treaties, such as the CEDAW, on human rights outcomes. More specifically, one concern is 
that countries signed this treaty at different times over a thirty-year period as equality in gender 
relations evolved for other reasons, e.g. democratization. Signing of the treaty might have 
followed these changes. This may result in a spurious correlation between ratification and 
education outcomes. We therefore exploit exogenous variation on the timing of CEDAW 
ratification. We find that commitments to three UN Human rights treaties are powerful 
instruments8 in our context since they have a large significant impact on CEDAW ratification, 
and pass various tests of the necessary exclusion restriction.  
Moreover, the literature on the impact of international agreements on human rights outcomes 
has largely neglected to control for long-running trends, which might cause a positive 
relationship between treaty ratification and human rights outcomes (Chilton, 2016). Thus, we 
include time dummies in our model and run 1,000 placebo tests where we randomly assign the 
dura      f a c u  ry’s ra  f ca        sh w  ha   ur m d l d  s     suff r fr m  h   m ss     f 
time trends. We find that higher GDP per capita (above a threshold of 5720 US$), the absence of 
inheritance rights, and the number of years a country is involved in interstate conflicts are 
correlated with the change of the gender gap in education. We identify a positive average 
treatment effect for the countries whose CEDAW ratifications respond to UN treaty 
participation. However, this positive and statistically significant effect of signing the CEDAW 
disappears for higher levels of education (secondary and tertiary) and holds for only primary 
education after controlling for endogeneity issues.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature overview of 
factors that are related to gender inequality in education with specific emphasis on CEDAW 
ratification. Section 2.3 explains the data, and Section 2.4 discusses the regression specification 
and the empirical strategy to deal with endogeneity problems. Section 2.5 is devoted to the 
regression results. Section 2.6 and 2.7 d scuss  h  s udy’s r bus  ess checks and limitations and 
Section 2.8 concludes. 
                                                        
 
 
8 The selected treaties are the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention, CAT 1984) and the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention, GPPCG 1948). 
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2.2 Literature Overview 
The literature on female educational attainment has looked at various angles across time and 
regions, but few studies focus specifically on the education gap, i.e. changes in female education 
vs. male education over time. Therefore, we present an overview on various strands of the 
general literature on determinants of gender inequality, which draws attention to trends in 
economic development, formal and informal institutions, conflict, development aid, and religion. 
Second, we review literature on the impact of international agreements, such as CEDAW, on 
gender inequality. 
2.2.1 Economic Factors 
Economic Growth 
Empirical evidence in recent years suggests that the link between economic growth and gender 
equality is rather weak and inconclusive. Yet, several micro-level studies hint at improvements 
in gender outcomes and reveal possible pathways (Duflo, 2012). Explanations based on family-
decisions claim that economic growth improves access to resources for poor households, 
lowering vulnerability as in times of crisis, which leads to less discriminatory practices against 
girls (Duflo, 2012). Other market-oriented explanations, (e.g., Becker, 1975) argue that growth 
should induce competitive markets to increase the costs of discriminating against women, 
ultimately leading to equal opportunities between males and females. Yet, whether these 
cha   ls ca  b  fully  ff c  v  d p  ds    a c u  ry’s  r w h pa   r s,  . .  h  ab l  y  f 
economic growth to generate competitive markets and benefit poor households. 
Very few studies exist with respect to education outcomes at the macro-level. For instance, 
Dollar & Gatti (1999) investigate the link between gender inequality in education and economic 
growth in a panel analysis covering 127 countries (1975-1990) and find a convex relationship 
between income and female secondary achievement. The impact of rising GDP per capita on 
female education kicks in only after a certain threshold. Other theoretical studies conclude that 
growth does not automatically translate to gender equality (Kabeer, 2016). The role of the state 
and its ability to allocate benefits from economic growth, as well as patriarchial structures, 
determine whether economic growth results in better outcomes for women. 
Structural transformation 
As countries develop, the sectoral composition of the economy moves away from agriculture and 
manufacturing toward services, a sector in which women have a clear advantage. Agriculture 
and manufacturing typically require more physical strength, while the service sector is less 
     s      h  usa    f “braw  sk lls”. F ll w     h  w ll-established arguments in literature, 
w m   ar  b    r  qu pp d w  h “bra   sk lls”,   clud        rp rs  al a d c mmu  ca     
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skills which are typically required qualifications in the service sector. Thus, the historical growth 
in the tertiary sector has created jobs for which women are appropriate and have a comparative 
advantage (Goldin, 1990, 2006; Galor and Weil, 1996; Rendall 2010; Weinberg, 2000; Ngai and 
Petrolongo, 2015). As a result, female labor productivity rises in the course of the tertiarization 
process in the economy and thereby may increase the demand for female education.  
Globalization 
Since the 1980s, most developing countries have adopted trade liberalization policies aimed at a 
better integration into the world economy (Aguayo-Téllez, 2011). Yet, empirical evidence is 
scarce and inconclusive on whether trade openness fosters gender parity in education and other 
dimensions (Grown et al., 2016). The impact of trade policies and foreign direct investments 
(FDI) varies depending on global and local context characteristics, such as resource 
endowments, political institutions, or socioeconomic background of the women, amongst others 
(Balliamoune-Lutz., 2009). Balliamoune-Lutz (2006) finds that higher integration into the world 
market exacerbates differences in youth and adult literacy rates between men and women in 
Sub-Saharan Africa; but not in other developing countries. Similarly, other studies suggest that 
higher trade openness exerts a negative impact on female education in developing countries 
when unskilled women are mainly engaged in labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, or other 
light manufacturing (e.g., Balliamoune-Lutz & Mc Gillvray 2009; Fontana and Wood 2000,).9 In 
contrast, evidence from India and South Africa shows that whenever incentives for investments 
in schooling increase due to new job opportunities in export-oriented sectors and ICT-related 
jobs which require specific skills, enrollment rates of children increase. This effect is even more 
pronounced among young women, compared to men (Oster & Steinberg, 2013; Jensen, 2012; 
Levinson 2007). 10  
2.2.2 Social Institutions, and Culture 
Additional explanations suggest that gender outcomes can also be affected by a wide range of 
social institutions, cultural norms, and values that have been changed over the last decades. 
There are different ways through which informal or social institutions may affect gender 
                                                        
 
 
9 Hypothesized channels are that women drop out of school earlier to join the labor force and thus, 
inequality in education would increase compared to higher LFP rates. 
10 Another channel mentioned in literature relates to trade and the potential decrease the wage gap 
between men and women, as higher competition decreases discrimination against females. Thus, higher 
relative wages may give women access to educational opportunities (Aguayo-Téllez, 2011). 
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outcomes in education. Social norms may affect the costs and benefits of education as they are 
an important factor in shaping gender attitudes related to the division of work. They can even 
  flu  c   pp r u   y c s s  f w m  ’s  duca    , f r   s a c      h  cas   f dowry payments 
(Hill & King, 1995; Lahiri & Self, 2007). Social institutions can affect the returns on education 
which are lower for females than for males, as women often face unequal access, payment and 
other barriers at the labor market (Pasqua, 2005; Song, Appleton, & Knight, 2006).  
Ov rall,   f rmal   s   u    s  ha  c  s ra   w m  ’s au    my a d bar a      p w r ar  
   a  v ly r la  d    w m  ’s  duca     (Bra  sa    al., 2013).  We measure different aspects of 
formal institutions, such as absence of inheritance rights, nuclear families and patrilocal vs. 
matrilocal societies. For instance, we test the impact of different family structures (Bertocchi & 
Bozzano, 2015; Alesina & Nunn, 2013). It is assumed that nuclear family living arrangements 
reflect a more liberal, rather than authoritarian, norms which should favor a more advantaged 
position for women within the household and society (Engels, 1902, Boserup, 1970, Barry, 
Bacon and Child, 1957). In the same line, absence of inheritance rights reflects a more egalitarian 
society as control over private property allowed men to have a more superior position over 
females and to introduce the concept of paternity over their children (Alesina & Nunn, 2013).  
Religion 
The impact of religion on gender roles has been explored by Algan & Cahuc (2006) among 
  h rs. Us    pa  l da a,  h y sh w  ha  c  c p    s  f  h  “mal  br adw    r m d l” ar  m r  
likely to persist in Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim rather than Protestant and Atheist societies. 
With respect to inequality in education, Cooray & Potrafke (2011) compare the impact of 
political institutions versus culture and religion on girls-boys enrollment ratio for primary 
education using a cross-section analysis. They find that neither democratic nor autocratic 
regimes influence improvements in gender equality. Instead, Muslim dominated countries are 
impeding female education. Similarly, Norton & Tomal (2009) find that the proportion of Hindu 
and Muslim population in a country has a negative impact on female educational attainment. In 
contrast, evidence taking into account historical patterns finds that exposure to Protestant 
missionaries improves current literacy rates amongst females in India (Mantovanelli, 2014), 
while Gallego & Woodberry (2011) find a positive relationship between 20th century 
missionaries and current education levels across African countries. 
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Becker & Wössmann (2008) investigate the determinants of the education gap in 19th century 
Prussia. They find that a larger share of Protestants decreased the gender gap in education since 
  rls a d b ys w r   qually ur  d    r ad r l    us   x s, fac l  a      h  pr m       f   rls’ 
schooling.11  
 
2.2.3 Political Factors 
Development Aid 
The topic of how development assistance affects gender inequality is relatively new in the 
broader framework of studies on aid effectiveness and development (Grown et al., 2016).  
While empirical studies suggest that aid is allocated to countries according to the level of 
existing gender gaps in education and health (Dreher, 2015), there is only scarce literature at the 
macro- and micro-level on sectoral allocation of aid and its impact on gender equality outcomes. 
With respect to aid effectiveness in the educational sector in general, the effects are found to be 
rather small (Riddel, 2012). For instance, Michaelowa & Weber (2006; 2007) explore Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) directed to the education sector in low and low-middle income 
countries over the long-run (using five-year averages, 1975-2000) and in the short-term 
perspective (1993-2000). They conclude that ODA had positive effects on primary enrolment 
rates. Furthermore, Pickbourn & Ndikumana (2013) use OECD data to evaluate the impact of the 
sectoral allocation of aid and show that aid in education significantly diminishes the female–
male gap in youth literacy. These findings are in line with other research on aid effectiveness in 
this sector (Riddell, 2012). 
Conflict 
Another strand of literature examines the role of conflict, crisis, and shocks. Existing gender 
inequalities may be exacerbated during violent conflict, but they may also be attenuated. In 
                                                        
 
 
11 More recently, the results of Seguino (2011) using cross- section and OLS analysis, suggest that the 
negative positions against gender equality do not come specifically from one specific religion, but from the 
degree of religiosity of people. 
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times of conflict, traditional norms and cultural values can be challenged12, but in many cases 
they increase early childhood marriages and early pregnancies, forcing girls out of school 
(Justino, 2011).  Various single-country studies suggest that conflict has a direct, negative impact  
on gender disparities in schooling which can be attributed to safety concerns, migration and 
d splac m    a d l w r  ur s      rl’s  duca     (Chamarba wala & Moran, 2011; Shemyakaina 
, 2011; Justino, 2014). Girls are more vulnerable in times of conflict compared to boys, when 
their labor force is required at home, or when scarce resources mean that the money is 
reallocated in favor of male children in the household (Obura, 2003).  
Further, in contexts where conflict simultaneously occurs with specific ideologies on gender 
roles, as in the case of Islamist extremist groups in Pakistan, negative effects on girls schooling 
outcomes can be observed (Khan and Seltzer, 2015). In other contexts, such as Nepal or Eritrea, 
c  fl c  had p s   v   mpac s      rls’  duca    al  pp r u     s du      h  r   v lv m       
military service, providing them e.g. with pedagogical skills (Manchanda, 2011; Hale, 2001). Yet, 
in the case of Eritrea, these educational improvements were not sustainable in post-conflict 
times, ultimately resulting in discouragement and frustration (Hale, 2001). 
International policies: CEDAW 
Another body of literature to which we pay specific attention describes the role of international 
instruments targeting the de facto status of women. Several international agreements have been 
signed in the last 30 years in order to improve the status of women, and a large body of 
l   ra ur   r  s    d s   a  l   h s   ff c s    w m  ’s  qual  y s a us fr m   h r fac  rs. S  c  
we focus on education, we specifically review the literature on the (CEDAW), which was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 1979. 13  
A  r w    b dy  f s ud  s f  ds  ha  CEDAW  x r s a p s   v   mpac     w m  ’s w lfar  s a us. 
For instance, various scholars show that CEDAW is associated with improved political, economic 
and social rights outcomes (Cole, 2013; Lupu, 2013; Simmons, 2009). Yet, only a few of them 
                                                        
 
 
12 This has been mainly shown in other dimensions such as labor force participation. Here, opportunities 
for women in paid labor due to absence of men improved female labor force participation rates (Verwimp, 
2010; Akbulut et al. 2011; Kreibaum and Klasen, 2015). 
13 Aside from addressing discrimination against girls and women in education, the convention aims at 
ending "all forms" of disadvantages women are exposed to. With ratification, states are obliged to 
implement a number of strategies to end discrimination. The monitoring process requires that states 
submit an annual report to the CEDAW committee in order to prove the progress. 
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incorporate the endogenous treaty ratification by instruments or other methods to tackle a 
potential spurious correlation (Cho, 2014; Simmons, 2009, 2010). For instance, Simmons (2009) 
finds that CEDAW exerts a positive influence on educational attainment, in addition to legal 
improvements, by using a selection equation as an instrument for treaty commitment. 14Another 
conclusion that most of these studies are drawing, regardless of the methodology they use, is 
that the effect of CEDAW hinges on the domestic preconditions or level of democracy in a 
country. Again Simmons (2010) finds largest effects for democratic regimes in a transitional 
status. In contrast, in autocratic or stable democracies, the effect seems to be smallest. Similarly, 
Cho (2014) finds an impact of the CEDAW on political and economic rights only after a certain 
level of democratic degree.15   
2.3 Data and Background 
In this section we will present the data on which the analysis on educational gender gaps is 
drawn. We also focus our attention on the instrument that is employed to tackle the endogeneity 
problem when estimating the causal impact of CEDAW on our outcome measure. 
We use an unbalanced panel of 98 countries covering the years 1981-2010, which leaves us with 
6 times periods due to five-year intervals. In fact, gender gaps in education in the group of 
‘adva c d  c   m  s’ hav  alr ady b    alm s  c mpl   ly cl s d ( . .  h     d r ra   s 
approximate the 100% benchmark for education gender parity) before our period of 
investigation. Therefore, we exclude them from the analysis.16 
As our dependent variable, we use the Barro- Lee dataset (2013) that includes information on 
the average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and over, disaggregated by gender. A 
complete overview on the data sources that have been used for testing the various theories from 
the literature section above is provided in Appendix Table 2A.2.  
                                                        
 
 
14 First, the propensity that a government is ratifying any tr a y    w m  ’s r  h s  s m d led using 
exogenous factors. In a second stage, this probability is used as an instruments for CEDAW treaty 
ratification.  
15 We also take these findings into account when estimating our analysis by testing several interaction 
terms between CEDAW and the level of democracy or the civil liberty status in a country. 
16 We also excluded 5 outliers from the analysis, namely Nepal, Haiti, Yemen, Libya and Mali, since they are 
very unusual cases, e.g. having education ratio values exceeding 100. 
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Data for the ratification of the CEDAW and for country reservations are drawn from the United 
Na    s Tr a y C ll c    . H w v r,  h  ‘qual  y’  f  h  da a     h  s        f  h  CEDAW  s qu    
different for the complier countries (Simmons, 2004). In our case, though, no country has placed 
a reservation on Article 10 of CEDAW, which lays out obligations on equality in education. 
However, 35 countries have made reservations on other major provisions, such as article 2/16, 
that could affect the right to education as applied to women and girls (UNESCO report, 2017). In 
this regard, the majority of the predominantly Islamic countries ratified the treaty with major 
reservations.17 One might be suspicious whether countries placing reservations on various 
articles are actually motivated to enforce strategies on educational equality. As this could impact 
our estimation outcomes, we account for these differences by coding our CEDAW variable with 
and without reservations in several robustness checks. 
2.3.1 Instruments- UN Human Rights Treaty Ratification 
To tackle issues of endogeneity due to omitted variables, we implement commitments to human 
rights treaties at the UN as instruments, similar to Cho (2014).18 The selected instruments are 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Torture Convention, CAT 1984), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention, GPPCG 1948), as well as the Convention against 
all Forms of Racism. The justification for this choice is that if a country signs one human rights 
treaty, it is very likely to commit to another. Regarding the exogeneity of the instruments, we 
assum   ha  UN C  v       s   a ur s m  h  b  a s   al  f a c u  ry’s     r s     human rights 
       ral ra h r  ha    duc d by w m  ’s l bby        h  c u  ry. M r  v r,     s u l k ly  ha  
the mandates of these two conventions are immediately related to gender inequality in 
education given the fact that the Torture Convention specifically focus on the problem of torture 
and the prevention of such crimes and the Genocide Convention war crimes against humanity. 
Further tests on the validity of the instruments are presented in Section 2.5, showing that our 
instruments meet well the requirements of the exclusion restriction and weak instruments tests. 
                                                        
 
 
17 While article 2 and article 16 are fundamental for the convention, for example, the latter refers to 
domestic and marriage law. 
18 Cho (2014) used the UN Convention against Torture as well as the UN Convention against genocide as 
instruments for commitments to CEDAW. 
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We also tested several alternatives to these instruments, such as interaction terms between each 
of the three abovementioned UN Conventions and different components of Mosley and Uno's 
(2007) “bas c c ll c  v ” Lab r R  h s (LR)   d x. Th s   d ca  r cap ur s,  . .,  h  ac ual  umb r 
of violations observed in the labor rights prescribed in the laws. The rationale behind this 
instrument is to measure actual enforcement of labor rights in a country. Thus, it captures 
countries that potentially ratify conventions without actually implementing the regulations.19 
This lack of enforcement in labor rights might overlap with countries that have not strictly 
implemented gender equality regulations yet and hence introduce greater heterogeneity into the 
set of countries in the instrument. However, none of these alternative interaction instruments 
between the UN treaties and different components of the LR Index turns out to be significant in 
the first stage. 20 
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics - Trends in Female-Male Ratios in Education 
We now turn to the evolution of female-male ratios in educational attainment over the last 40 
years. We use the average number of years of total schooling, a widely used measure of a 
p pula    ’s  duca     l v l (Barr  a d L  , 2013). Th s all ws  h  a  r  a      f  h  av ra   
educational attainment across different education levels and therefore enables an analysis of a 
p pula    ’s ‘s  ck  f huma  cap  al’ a  a y   v     m . Figure 2.1 below shows the evolution of 
educational attainment for men vs. women across different world regions, over the last 40 years. 
As we can see, there is generally a sharp upward trend in female-male schooling ratios towards 
parity across all regions. According to this graph, the Middle East and North African countries 
(MENA) clearly outperform all other regions by almost doubling their female-male ratios, 
whereas, Sub Saharan Africa, has a steady, continuous improvement at a slower pace.21 However, 
the global average, which is of main interest for this analysis, clearly shows a rapid increase. 
Overall, women have registered a greater rate of growth than men, as women have increased 
their average years of schooling by 0.5 years more than men did during that period. Figure 2.2 
                                                        
 
 
19 This IV interaction term should be monotone increasing in the actual enforcement of labor's rights, i.e. 
better enforcement in labor's right should result in better CEDAW enforcement. 
20 W    s   h  “prac  c  c mp     ” wh ch c v rs v  la    s    lab r r  h s    37 d ff r    ca    r  s, as 
well as the law component if specific labor laws are in place in a country (Davis and Vadlamanati, 2013). 
21 Yet, one should notice that they start from very low levels of female-male ratios of schooling to begin 
with. 
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depicts that the world average of the female-male ratio in education was already on the rise 
before the CEDAW was put into place in 1979. We will further discuss these trends in the 
following sections. 
 
Figure 2.1 Trends in female-male ratios in average years of total schooling (by regions) 
 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013), own calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Trends in CEDAW ratification and female-male ratios in average years of  
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total schooling, 1960-2010 
 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2013), own calculations 
 
2.4 Methodology 
In this section, we describe both the estimation specification and the strategy that deals with 
potential endogeneity problems.  
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy  
It turns out that the best panel specification to address our research question is to use a random 
effects model. We have run the regressions for fixed effects but specification tests (Hausman 
test) provide evidence in favor of the more efficient random effects estimator.22 Moreover, pre-
tests on panel unit roots (which are pertinent to apply before estimating random and fixed 
                                                        
 
 
22 The Hausman test is applied to help in deciding between fixed and random effect estimators under the 
null hypothesis that the time-invariant part of the error terms are not correlated with the repressors. The 
p-value of 0.149 does not reject the null hypothesis and therefore, the more efficient random effects 
estimator has been chosen. 
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effects) suggest that the presence of unit roots in our panel can be rejected at a one percent 
significance level.23 Thus, our baseline regression is estimated as follows24: 
                 
 
        
 
                          (1) 
Where EducGapit r pr s   s  h  “ ap”     duca    al a  a  m   , m asur d by  h  f v  y ars 
percent change in female-male ratios in the average years of schooling. 25Our control variables 
are partly drawn from the existing growth literature (Knowles et al., 2002; Barro and Lee, 1991) 
and include the initial level of female-mal  ra   s     duca     (   1980)    r fl c  a c u  ry’s 
stock of human capital and to test for a potential convergence effect. The latter is captured 
together with other time-invariant explanatory variables in the vector       Moreover, as an 
additional control variable, the change in years of schooling of males enters as a proxy for 
investments in human capital.26 The intercept is measured by αi, and ϵit are clustered standard 
errors at the country level. 
Th  v c  r X’i gradually introduces explanatory variables on the economic, political and 
formal/informal institution theories discussed above, which potentially explain our education 
gap, such as log(GDP), log(GDP)2, trade share, democracy, civil liberties, etc.  
 To mitigate concerns of endogeneity, we lag all of the time-varying explanatory variables by five 
y ars. Fur h rm r , r     al dumm  s, ƟR control for level differences and time- invariant, 
region-specific characteristics. δt is included in the model to capture macro shocks and absorb 
all time-specific variation that is common to all countries. Finally, to take into account region-
specific time trends,           represents a linear time trend for each region.27  
                                                        
 
 
23 The Stata command xtunitroots fisher is chosen, as we have an unbalanced panel. 
24 As a further robustness check, we implement a Hausman-Taylor model which takes into account that 
some country-specific unobservable effects are potentially correlated with some explanatory variables 
(Green, 2012). 
25 This variable captures age cohorts 25-49. 
 
27 The following regions are included in the analysis: East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), South Asia (SA), 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA). The left out-category is Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
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Turning to the second specification, we further introduce the CEDAW variable- our main 
variable of interest- for which we claim to establish a causal relationship: 
                               
 
        
 
         
                                                                                                                                               (2) 
The variable CEDAWi (t-5) indicates the duration of years since a country has ratified the CEDAW. 
This measure, the number of years after ratification, has been employed by other studies testing 
the impact on w m  ’s r  h s (Haf  r-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). Yet, possible drawbacks of this 
method are that we implicitly assume that ratification to the CEDAW increases linearly year by 
year, which may not be the case. Possibly, the effect comes into play several years after the 
ratification.28 Therefore, we overcome this problem by lagging this variable by five years. This 
specification recognizes that there might be no immediate impact of signing the CEDAW on 
education outcomes, but, rather, the effect might happen with a certain delay due to 
bureaucratic, logistic or political procedures. In addition, the CEDAW variable is included with 
a d w  h u  r s rva    s     ak       acc u   var a    s     h  qual  y  f a c u  ry’s 
ratification.29 This is of specific concern in our case, since the majority of countries, especially in 
the MENA region (which shows rapid improvements in education), has placed reservations on 
their commitment to CEDAW. 
2.4.2 Potential Sources of Endogeneity 
We further assume that Cov(CEDAW i(t-5), ϵit) ≠0, wh ch p      ally r sul s    a    c  s s     
estimator of β. There are various reasons for this assumption. For instance, it might be possible 
 ha  h  h    d r    qual  y     duca       duc s w m  ’s m v m   s to lobby or push for the 
CEDAW to be ratified in a country (Cov>0). Alternatively, countries with a higher level of 
w m  ’s  duca     may b  m r  l k ly    ra  fy  h  CEDAW c  v       b caus   h s  c u  r  s 
can more easily meet the respective obligations (Cov<0).  To measure an average causal 
treatment effect of CEDAW on our education gap, we exploit exogenous variation in CEDAW 
                                                        
 
 
28 On the other hand, if the effect could be stronger right after ratification of the Convention due to 
increased public awareness. 
29 The CEDAW allows countries to place reservations on specific articles. An overview of countries which 
mad  r s rva    s    ar  cl  2/16 (wh ch   clud  w m  ’s r  h s     duca    ) ca  b  f u d     h  
Appendix.  
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which is generated by commitment to three other human right treaties. This relationship is 
measured by estimating a linear regression of the endogenous regressor on the instrument: 
                                                              CEDAW i (t-5) = π0 + π1 Z i (t-5)                                                  (3) 
The first stage in equation (3) includes CEDAW as the dependent variable, measured by duration 
(in years) since ratification of the CEDAW; Z reflects the instruments measured by the duration 
(in years) since ratification to the other three UN conventions. Then the outcome is regressed on 
the predicted value of our endogenous variable, CEDAW duration.  
                                 
 
        
 
           
                                                                                                                           (4) 
A second source of endogeneity relates to the question of whether treaty ratification causes 
improvements in outcomes or whether the correlation between the CEDAW ratification and 
improved education outcomes is driven by a third omitted factor. F r   s a c ,  m    d w m  ’s 
rights movements or advocacy groups in a country might push both, the CEDAW ratification and 
laws to improve female education outcomes at the same time.30 
There might also be a concern about other omitted variables. For instance, in the course of a 
c u  ry’s d v l pm   , fac  rs such as d m cra  za    , m d r ization and demographic 
changes could have affected gender equality outcomes and CEDAW commitment simultaneously. 
However, we try to capture these trends in our analysis by including a bunch of control 
variables, such as civil liberties or the democracy index of Freedom House (2014), to keep track 
 f a d ad qua  ly m asur  a c u  ry’s d m cracy a d m d r  za     pr  r ss. 
2.4.3 Monotonicity of the Instrument 
Given heterogeneity across countries in the effect of CEDAW on education gaps, the 
identification of an average treatment effect requires monotonicity of the CEDAW variable with 
respect to the instrument (Angrist and Evans, 2004).  However, it is very unlikely that countries 
who sign to UN treatments and would deny ratifying the CEDAW, as human rights issues are 
                                                        
 
 
30 Finally, the endogeneity test after xtivreg rejects the null hypothesis that the CEDAW coefficient is 
exogenous with a p-value of 0.002 (Baum et al., 2003). 
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already on the agenda. More problematic are cases such as Saudi Arabia, a country which ratified 
the CEDAW under the condition of major reservations. However, given that it is difficult to 
imagine a considerable amount of defiers in our sample, we argue that our instrument satisfies 
the necessary monotonicity assumption.  
To this end, we imply an informal test to show that our instrument is indeed monotone. 
According to Angrist and Imbens (1995), the cumulative density function (CDF) of the treatment 
wh    h    s rum     s “sw  ch d   ” sh uld l   b l w  h  CDF  f  h   r a ment if the 
  s rum     s “sw  ch d  ff”. I    h r w rds,  h  CDF  f  h   r a m     f  h    s rum     s 
switched on should first-order stochastically dominate the distribution of the treatment if the 
instrument is switched off.  
As the ratification to the three UN treaties is not binary, we look at below and above the median 
of the duration in ratification to the UN commitments. 
Both Figures in 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that the distribution of CEDAW ratification for countries 
which ratify UN treaties clearly dominates the CDF of those who did not ratify in our sample. 
Therefore, our instruments fulfill the required monotonicity assumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 CDF’s  f CEDAW ra  f ca     f r ab v  a d b l w m d a  UN treaty ratification 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 CDF’s of CEDAW ratification for top & bottom 25 Percent UN treaty 
ratification 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
2.5 Regression Results 
2.5.1 Baseline Results 
Before turning to the CEDAW variable, Table 2.1 presents our baseline results from the random 
effects model and demonstrates which factors are associated with the change in education 
outcomes. 
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W  always c   r l f r a c u  ry’s      al f male-male ratio, the stock of human capital, civil 
liberties and fertility; at the same time we include gradually the factors of the various theories 
discussed earlier (in column 2-8)  in order to test their influences on gender gaps in education 
outcomes. Hence, the last column (column 9) includes all variables from column (1)-(8).31 
Economic Factors 
Column (1) focuses on the hypothesis on economic development testing for non-linearities, and 
we can see that GDP per capita income enters convexly in the first column. The shape of this 
relationship basically indicates that, as income increases up to a level of about $5,671 per capita 
(PPP adjusted), there is no tendency of female education to increase faster than male education. 
After this threshold, however, there is a strong tendency to catch up. In other words, if a country 
moves from a lower-middle income economy to an upper-middle income economy (according to 
World Bank categories), we can see fast improvements in female-male ratios in education. This 
result differs from a study by Dollar and Gatti(1999) who estimated a lower threshold at around 
$2000. Yet,  they used a different outcome measure- female with some secondary schooling 
attainment- which excludes people who achieved more than secondary education. There is a 
considerable number of developing countries in our sample with a growing share of males and 
females with more than secondary education. Thus, our measure is able to take into account 
these improvements which potentially results in a higher threshold. 
Social Institutions 
In column (4), we test the determinants of social institutions on our education gap, based on the 
hypothesis discussed above. Only the absence of inheritance rights seems to be positively 
associated with education outcomes. Recall that we take the proporti    f a c u  ry’s 
population with ancestors without inheritance rules for land and formal regulations. The 
absence of these discriminating juridical practices against women with regard to legal property 
and the distribution of land seems to be highly correlated with improvements in our education 
gap measure. 
We test various other hypotheses on social institutions in Appendix Table 2A.5. For instance, the 
pr p r      f a c u  ry’s a c s  rs w  h pa r l cal p s -marital in contrast to matrilocal 
residence rules as this might shape parents’ decisions to invest in female education as outlined 
                                                        
 
 
31 F r  h  r ad r’s c  v     c , w    ly sh w  h  c  ff c    s  f     r s     Tabl  2.1. The full 
specifications are displayed in the Appendix starting from Table A 2.1.  
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above. However, the coefficient turns out to not be statistically significant. Also, family patterns 
do not seem to be correlated with our education outcome variables, as the coefficient of nuclear 
families vs. extended families is not statistically significant.  
Turning to the control variables, the negative and statistically significant impact of the initial 
female-male ratio points to a convergence effect. Countries which start off at a lower level of 
their initial education gap tend to close their education gap faster than countries which have 
already higher gender equality in education at the very beginning. The proxy for investments in 
human capital, the change in male education, is negatively, but insignificantly correlated with 
our education gap measure in all specifications. 
Surprisingly, other formal institutional variables added to the model as controls, such as the 
level of democracy and civil liberties, as well as fertility, are not significantly correlated with our 
outcome variable of interest. 
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Table 2.1 Baseline results (random effects model) 
 
Dependent Variable: Female-male ratio in educational attainment 
 
VARIABLES 
(1)  
Growth 
(2)  
Structural 
Transformation 
(3)  
          Globalization 
(4)  
Informal Institutions 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c) 
-7.772** 
(3.318) 
-7.390* 
(4.010) 
-7.495* 
(3.995) 
-8.074** 
(3.847) 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c)2 
0.441** 
(0.190) 
0.426** 
(0.215) 
0.436** 
(0.215) 
0.468** 
(0.208) 
Lagged Agr. Sector value added (% of GDP)  
-1.338 
(5.447) 
-1.432 
(5.442) 
-1.537 
(5.409) 
Lagged Service sector value added (% of 
GDP)1 
 
1.449 
(3.052) 
2.096 
(3.035) 
1.910 
(2.985) 
Lagged Trade share (% of GDP)   
-0.00687 
(0.00657) 
-0.00557 
(0.00633) 
Absence of inheritance rights    
1.927*** 
(0.737) 
Year FE, regional dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional specific time trends included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 536 536 
Countries 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 
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Table 2.1 continued: (5)         (6) (7)           (8) (9) 
VARIABLES         Conflict    Religion Development Aid   Women’s Activism CEDAW 
Protestant2  6.343**    
  (2.975)    
Hindu  0.517    
  (2.791)    
Muslim  -2.104    
  (1.745)    
Other Christian  -3.276    
  (2.650)    
Years of interstate conflict  -0.0763***     
 (0.0285)     
Lagged Net ODA share (% GDP)   
0.00228 
(0.0393) 
  
W m  ‘s CSO participation    -0.195  
    (0.481)  
Lagged CEDAW duration     0.223*** 
     (0.0644) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional specific time trends included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 466 508 536 
Countries 98 98 89 93 98 
R-squared 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.51 
Dependent Variable: Female-male ratio in educational attainment. Clustered-robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. All time-varying independent variables are lagged by 5 years. 1Base group: lagged industrial sector value added (% GDP). 2Base-group religion: Catholics. 
Control variables included in all specifications: Absolute change in male education, lagged ln(fertility), initial female-male ratio in 1980, civil liberties, lagged ln(GDP 
p.c), lagged ln(GDP p.c)2.  
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Column (6) adds variables on religious preferences and we find that only the coefficient of the 
share of Protestants in a country is positively associated with a faster closing of our female-male 
ratio.32 In contrast, increases in years of interstate conflict are negatively correlated with 
improvements in our female-male ratio. Thus, the negative relationship found in several micro 
level studies reviewed above (Justino, 2011) is still visible at the aggregated level. 
Mor  v r,  ur m asur s f r d v l pm    a d (c lum  7) a d w m  ’s ac  v sm (c lum  8),  . . 
the participation of women in civil society organizations, have no consistent relationship with 
the education outcome variable. This is actually surprising, given that various anecdotal and 
 mp r cal m cr  l v l  v d  c  p    s     mpr v m   s  hr u h w m  ’s ac  v sm a d l bby sm 
(Weldon and Htun, 2013). Furthermore, years of civil conflict do not seem to be associated with 
the closing of the gap as well as political empowerment, measured by the share of females in 
parliament.  
2.5.2 CEDAW Ratification 
Finally, we turn to our main variable of interest in column (9), CEDAW, which depicts a strong 
positive association with the education gap with a five-y ar la . A c u  ry’s ratification is 
associated with a 0.202 percentage point increase in the change of the female-male ratio of total 
schooling, on average.  
However, the positive effect of CEDAW vanishes for total schooling after we address the 
endogeneity concern, as discussed in depth in Section 2.3. After applying our instruments, the 
CAT Convention, the Convention against all Forms of Racism and the Convention against 
Genocide, the results in Table 2.3 show that the positive effect disappears for total schooling, as 
well secondary schooling in the second stage. Yet, the positive coefficient in the second column 
points to a weakly positive correlation (at a 10% significance level) between our education gap 
measure and cohorts with average years of primary schooling. By the fifth year, a CEDAW 
commitment accounts for a 0.18 percentage point increase in the female-male ratio. One 
potential explanation of this heterogeneity is that signing of CEDAW is more important for lower 
levels of education, since after passing a certain education threshold, other factors might become 
more important. For instance, the change in secondary and tertiary education might be 
dependent on labor market opportunities, family background or child care system in a country, 
                                                        
 
 
32 Seguino (2003) suggests to control for degree of religiosity rather than the share in the population. 
However, the data he uses do not contain sufficient time periods to test for degree of religiosity. 
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which are not captured in our analysis. Similar to Cho (2014), we further test if the effect of 
commitments to CEDAW varies by other factors, such as the level of democracy. Yet, the 
interaction effects between democracy (or alternatively, the degree of civil liberties) and 
CEDAW commitment are not significant in our case (Appendix Table 2A.4). Anecdotal evidence 
also hints at   h r fac  rs b s d s   s   u    al qual  y, such as w m  ’s r  h s m v m   s 
which are necessary preconditions to effectively push and advocate human rights norms in a 
specific country. However, we are constrained      s      h  hyp  h s s    w m  ’s m v m   s 
due to data availability in terms of sufficient time periods. 
Regarding our instruments, we test for under-identification (weak instruments) using the 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test and over-identification (endogenous instruments) using 
Ha s  ’s J-test (Hansen, 1982).  The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic is in all cases >= 10, 
rejecting that our instruments are weak.33 More specific, the F-statistic with 18.36 is above the 
Stock and Yogo critical value threshold of 13.91, meaning that the IV bias should be less than 5%. 
We also can't reject the null hypothesis that there is no over-identification for all three UN-
treaties, indicating that our set of instruments is appropriate (Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2 CEDAW ratification: Instrumental variable estimation-first stage 
 
First Stage –  
Instruments 
(1) 
Total 
Schooling 
(2) 
Primary 
Schooling 
(3) 
Secondary 
Schooling 
(4) 
Tertiary 
Schooling 
Lagged Torture Convention (CAT) 
0.312*** 
(0.061) 
0.278*** 
(0.0562) 
0.313*** 
(0.0608) 
0.307*** 
(0.0587) 
Lagged Genocide Convention 
(GPPCG) 
0.065*** 
(0.0132) 
0.066*** 
(0.014) 
0.065*** 
(0.012) 
0.113*** 
(0.013) 
Lagged Convention against all Forms 
of Racism 
0.083*** 
(0.0245) 
0.096*** 
(0.0244) 
0.081*** 
(0.0231) 
0.113*** 
(0.022) 
Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
(Weak instruments) 
18.71 
 
16.67 
 
15.09 
 
47.07 
 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic, 
Overidentification test: p-value 
0.657 0.128 0.254 0.535 
                                                        
 
 
33 We use this test statistic since we implement robust clustered standard errors (Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman ,2007). 
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Dep. Variable: lagged ratification of CEDAW (in years). Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All control variables and explanatory variables included as in Baseline, 
Table 10. 
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Table 2.3 CEDAW ratification: Instrumental variable estimation- second stage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total Education Primary Education Secondary Education Tertiary Education 
Lagged CEDAW duration 0.151 0.176* 0.0895 -0.260 
 (0.110) (0.106) (0.211) (0.341) 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c.) -7.649** -7.755* -2.526 9.074 
 (3.739) (4.326) (8.098) (11.00) 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c.)2 0.453** 0.457* 0.149 -0.422 
 (0.207) (0.241) (0.441) (0.645) 
Lagged agr. sector value added (% of GDP) -2.945 -0.663 7.112 0.305 
 (4.465) (4.816) (8.643) (9.576) 
Lagged service sector value added (% of GDP) 1.248 3.366 -1.950 -5.757 
 (3.178) (3.783) (5.817) (8.186) 
Years of interstate conflict -0.0973*** -0.0720* -0.0786 -0.236* 
 (0.0333) (0.0375) (0.0698) (0.131) 
Protestant 5.587* 4.924 13.71** 19.03*** 
 (3.136) (3.244) (6.773) (6.038) 
Hindu 1.728 2.478 1.411 -10.30 
 (3.130) (2.285) (6.551) (7.392) 
Muslim  -1.380 -1.103 0.340 -1.433 
 (1.681) (1.842) (3.145) (3.630) 
Absence of inheritance rights 2.801*** 3.071*** 2.204 1.286 
 (1.038) (1.032) (1.924) (2.533) 
Constant 40.51** 39.26** 17.64 -16.40 
 (17.02) (19.09) (37.69) (46.27) 
Observations 536 536 536 536 
Countries 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.52 0.58 0.3 0.2 
Dependent Variable: (1) Female-male ratio in educational attainment. : (2) Female-male ratio in primary educational attainment. (3) Female-male ratio in secondary educational 
attainment. Clustered-robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All time-varying independent variables are lagged by 5 years. Base-group 
religion: Catholics. The following variables are included: Initial female-male ratio in 1980, lagged fertility, civil liberties, absolute change in male education, trade share.
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W  c  s d r  h   s  ma  d  ff c s  f CEDAW     h  pr v  us s c     as “l cal”     h  s  s   ha  
they are identifying the effect for a specific population of countries, i.e. those whose CEDAW 
ratification responds to UN treaties participation. More specific, the LATE measures a causal 
effect for the specific part of our sample whose treatment is shifted by the instrument, the 
compliers (according to Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In our context, this includes only countries 
whose CEDAW ratification changes with commitment to the three UN treaties discussed 
before.34   
In the following, we systematically explore and rule out possible concerns which potentially 
violate a causal interpretation of our estimate β. These potential concerns can be categorized 
into three broad groups: 1) Omission of time trends 2) Endogenous timing of CEDAW ratification 
3) Sample size and omitted variables. Each of these concerns will be addressed in the next 
subsections. 
2.6 Robustness Check 
2.6.1 Placebo Test: Omission of Time Trends?  
We also address a concern raised by Chilton (2016) that improvements in human rights 
outcomes have simply coincided with the adoption of human rights treaties, rather than caused 
it. It has been criticized that past literature overlooked the long-running rends hat human rights 
had already improved long before the treaty regimes were put into place. They argue that the 
positive correlation that has been found in various studies between treaty ratification and 
human rights outcomes (e.g. Simmons, 2004, 2009) has actually little to do with the fact that a 
country ratified a given treaty. We thereby follow Chilton (2016), who shows via running several 
placebo tests that the positive effect of the CEDAW ratification on the Gender Equality Index 
                                                        
 
 
34 In contrast, we might have countries who will sign to CEDAW regardless of their participation in UN 
treaties (always takers) and countries who will not sign to CEDAW regardless of their UN treaty 
participation (never takers). Thus, we cannot claim to draw any conclusions of the impact of CEDAW on 
education gaps for those countries. 
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(GEI) persists in the majority of simulations, despite the ratification years being randomly 
generated.35 
We apply these placebo tests to our specification, by randomly assigning the duration of years 
since the CEDAW was ratified and repeated the regression specification 1,000 times.  
In contrast to the study of Chilton (2016) mentioned above, our coefficients are statistically 
different from zero in less than 5% of the simulations (see Appendix, Figure 2A.1). Thus, the 
results suggest that our model specification does not suffer from any biases due to the omission 
of time trends.  
2.6.2 Is the timing of CEDAW ratification endogenous? 
A further concern is the potential endogenous timing of the CEDAW ratification. We address the 
p      al  ssu   ha    v r m   s’ d c s   s    s    ar  a r sul   f alr ady  mpr v d f mal  
education outcomes rather than a consequence. Figure 2.5 shows that there is an almost equal 
proportion of countries with high and low female-male ratios in education in the year in which 
the country ratified the CEDAW. The female-male education ratio is less than 88% for half of the 
sample. This contradicts the argument of endogeneity of timing of the CEDAW ratification 
because not only countries who have already achieved high female-male ratios ratified the 
CEDAW. 
 
Figure 2.5 Female-male ratios in education in the year of the CEDAW ratification 
 
                                                        
 
 
35 For instance, if a country ratified the CEDAW in 1999, our test would suggest a positive, significant 
relationship regardless of the country being coded as having committed to CEDAW on 1981, 2005 or any 
other time.  
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2.6.3 Robustness to Sample Size and further Controls 
We undertake several re-estimations of the baseline regression using different sample sizes and 
additional controls to mitigate concerns on omitted factors in random effect models. 
First, regions which already started with a considerably high level of equality in education levels, 
such as the Latin American countries and Europe and Central Asia, are excluded from the 
analysis.36 S c  d, w    clud  add     al c   r l var abl s such as a   v r m   ’s  xp  diture 
on education, as well as oil rents. The latter should partly account for specific dynamics in the 
MENA region. Various studies have shown that in some cases, wealth generated by oil rents has 
weakened institutions which could in turn affect gender equality outcomes. The results in 
Appendix Table 2A.8, c lum  (1) d splay  ha ,     r s    ly,   clud    a   v r m   ’s 
expenditure on education lowers the magnitude of our CEDAW variable. Possibly, governments 
who ratified the CEDAW show their commitment by spending a higher share of public financing 
on education which points to a potential channel. Overall, the results of the subsections above 
confirm that our findings are robust in terms of significance and direction of the effect against a 
variety of robustness checks. 
                                                        
 
 
36 Regression results are available upon request. 
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2.7 Limitations of the Study 
Before turning to the implications of the regression results, we will discuss several limitations of 
this analysis.  
First, we acknowledge that we do not account for several possibly influential factors, such as 
national strategies and programs towards female education, since we are constrained by data 
availability. Various national policies such as cash transfer programs and other school programs 
are implemented on a large scale in many regions of the world to improv    rls’ sch  l    
(Klasen, 2016). Second, we cannot draw any conclusions on the pathways through which 
CEDAW is improving primary educational attainment of women. This would be interesting work 
for future research. Other studies conducted on human rights outcomes mention possible 
channels such as increased public expenditures (governmental supply side), or increased 
awareness and change in the behavior of local communities; or increased pressure of the 
international community (Gray, Kittison, 2013). We expect that global pressures on 
governments may be one of the primary factors related to the magnitude and success of 
domestic efforts to reduce education inequalities. 
Third, a further concern is that we look at education outcomes rather than improvements in 
access to education. For instance, a study by Simmons (2004) finds that enrollment rates 
improve after CEDAW ratification for primary education and tertiary education. Possibly, a high 
number of drop-out rates in schooling might explain that the significant increase in enrollment 
rates does not translate into higher years of secondary or tertiary education in our analysis. 
Lastly, an alternative explanation of our insignificant result is that we only pick up the effect of 
habitual convention signers due to the selection of our instrument.37 Finally, we also cannot 
make any predictions if this positive trend in education will be persistent in the future, as one 
might expect a possible male backlash as for example in the US. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The goal of this paper is to provide empirical results on the recent closing of the gender gap in 
education, particularly for developing countries. Secondly, we specifically focus on the role of 
international policies targeting inequality in education, namely the CEDAW, where we attempt 
to establish a causal link with our education gap outcome variable. While doing so, we addressed 
                                                        
 
 
37 However, we lack again sufficient data to test this hypothesis. 
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methodological issues, raised in recent literature on the effects of international human rights 
treaties.  
Overall, the findings of this panel analysis suggest that economic growth, religion (the share of 
Protestants in a country), social institutions in terms of absence of inheritance rights, as well as 
fewer years of interstate conflict are associated with rapid improvements in female education 
outcomes over the last 30 years. With respect to economic growth, our results suggest that there 
is little tendency for countries to improve their education gap unless they move from low-
income to middle-income economies, which is associated with a faster closing of the gap. Hence, 
policies that promote growth in per capita income will generally lead to higher gender equality 
in education (despite evidence in literature that growth alone is not sufficient to improve gender 
gaps in general (Bertocci, 2013; Duflo, 2012). Moreover, other factors that we tested, such as 
formal institutions in terms of civil liberties and degree of democracy, show no association with 
convergence in education outcomes between males and females.  
Methodologically, the analysis confirms the importance of controlling for potential endogeneity 
due to omitted variable bias. The baseline results suggest that education gaps, on average, 
 mpr v d wh   a c u  ry’s   v r m    ra  f  d  h  CEDAW a d a plac bo test confirms that 
these positive findings are not driven by the omission of time trends. However, the statistically 
significant effect of the CEDAW does not hold for total schooling after correcting for endogeneity 
through IV-estimation. Yet, we do find that female-male ratios in primary education improve by 
0.18 percentage points after five years of CEDAW ratification. This result suggests that an 
    r a    al l  al c mm  m    d  s m   va   a   v r m   ’s  ff r s   wards pr mary 
educational achievement for women. 
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2.9 Appendix 
Table 2A.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
CEDAW      
CEDAW duration 10.875 8.978 0 30 
CEDAW duration (with reservations) 7.763 9.152 0 30 
Instruments     
Genocide duration (years) 22.717 21.043 0 61 
CAT duration (years) 5.962 7.189 0 24 
Convention against Racism     
Dependent Variables:     
Change in female-male ratio in education: (total 
schooling) 
6.205 7.832 -15.867 39.511 
Primary education 5.291 7.937 -18.236 41.761 
Secondary education 7.745 11.604 -23.886 83.523 
Tertiary education 13.81 16.263 -16.696 98.38 
Economic factors     
ln (GDP p.c.) 8.305 1.090 5.909 11.648 
ln (GDP p.c.)2 70.161 18.435 34.916 135.678 
Agric. sector value added (% GDP)  0.171 0.136 0.0004 0.7002 
Industrial sector value added (% GDP) 0.316 0.118 0.081 0.785 
Service sector value added 0.513 0.115 0.101 0.811 
Trade share (% GDP) 79.711 46.745 12.678 372.099 
Initial female-male ratio 0.688 0.275 0.168 1.426 
Change in male education 0.497 0.447 -.942 2.264 
ln (fertility) 1.202 0.497 0.073 2.114 
Oil rents (% GDP) 10.635 20.831 0 78.931 
Total education expenditures (%GDP) 4.261 1.849 1.004 14.79 
Political factors     
Civil liberties 3.905 1.589 1 7 
Democracy index 5.603 3.031 0 10 
Social institutions     
Absence of inheritance rights 0.168 0.293 0 0.999 
Nuclear families 0.293 0.343 0 1 
Patrilocal society 0.744 0.348 0 1 
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Plow 0.479 0.458 0 1 
Religion     
Protestant 0.080 0.104 0 0.493 
Hindu 0.019 0.089 0 0.771 
Muslim 0.258 0.351 0 0.991 
Catholic 0.290 0.334 0 0.943 
Other Christian 0.100 0.133 0 0.634 
Conflict     
Years of civil conflict 8.576 16.187 0 105 
Years of interstate conflict 3.496 5.914 0 35 
Development Aid     
Net ODA share (% GDP) 6.703 10.612 -0.186 127.280 
Net ODA share (% Government expenditure) 28.499 56.636 -0.973 522.703 
Women’s activism     
W m  ‘s CSO participation 0.928 0.931 -2.079 2.79 
Share of women in parliament 13.18 8.800 0 56.3 
N 498    
Table 2A.2 Data Sources and Description 
 
Variable Explanation Source 
CEDAW duration in years 
Duration of CEDAW ratification in 
years 
United Nations Treaty 
Collection 
http://treaties.un.org// 
Genocide duration (years) 
Duration of Genocide ratification in 
years 
United Nations Treaty 
Collection 
http://treaties.un.org// 
CAT duration (years) Duration of CAT ratification in years 
United Nations Treaty 
Collection 
http://treaties.un.org// 
Convention against all Forms of 
Racism 
Duration of ratification to the 
Convention against all Forms of 
Racism(in years) 
United Nations Treaty 
Collection 
http://treaties.un.org// 
CEDAW duration (with 
reservations) 
Commitments to the CEDAW: time 
after ratification in years,  signed 
with reservations  
United Nations Treaty 
Collection 
http://treaties.un.org// 
Change in female-male ratio in 
education 
P rc    cha       a c u  ry’s  
female-male ratio *100 
Barro and Lee(2013) 
Ln (GDP p.c) 
Log of per capita GDP in constant 
prices (US$, PPP, base year:2005) 
Penn World Tables(2017, 
Version 8.1) 
Ln (GDP p.c)2 
Log of per capita GDP in constant 
prices (US$, PPP, base year:2005) 
squared 
Penn World Tables(2017, 
Version 8.1) 
Agric. sector value added (% 
GDP)  
Agric. sector valued added divided 
by total value added (% GDP) 
United Nation Statistics 
Database(2017) 
Industrial sector value added (% 
GDP) 
Industrial Sector valued added 
divided by total value added (% 
GDP) 
United Nation Statistics 
Database(2017) 
Service sector value added (% 
GDP) 
Service sector valued added divided 
by total value added (% GDP) 
United Nation Statistics 
Database(2017) 
Trade openness (% GDP) 
% of the sum of exports and imports 
in GDP 
World Development 
Indicators(2007) 
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Initial female-male ratio 
I    al l v l  f a c u  ry’s f mal -
male ratio  in 1980 
Barro and Lee(2013) 
Change in male education 
Percent change in male education of 
cohorts 25-49 years 
Barro and Lee(2013) 
Ln (fertility) 
Log of total fertility rate (births per 
woman) 
World Development 
Indicators(2007) 
Civil liberties 
Civil liberties. Scored: 1=most free 
and 7=least free 
Freedom House(2015) 
Democracy index 
Combined democracy measure. 
Scored: 1=least free  and 10=most 
free 
Freedom House(2015) 
Absence of inheritance rights 
Shar    f  c u  ry’s p pula      w  h  
ancestral   absence   of inheritance  
rights  of real property (land). 
Alesina et al.(2013) 
Nuclear family structure 
Shar   f a c u  ry’s p pula     w  h 
ancestral nuclear family structure 
Alesina et al.(2013) 
Extended family structure 
Shar   f a c u  ry’s p pula     w  h 
ancestral extended family structure 
Alesina et al.(2013) 
Patrilocal societies 
Shar   f a c u  ry’s p pula     w  h 
ancestral patrilocal societal 
structures. Equals 1 if patrilocal 
society. 
Alesina et al.(2013) 
Matrilocal societies 
Shar   f a c u  ry’s p pula     w  h 
ancestral matrilocal societal 
structures. Equals 1 if matrilocal 
society. 
Alesina et al.(2013) 
Plow 
Shar   f a c u  ry’s p pula      
with  ancestors that practiced plow 
agriculture. 
Alesina et al.(2013) 
Religious share  in 1980:   
Protestant 
% of share of Protestants in total 
population 
La Porta et al.(1999) 
Hindu 
% of share of Hindu in total 
population 
La Porta et al.(1999) 
Muslim 
% of share of Muslim in total 
population 
La Porta et al.(1999) 
Catholic 
% of share of Hindu in total 
population 
La Porta et al.(1999) 
Other Christian 
% of share of other Christians in 
total population 
La Porta et al.(1999) 
Years of civil conflict 
Number   of   years a country was 
involved in civil conflict. Original 
source: Correlates of War Database 
Version 4 
Correlates of War database 
Years of interstate conflict 
Number   of   years a country was 
involved in interstate conflict.   
Original source: Correlates of War 
Database version 4. 
Correlates of War database 
Net ODA share (% GDP) 
Net ODA received by country (% of 
GNI) 
World Development 
Indicators(2007) 
Net ODA share (% Government 
expenditure) 
Net ODA received as % of central 
government expense 
World Development 
Indicators(2007) 
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Share of women in parliament 
Proportion of seats held by women 
in national parliaments (%) 
World Development 
Indicators(2007) 
W m  ‘s CSO participation 
Question: Are women prevented 
from participating in civil society 
organizations (CSOs)? Ranked as: 
0: Almost always 
1: Frequently. 
2: About half the time. 
3: Rarely. 
4: Almost never. 
Variety of democracy(2015) 
Collective Labor rights , law 
elements 
Standardized values of collective 
labor rights. Higher values (0-7), 
more violations. 
Collective Labor Rights 
dataset 
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Table 2A.3 Full-sample - Baseline results of the random effects model investigating female-male ratios in educational attainment (1980-2010) 
 
VARIABLES 
           (1) 
Growth 
(2) 
Structural Transformation 
(3) 
Globalization 
     (4) 
  Informal Institutions 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c) 
-7.772** 
(3.318) 
-7.390* 
(4.010) 
-7.495* 
(3.995) 
-8.074** 
(3.847) 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c)2 
0.441** 
(0.190) 
0.426** 
(0.215) 
0.436** 
(0.215) 
0.468** 
(0.208) 
Lagged agr. sector value added (% of GDP)  
-1.338 
(5.447) 
-1.432 
(5.442) 
-1.537 
(5.409) 
Lagged service sector value added (% of GDP)  
1.449 
(3.052) 
2.096 
(3.035) 
1.910 
(2.985) 
Lagged trade share (% of GDP)   
-0.00687 
(0.00657) 
-0.00557 
(0.00633) 
Absence of inheritance rights    
1.927*** 
(0.737) 
Initial female-male ratio 1980 
-13.50*** 
(2.029) 
-13.47*** 
(2.073) 
-13.28*** 
(2.075) 
-13.79*** 
(2.162) 
Absolute change in male education 
-1.158 
(0.811) 
-1.118 
(0.848) 
-1.100 
(0.835) 
-1.047 
(0.837) 
Civil Liberties (Freedom House) 
0.299 
(0.208) 
0.238 
(0.217) 
0.249 
(0.218) 
0.192 
(0.223) 
Lagged ln (fertility) 
1.592 
(1.415) 
1.462 
(1.428) 
1.492 
(1.445) 
1.208 
(1.394) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional specific time trends included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 536 536 
Countries 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 
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Table A 2.3. continued: 
VARIABLES 
       (5) 
 Conflict 
(6) 
Religion 
(7) 
Development Aid 
(8) 
Women`s Activism 
Lagged ln  (GDP p.c) -8.427** -5.909 -10.92** -9.541** 
 (4.024) (3.837) (4.907) (4.798) 
Lagged ln  (GDP p.c)2 0.506** 0.340* 0.660** 0.568** 
 (0.214) (0.206) (0.275) (0.271) 
Protestant  6.343** 6.390* 6.143** 
  (2.975) (3.539) (3.080) 
Hindu  0.517 -0.875 0.109 
  (2.791) (2.693) (2.923) 
Muslim  -2.104 -2.537 -2.181 
  (1.745) (1.806) (1.824) 
Other Christian  -3.276 -5.912 -3.425 
  (2.650) (3.847) (2.622) 
Initial female-male ratio -13.52*** -13.91*** -13.67*** -13.42*** 
 (1.838) (2.193) (2.178) (2.036) 
Civil Liberties 0.313 0.377* 0.260 0.369* 
 (0.217) (0.225) (0.258) (0.208) 
Years of interstate conflict -0.0763***  -0.0815* -0.0531* 
 (0.0285)  (0.0421) (0.0290) 
Lagged Net ODA share (% GDP)   
0.00228 
(0.0393) 
 
Women‘s CSO participation    -0.195 
    (0.481) 
Constant 
40.89** 
(19.80) 
 
34.56* 
(19.92) 
64.94*** 
(19.92) 
49.13** 
(19.92) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional specific time trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 466 508 
Countries 98 98 89 93 
R-squared 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 
Dependent Variable: Female-male ratio in educational attainment. Clustered-robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
* p<0.1. All time-varying independent variables are lagged by 5 years. Base-group religion: Catholics. Controls included: Absolute Change in male education, 
 lagged ln(fertility), lagged agric. sector value added (% of GDP),  lagged service sector, sector value added (% of GDP), lagged ind. sector value added (% of  GDP).
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Table 2A.4 CEDAW specifications, random effects model /with reservations /second stage 
 
 (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES 
Full Sample 
CEDAW 
CEDAW with 
Reservations 
Second Stage 
Primary 
Education 
Lagged CEDAW duration  0.223*** 0.103* 0.168* 
 (0.0644) (0.0560) (0.101) 
Ln (GDP p.c.) -8.258** -6.563* -7.620 
 (3.796) (3.900) (4.756) 
Ln (GDP p.c.)2 0.495** 0.383* 0.448* 
 (0.207) (0.210) (0.263) 
Lagged agr. sector value added (% of GDP) -3.088 -3.140 -0.512 
 (4.473) (4.758) (5.047) 
Lagged service sector value added (% of GDP) 1.285 -0.259 3.428 
 (3.133) (3.240) (3.714) 
Initial female-male ratio  -14.85*** -14.88*** -14.79*** 
 (2.207) (2.345) (2.267) 
Trade share -0.00538 -0.00803 -.0028 
 (0.00627) (0.00679) (0.0066) 
Civil liberties 0.326 0.211 0.407 
 (0.217) (0.235) (0.231) 
Lagged log(fertility) 2.218 1.006 2.180 
 (1.487) (1.464) (1.574) 
Male change in education -0.841 -0.0270 -0.432 
 (0.813) (0.833) (0.767) 
Years of interstate conflict  -0.110*** -0.0708** -0.0389* 
 (0.0314) (0.0302) (0. 028) 
Protestant 5.224 7.512** 4.430 
 (3.223) (3.656) (3.170) 
Hindu 2.527 0.363 2.007 
 (2.954) (3.005) (2.082) 
Muslim -1.125 -1.129 -0.930 
 (1.679) (1.881) (1.980) 
Other Christian -0.0401 -4.290 -1.320 
 (2.731) (4.037) (2.723) 
Absence of inheritance rights 2.968*** 2.918*** 3.019*** 
 (1.028) (1.076) (0.9629) 
Constant 41.81** 31.25** 37.66* 
 (17.63) (15.39) (20.67) 
Year FE included Yes Yes Yes 
Regional specific time trends included Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 536 
Number of id 98 98 98 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Dependent Variable: Female-male ratio in educational attainment. Clustered-robust standard errors at the country 
level in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All time varying independent variables are lagged by 5 years. 1Base 
group: lagged industrial sector value added (% GDP). 2Base-group religion: Catholics. Control variables included in all 
specifications: Absolute change in male education, lagged ln(fertility), initial female-male ratio in 1980, civil liberties.
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Table 2A.5 Testing alternative indicators on the informal institution and conflict hypothesis, 1980-2010 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Informal Institutions 
(2) 
Informal Institutions 
(3) 
Informal Institutions 
(4) 
Conflict 
Patrilocal societies -0.102    
 (0.726)    
Nuclear family  -0.889   
  (0.904)   
Plow   -1.405  
   (1.240)  
Years of civil conflict    -0.00137 
    (0.0108) 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c) -7.415* -7.221* -7.394** -7.465* 
 (3.816) (3.906) (3.749) (3.914) 
Lagged ln  (GDP p.c)2 0.425** 0.412** 0.419** 0.427** 
 (0.205) (0.210) (0.200) (0.211) 
East Asia and the Pacific 0.277 0.700 1.085 0.313 
 (1.308) (1.346) (1.474) (1.283) 
Europe and Central Asia 0.777 0.926 1.487 0.772 
 (1.576) (1.580) (1.741) (1.592) 
Latin America and the Caribbean -0.452 -0.0211 -0.623 -0.410 
 (0.920) (0.997) (0.920) (0.914) 
Middle East and North Africa 2.565** 3.041** 3.630** 2.570** 
 (1.301) (1.433) (1.599) (1.297) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.629 0.961 1.697 0.628 
 (2.142) (2.198) (2.332) (2.151) 
Constant 43.51** 42.69** 44.16** 43.78** 
 (18.00) (18.40) (17.86) (18.37) 
Year FE included YES YES YES YES 
Regional specific time trends included YES YES YES YES 
Observations 536 536 536 536 
Number of id 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses ***. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following control variables are included: Initial female-male ratio in 1980, 
lagged fertility, civil liberties, absolute change in male education, lagged agricultural/industry/service sector value added (% GDP). 
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Table 2A.5 Continued: Alternative factors tested, 1980-2010 
 (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Development Aid CEDAW with Reservations 
W m  ’s p l   cal 
empowerment 
Net ODA share (government expenditures) 0.00744   
 (0.0111)   
CEDAW duration with reservations  0.100***  
  (0.0364)  
W m  ’s shar     parl am      0.0233 
   (0.0293) 
Lagged ln (GDP p.c.) 14.43 -8.143** -12.31*** 
 (9.817) (3.939) (3.573) 
Lagged ln  (GDP p.c.)2 -0.882 0.469** 0.707*** 
 (0.607) (0.212) (0.203) 
East Asia and the Pacific -0.893 0.277 -0.381 
 (1.264) (1.243) (1.265) 
Europe and Central Asia -2.785* 0.249 -1.127 
 (1.448) (1.498) (1.487) 
Latin America and the Caribbean -1.200 -0.658 -0.550 
 (0.876) (0.912) (1.201) 
Middle East and North Africa 1.293 2.889** 2.058 
 (1.670) (1.330) (1.488) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.387* 1.016 0.151 
 (1.316) (2.192) (1.748) 
Constant -44.23 45.78** 62.15*** 
 (38.31) (18.38) (15.31) 
Year FE included YES YES YES 
Regional specific time trends included YES YES YES 
Observations 191 536 330 
Number of id 76 98 97 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.50 0.53 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses ***. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following control variables are included: Initial female-male ratio in 1980,         
lagged fertility, civil liberties, absolute change in male education, lagged agricultural/industry/service sector value added (% GDP).
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Table 2A.6 Instrumental variable approach (2SLS) -Interaction effects between the Democracy 
Index (Civil liberties) and CEDAW ratification, 1980-2010 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Civil liberties Democracy Index 
VARIABLES 
Total 
education 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
Education 
Total 
education 
Primary 
education 
Civil liberties*CEDAW 0.0919 0.0504 0.115   
 (0.0936) (0.0876) (0.190)   
Democracy 
Index*CEDAW 
   -0.0210 -0.0133 
    (0.0531) (0.0512) 
CEDAW duration 
(years) 
-0.109 0.0219 -0.0742 0.260 0.210 
 (0.339) (0.306) (0.665) (0.364) (0.358) 
Civil liberties -0.453 -0.00714 -0.953   
 (0.809) (0.790) (1.489)   
Democracy Index -0.112 -0.166    
 (0.299) (0.301)    
Ln (GDP p.c.) -13.49*** -12.58*** -13.20 -11.80*** -10.89** 
 (4.239) (4.531) (8.646) (4.213) (4.955) 
Ln (GDP p.c.)2 0.783*** 0.717*** 0.771 0.645*** 0.583** 
 (0.244) (0.257) (0.512) (0.238) (0.280) 
Constant 68.06*** 62.76*** 64.99* 66.30*** 61.42*** 
 (18.63) (20.12) (36.66) (18.80) (22.40) 
Year FE included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional specific time 
trends included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 536 536 511 511 
Countries 98 98 98 94 94 
R-squared 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.29 0.28 
The following control variables are included: Initial female-male ratio, absolute change in male education, 
years of interstate conflict, plow, absence of inheritance rights, agricultural/industrial/service 
sector/value added (% GDP), robust clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Figure 2A.1 Robustness checks for testing CEDAW: Time trend 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A.7 Further controls added, oil rents and public expenditures on education 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Second Stage 
Primary 
Education 
Second Stage 
Primary Education 
 
Lagged CEDAW duration  0.164* 0.182* 
 (0.0943) (0.0945) 
Total government expend. on education (% GDP) -0.0984 
(0.106) 
 
Oil rents (% GDP)   0.119*** 
  (0.0339) 
Ln (GDP p.c.) -11.62** -10.37** 
 (5.119) (4.837) 
Ln (GDP p.c.)2 0.614** 0.543** 
 (0.282) (0.266) 
Initial female-male ratio -14.58*** -14.76*** 
 (2.316) (1.842) 
Years of interstate conflict -0.0463 -0.0520* 
 (0.0288) (0.0281) 
Constant 66.25*** 53.91** 
 (22.62) (21.80) 
Year FE included Yes Yes 
Regional specific time trends included Yes Yes 
Observations 528 534 
Countries 95 98 
R-squared 0.58 0.59 
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Dependent Variable: Female-male ratio in primary educational attainment. Clustered-robust standard errors at the 
country level in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All time-varying independent variables are lagged by 5 
years. 1Base group: lagged industrial sector value added (% GDP).2 Base-group religion: Catholics. Control variables 
included.in all specifications: Absolute change in male education, lagged ln(fertility), initial female-male ratio in 1980, 
civil liberties. All explanatory variables from baseline, Table C4 (9) included. 
 
Table 2A.8 Countries under study 
 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Cambodia Albania Argentina Cyprus Bangladesh Benin 
China Armenia Bolivia Egypt India Botswana 
Indonesia Bulgaria Brazil Iran Nepal Burundi 
Laos Croatia Chile Iraq Pakistan Cameroon 
Malaysia 
Czech 
Republic 
Colombia Israel Sri Lanka 
Central African 
Republic 
Mongolia Estonia Costa Rica Jordan  Congo 
Philippines Hungary 
Dominican 
Republic 
Morocco  Gambia 
South Korea Kazakhstan Ecuador Qatar  Ghana 
Thailand Kyrgyzstan El Salvador Saudi Arabia  Ivory Coast 
Vietnam Latvia Guatemala Syria  Kenya 
 Lithuania Honduras Tunisia  Lesotho 
 Moldova Jamaica   Liberia 
 Poland Mexico   Malawi 
 Russia Panama   Mauritania 
 Slovakia Paraguay   Mozambique 
 Slovakia Peru   Namibia 
 Slovenia 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
  Niger 
 Tajikistan Uruguay   Rwanda 
 Ukraine Venezuela   Senegal 
     Sierra Leone 
     South Africa 
     Sudan 
     Swaziland 
     Tanzania 
     Togo 
     Uganda 
     Zambia 
     Zimbabwe 
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Table 2A.9 United Nations human rights treaties used as instrumental variables 
 
United Nations human rights treaty Date opened 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Torture Convention, CAT 1984) 
10/12/1984 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention, GPPCG 1948). 
9/12/1948 
Convention against all Forms of Racism 7/03/1966 
  
 
 
 
Table 2A.10 Countries with reservations to article 2 and/or 16 (including w m  ’s r  h s     
education) 
 
Algeria Egypt Jamaica  Malta  
Bahrain India Jordan  Mauritania  
Bangladesh Iraq Kuwait  Morocco  
South Korea Israel Malaysia  Niger  
Syria Tunisia Maldives  Qatar  
  United Arab Emirates  Singapore  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 
3 The Impact of Refugees on Female Labor Market Outcomes 
and Welfare among the Host Population in Uganda 
Abstract38 
This study explores the effect of refugee intensity based on refugee inflows on local female 
 mpl ym     u c m s a d subs qu     ff c s     h  h s  p pula    s’ w lfar  a d s c al 
cohesion in Uganda. We exploit a natural experiment of three sudden Congolese refugee 
inflows and use a difference-in-difference estimation to investigate the causal impact of 
sudden refugee inflows on different types of female employment among the host population 
a d     h  h s  p pula    ’s s c al fabr c.  
Using a repeated cross-section (pre- and post-treatment) of DHS data covering the years 
2001-2011, we find that higher exposure to the treatment variable (greater refugee 
inflows) increases the probability that Ugandan women are working by 0.02 percentage 
points. The results differ by type of employment. A higher refugee intensity results in a 
higher likelihood of women being engaged in agricultural self-employment and a lower 
probability of being engaged in agricultural work for the family. We also find that higher 
refugee intensity has a positive impact on household wealth and a beneficial effect on 
undernutrition indicators of children below the age of five. 
 We interpret these findings as improved labor market opportunities for Ugandan women 
created by the sudden refugee inflows, which translates into positive average welfare 
effects for the host population. Using three different dimensions of social cohesion and 
Afrobarometer data covering the years 2000-2012, we find that higher refugee intensity is 
associated with an increased perception of equality among the host population and slightly 
higher levels of adherence to the Ugandan nationality. We neither find an effect on 
institutional nor on interpersonal trust levels.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The number of people forced to leave their home has reached an unprecedented height of almost 
70 million people worldwide (UNHCR, 2018a). Those that had to cross borders were mostly 
received by neighboring low and middle-income countries that themselves face scarce resources 
and development challenges (UNHCR, 2018b). As the number of protracted refugee situations- 
those that last longer than five years- increases over the past decades, this puts an additional 
                                                        
 
 
38 This is joint work with Jana Kuhnt and Ramona Rischke. 
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s ra      h s  c u  r  s. Of    h s  p pula    s’ support reduces over time, leading to social 
conflict and potential violence (e.g., International Crisis Group, 2018; Sarzin, 2017).  
Wh l  U a da s  h ms lv s hav  s u h  r fu          hb r    s a  s dur     h  c u  ry’s 
recent history of civil war, Uganda has also been receiving displaced populations over several 
decades from around 13 countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, 
South Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi (World Bank, 2016). Building upon the so-called self-reliance 
strategy from 1999, the Refugee Act from 2006-09 gave the refugees relative freedom of 
movement, equal access to primary education, healthcare, and other basic social services, and 
the right to work and own a business. In spite of their freedom to settle outside of designated 
areas, the majority of refugees choose to stay in refugee settlements in order to receive UNHCR 
assistance. In these settlements (rather than camps), until recently39, they were allocated pieces 
of agricultural land and materials to put up shelters and grow food. The aim of this strategy was 
to promote self-reliance and overcome their dependence on humanitarian aid (World Bank 
report, 2016). Uganda has been praised by the international community for its progressive 
refugee policy (UNHCR, 2018; Meyer, 2006). The settlements are neither socially nor 
economically isolated areas. There is intensive and frequent interaction between different 
refugee groups as well as with the host population, who are often neighbors and use the same 
public services, such as hospitals and schools (e.g. Betts, Bloom, J. Kaplan, et al., 2014). 
The focus of this study is a refugee influx from the DRC starting in the aftermath of the Second 
C     War,      f Afr ca’s d adl  s  c  fl c s    r c    h s  ry (UN, 2015). U  xp c  d by  h  
local and international institutions, more than 100,000 refugees from DRC arrived in Uganda in 
the years following the official peace agreement in summer 2003 (Kreibaum, 2016). They were 
mainly sent to three camps located in the Southwest of Uganda that were mostly vacant before. 
While the Congolese refugees were initially received openly by the Ugandan population, the 
protraction of their situation led to increasing reluctance among the hosts. They were perceived 
as a burden on public services and as competition in the labor market (Kreibaum, 2016). 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the impact of refugees on 
local communities in terms of employment and social cohesion. As the host and refugee 
population regularly interact, the refugee presence is expected to have an economic and social 
                                                        
 
 
39 Due to scarcity of land, refugees arriving after 2011 received smaller or no plots of land for agricultural 
purposes in some camps (personal interviews, 2018; UNHCR, 2018c; The EastAfrican, 2017). 
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impact on the Ugandan society. While there is a growing interest in estimating the economic 
impacts of hosting refugees (Balkan & Tumen, 2016; Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015; Ruiz & Vargas-
Silva, 2015, 2016; among others), we still know little about the consequences of refugee influxes 
on labor market outcome, particularly in developing countries. This limits our understanding of 
the potential consequences of hosting refugees (UNHCR, 2015). Female labor force participation 
is of particular interest in Uganda, as women, and female-headed households are often found to 
be poorer than male-headed households, and men within the household have main control over 
the productive resources. This is despite the fact that female control over household resources 
has been linked to better livelihoods in terms of household and children food consumption and 
health, for instance (Duflo, 2003; Klasen, 2004). To analyze the impact on female labor force 
participation and subsequently household welfare, we use a repeated cross-section of 
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) and yearly UNHCR data on the number of refugees allocated 
to three different settlements in Uganda. We exploit the sudden and unexpected inflow of 
Congolese refugees as a natural experiment, controlling for initial differences using a difference-
in-difference framework. We find that a greater exposure to refugees positively influences 
w m  ’s lab r f rc  participation. This effect is mainly driven by women working in the 
agricultural sector. 
 While several qualitative studies suggest substantial social effects of hosting refugees, there is 
very little empirical insight (e.g., Agblorti, 2011; Kuhnt et al., 2017). Using a repeated cross-
section of the Ugandan Afrobarometer data, we study potential effects of hosting refugees on 
measures of social cohesion). Here, we find that greater refugee presence is related to larger 
perceived equality within the host population as well as slightly stronger feelings for the 
Ugandan identity in comparison to the respective ethnic group. More intense refugee presence 
does neither significantly influence measures institutional nor interpersonal trust.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways: First, we argue that we can establish causality 
when analyzing the effects of refugee inflows on the host population by applying a difference-in-
difference methodology. Second, we complement the analysis of female labor market outcomes 
by looking at different indicators for multi-dimensional household welfare. Third, to the best of 
our knowledge, we perform the first quantitative study that focuses on social cohesion and 
gender labor outcomes in Uganda. 
3.2 Literature Overview 
3.2.1 Female Employment 
There is a paucity of studies on the effects of refugee inflows on native female employment in 
developing countries, therefore, we discuss in the following general effects of refugees on labor 
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markets among the host population. Empirical evidence on the impact of migration on host 
countries and communities have traditionally focused on voluntary migration flows (e.g., Borjas, 
1995, 2003; Glitz, 2012; Ottaviano & Peri, 2008). Their findings illustrate potential mechanisms 
that might also apply to forced migration, yet, it is important to note critical differences: Studies 
on voluntary migration largely focus on high-income countries, while low-income countries host 
the vast majority of refugees (e.g., Borjas, 1995, 2003; Glitz, 2012; Ottaviano & Peri, 2008). 
Further, the multidimensional motivations behind migration choices are expected to differ 
across migrant groups. Voluntary migrants are often assumed to seek better economic 
opportunities while forced migrants are assumed to primarily be fleeing from oppression, war 
or conflict without any particular economic motivation (Cassidy, 2004). While there is some 
evidence on the effects of refugee protection crises on forcefully relocated populations 
themselves, the literature trying to quantify the impact of forced migration on the host economy 
and population is increasing only recently. Possible effects are complex, ranging from price 
increases for goods and services over competition for jobs and natural resources to economic 
opportunities and beneficial social spillovers (e.g. Balkan & Tumen, 2016b; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 
2016; Taylor et al., 2016; Tumen, 2016). 
It has been acknowledged that the presence of refugees can be both economically harmful and 
beneficial to the host population and depends, for instance, on labor market policies40. According 
to theoretical considerations as well as previous literature (though traditionally mostly studying 
voluntary migration towards high income countries), the arrival of significant numbers of 
migrants often presents an initial burden on the local environment and resources as well as 
increasing competition in low-income segments of the labor market (e.g. Borjas, 2003; Braun & 
Omar Mahmoud, 2014; Foged & Peri, 2015). However, host populations can simultaneously 
benefit from the provision of cheap labor to local producers and from increased demand for 
goods and services, which can change the mix of goods and services demanded and the 
technologies used to produce or provide them (Dustmann et al., 2009). Generally, these 
dynamics have the potential to create new job opportunities and markets. There are a number of 
descriptive studies that demonstrate the economic interaction between refugee and host 
population in several African countries (e.g. Werker, 2007; Alloush et al., 2017). 
                                                        
 
 
40 Here, an important factor is the length of the refugee presence under study. Studies have shown that 
short-term effects differ from the medium- to long-term impact (e.g., Kreibaum, 2016; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 
2015). 
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Betts, Bloom, Josiah Kaplan, et al. (2014), d scr b  d v rs  “r fu     c   m  s”    U a da  
refugee settlements, where intense economic interactions take place among refugee populations 
as well as between Ugandans and refugees. Their qualitative evidence suggests that refugees 
coming to Uganda from DRC are mainly working in agriculture, either on their own plot of land 
that they received upon arrival or as agricultural wage laborers. 
 Anecdotal evidence from western Tanzania shows that there are changing opportunities of a 
refugee influx over time: After an initial burden on infrastructure and local markets, the local 
host population is able to benefit from the business interaction and increased demand for 
agricultural products (Whitaker, 1999). In other words, over time, supply-side effects were able 
to catch up with demand-side effects. Recently, some researchers have started to investigate the 
causal economic effects of hosting refugees for populations in developing countries. Evidence 
from Kenya shows that in the long run, the presence of forced migrants increases economic 
activities (approximated by nightlight data) in refugee hosting areas (Alix-Garcia et al., 2018). 
The authors find that proximity to a large refugee camp is leading to increased consumption, as 
well as more low-skilled jobs and wage labor for the host population. Also, their results suggest 
that increased agricultural and livestock production are incentivized through increased demand 
by refugees. This is supported by Taylor et al. (2016), who are using a simulation approach and 
data on Congolese refugees in Rwanda and find that refugee presence increases host populations 
real income through market interactions. Using the same Ugandan setting as our study, 
Kreibaum (2016) finds that the sudden influx of Congolese refugees into Uganda increases real 
consumption of the host population at the district-level. Further, she documents that Ugandans 
living close to refugee settlements benefit from increased public service provision within 
refugee camps. Using the influx of Burundian and Rwandan refugees into Tanzania as a natural 
experiment, Maystadt & Duranton (2014) find a positive long-term impact of refugee influx on 
the local population's real per capita consumption even after the return to their country of 
origin. As a main driver for the observed persistent change in welfare, they refer to reduced 
transportation costs through road investments. Relying on similar data, Maystadt & Verwimp 
(2014) find differential effects of the large refugee presence on the Tanzanian host population: 
While overall consumption increases, this effect is less pronounced for paid laborers while most 
pronounced for agricultural self-employed households (i.e. those selling their surplus on the 
market). They explain this by increased competition among agricultural workers while the self-
employed agricultural households benefit from the provision of cheap labor.  
Investigating the effect of variations in refugee population in Tanzania, Alix-Garcia & Saah 
(2009) find that prices for agricultural goods increased for areas located closer to refugee 
camps. They discuss that this benefits the rural population, that is, people active in agricultural 
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production, for whom they find positive welfare effects versus negative wealth effects for those 
living in urban areas. In their setting, food aid as a supply side effect seems to affect prices only 
in the short-run.  
In this regard, results of previous empirical research have been mixed. Ruiz & Vargas-Silva 
(2016) investigate the effect of Rwandan and Burundian refugee presence on the Tanzanian host 
population labor market. They find that an increased presence of refugees positively impacted 
the incomes of farmers (owning land) engaged in agriculture or livestock production. Their 
results further suggest that particularly agricultural employees (not owning land) were 
negatively affected through the increase of cheap low-skilled labor. They did not find evidence 
for a general increase in the likelihood of self-employment, though they find that those 
previously employed as temporary workers show a tendency for increased self-employment 
after the refugee influx. In general, natives have an advantage in establishing new businesses 
due to their local knowledge and access to networks.  
There is some research investigating the effects of internal displacement on host communities. 
These studies might help to further understand labor market effects of population movements 
that are more similar to each other and, hence, are closer substitutes in the job market. 
Investigating a population shock to local labor markets through internal displacement in 
Colombia, Calderón & Ibáñez (2009) find a negative effect on wages, particularly for the low 
skilled informal workers. It is important to note, here, that internal displacement in Colombia is 
characterized by people scattered throughout the country, while in our study refugees are 
largely localized within the respective refugee settlement. Further, similarity of internally 
displaced people with the receiving population is expected to ease the substitutability of 
laborers. In the same country, Bozzoli, Brück & Wald (2013) find that internal displacement 
leads to increased self-employment. Following Calderón & Ibáñez (2009), Morales (2018) 
investigates the effect of internal displacement in Colombia on local labor markets. He finds that 
in the short-run, the host communities are negatively impacted by depressed wages. However, in 
the longer-run these effects are dispersed, though, a small negative effect persists for low-
skilled, female workers.  
Overall, results from studies focusing on voluntary migration suggest that an increase of 
migrants may force the local population to redistribute across occupations, and its effect largely 
depends on the substitutability of the existing and newly arriving workers. This finding is 
supported by several studies on internal displacement (e.g., Calderón & Ibáñez, 2009), where 
those displaced share more commonalities with host populations compares to incoming 
refugees from other countries. Results from rigorous evaluations are inconclusive regarding the 
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multitude of effects of voluntary and forced migration on the host community and depend on 
characteristics of the local economy (e.g. Borjas, 1995, 2003; Card, 2001; Ottaviano & Peri, 2008; 
Glitz, 2012; Clemens, 2013; Braun & Omar Mahmoud, 2014). While effects of internal 
displacement point towards a more negative direction for the hosting areas, the impact of 
hosting refugees in lower-middle income countries seems to be positive in terms of general 
economic activities, and particularly beneficial to households that are self-employed in 
agricultural or livestock production and, hence, can react to increased demand. However, it can 
harm agricultural workers who seem to some degree compete with refugees in the labor market.  
Women in low-income, rural settings are usually involved in agricultural activities. At the same 
time, their formal access to land owing rights and their role for handling cash crops (such as 
coffee, high-value fresh fruits and vegetables) is often restricted and in the hands of male 
household heads. Studies on gender-specific impact of voluntary or forced migration are very 
limited and mostly focused on high-income countries (Furtado, 2015; Cortés & Tessada, 2011). 
Fransen, Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2017) find that the presence of refugees in Tanzania had a 
differential impact on task and time allocation for male and female members of host 
c mmu     s. D p  d       w m  ’s sk ll l v ls,  h y f  d  ha  h  h r sk lled women experience 
an increase in outside employment due to a higher supply of unskilled refugee workers taking 
over household chores. In contrast, less skilled women suffer from increased competition over 
natural resources, leading to the need to dedicate more time in daily household tasks (such as 
firewood collection), which causes a reduction in outside employment. 
Building on these insights, we expect the hosting of refugees in Uganda with its liberal refugee 
policies in terms of access to productive assets and labor markets41 to have a positive economic 
effect in the medium to longer-run, particularly for Ugandans who are engaged in agricultural 
self-employment.  
3.2.2 Social Cohesion 
Apart from an economic impact of hosting refugees, it is likely that the arrival of new people 
aff c s  h  l cal c mmu   y’s s c al fabr c. Th s  s r l va   s  c     fram s     rac    s b  w    
different groups of society and might influence the beneficial and peaceful functioning of 
                                                        
 
 
41 These have recently been subject to changes due to scarcity of gazetted governmental land (personal 
interviews, 2018; The EastAfrican, 2017). 
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communities (e.g., Kuhnt et al., 2017). We are particularly concerned about the impact on social 
cohesion among the Ugandan host communities. While there is no uniform, clear-cut definition 
 f s c al c h s   ,     s  f    d scr b d as  h  ‘ lu ’  ha  h lds  h m      h r a d ca  b  pr x  d 
by a set of different variables, including trust levels, civic engagement, or memberships in 
associations (see Section 3.4.3 for our operationalization of social cohesion) (ibid).  
The majority of forced migrants seeks refuge in neighboring countries, which are often 
developing economies where governments are struggling to comply with their state obligations, 
including the provision of sufficient public services, economic opportunities or safety (UNHCR, 
2018c). If not adequately supported, for instance by the international community, the arriving 
refugees can represent an additional strain, both economically and socially, that can lead to 
secondary conflicts and violence among the local population. A popular recent example is the 
arrival of more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees followed by almost 0.5 million asylum seekers 
from mostly Iraq and Afghanistan in Turkey over the past six years. While the refugees were 
welcomed at the beginning, hostility towards the newcomers and intercommunal violence 
between host communities and refugees is rising in recent years (International Crisis Group, 
2018).  
Refugees are perceived as low-wage competition in the labor market and as culturally different. 
Particularly in the larger cities, there has been a rise in socio-economic inequality and urban 
violence. Host communities that themselves feel marginalized perceive the refugees as a threat 
and believe that they are provided with better public services and assistance than themselves 
(International Crisis Group, 2018). This was also reported by (Landau, 2002) in Tanzania, where 
the local population mobilized politically against the perceived unfair treatment with respect to 
access to public services. Also, respondents stated increased fear for safety since refugees were 
regarded as violent. Similar evidence comes from Ghana, where in reaction to large refugee 
inflows from neighboring countries a rise of social conflicts between host and refugee 
population was reported (Agblorti, 2011). Using descriptive data from a social media survey in 
Jordan, Kuhnt et al. (2017) show that the recent inflow of Syrian refugees was associated with a 
moderate deterioration on overall levels of social cohesion within Jordanian communities. 
Generally, there is still very little empirical evidence on the impact of refugees on social 
cohesion, particularly in developing countries. Potential impact channels are multifaceted. Large 
refugee inflows are likely to influence the socioeconomic structure – directly through the 
increased presence of people in need of humanitarian assistance, and indirectly, by their 
  flu  c      . .  h  l cal lab r mark   a d pr duc  pr c s   flu  c    h us h lds’ d sp sabl  
incomes. A low socio- c   m c s a us ca  h  d r a p rs  ’s capab l  y    b  a  ac  v  m mb r of 
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society, and can decrease trust levels (Vergolini, 2011). Generally, poverty and inequality have 
been shown to negatively influence levels of social cohesion (e.g. Kawachi & Kennedy, 1997; 
Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Costa & Kahn, 2003). Fleeing from conflict, many forcibly displaced 
populations have experienced psychological hardship and discrimination. Alesina & La Ferrara 
(2002) find that these experiences decrease level of generalized trust. Simpson (2018) argues 
that it is of utmost importance to overcome trauma triggered through the experience of violence 
as it is an important psychological barrier to contribute positively to social cohesion. Using 
cross-sectional data from Mali, Calvo et al. (2018) show that the experience of conflict decreases 
trust between groups and increases the tendency to gather within kinship groups. On the other 
hand, there are several studies that mostly use lab-in-the-field experiments to investigate the 
effect of civil wars or conflict on populat   ’s l v ls  f s c al c h s       d v l p    c u  r  s. 
They generally find that the personal experience of violence increases the level of pro-social 
behavior within communities (e.g. Gilligan et al., 2014; Voors et al., 2012; Blattman, 2009; Stage 
& Uwera, 2018).  
Newly arriving people from foreign countries often increase the diversity within the host 
community. They are likely to speak different languages, and follow other beliefs or cultural 
norms. A variety of studies has investigated effects of diversity on a society, whereas results are 
ambivalent. While diversity is often associated with diverse and sometimes conflicting 
preferences that can lead to unrest and exclusion, it also leads to an increased variety of abilities. 
This again can lead to more creativity and innovation, which benefits the economic development 
of a country (e.g. Alesina et al., 2005; van Staveren et al., 2017; Kanbur et al., 2011). Overall, new 
people affect existing group boundaries, and different waves of displacement can lead to shifting 
group memberships. Landau (2002) reports that the host population in Tanzania felt closer 
adherence to their national virtue and identity in reaction to the arrival of refugees, while it 
s mul a   usly d d     s r    h    h  c   z  ’s r la   nship or trust towards their nation state. 
Particularly, if people feel threatened (e.g. by low-wage competition in the labor market or by 
other belief or value systems) in-group (people sharing a similar belief system or salient 
characteristics) solidarity might increase, which is often simultaneously associated with out-
group distrust or hostility (intergroup threat theory) (Stephan et al., 2009; Hargreaves et al., 
2009). On the other hand, according to the contact theory, increasing the number of people from 
other groups fosters the possibility of interaction between members of different groups, which 
again can decrease prejudices (Wagner et al., 2006; Schlueter et al., 2010). Studies that have 
empirically investigated the relationship between social cohesion (or social capital) and 
diversity, find ambiguous results. Some report that levels of generalized trust as well as civic 
engagement, and organizational membership are lower in more diverse societies (Alesina et al., 
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2002, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Stolle et al., 2008; Delhey et al., 2005; Costa et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 
2000).  
Summing up, there is a multitude of channels potentially triggered by forced displacement that 
are likely to impact levels of social cohesion in the receiving society. Changing socioeconomic 
status of households is likely to influence the social fabric. A potentially perceived threat to the 
dominant belief and value system could negatively influence the level of social cohesion. The 
effect of diversity as such is contested with regard to its impact on social cohesion. It is likely 
that it is rather social exclusion and a lack of social interaction (e.g. complicated through 
language barriers) that drives lower levels of social cohesion.  
In our setting, the impact is unclear and ambiguous. The freedom of movement of refugees 
within the country and the de facto integrative settlements where refugee and host population 
live as neighbors and use the same public institutions (such as schools and health centers) 
provide extensive possibilities to interact (contact theory). This may decrease prejudices and 
also offers possibilities to interact on an economic and social level. Simultaneously, this 
  cr as s  h  ac  v  pr s  c   f r fu   s w  h    h  h s  c mmu     s, c mpar d    a ‘cl s d 
camp’ appr ach ( . . as prac  c d    K  ya) (Al x-Garcia et al., 2017). This might trigger people 
to strengthen ties with their own kinship or increase adherence to the nation state to 
differentiate themselves from other nationalities as a reaction to a perceived threat to the 
dominant group (here, Ugandan). Language barriers are likely to limit social integration, and 
perceived unfairness with regard to public service provision (better schools and health care 
within settlements) as well as conflicts over land fuel violence between host and refugee 
populations and increase the perception of threats (e.g., Sebba, 2006). Further, the protracted 
nature of the refugee crisis in Uganda may, on the one hand and after an initial welcoming of 
refugees lead to growing resentments over time (Harrell-Bond, 1986; 2002). On the other hand, 
if successfully managed, an economic and social integration of the refugees becomes more 
feasible as the barriers to social interaction fade with time (e.g. language learnt by second 
generation). This is also reported by Whitaker (1991) in Tanzania, where Rwandan and Burundi 
refugees were initially perceived as a burden by the host population, which changed following 
improvements in the provision of services and the establishment in structures to absorb the 
newly arriving people.  
3.3 Background on Refugee Inflows and Settlements in Uganda 
Uganda is situated in Eastern Africa and shares borders with conflict-torn countries, like South 
Sudan and DRC. The Northern part of Uganda has itself a recent history of civil war leading to 
large waves of displacement within and across borders. Uganda has a long history as a host 
 63 
 
country for refugees and currently provides refuge to almost 1.4 million forcibly displaced 
people, primarily from South Sudan, DRC, and Burundi (UNHCR, 2018). Uganda is known and 
often praised by international agencies for its open door policy to people seeking refuge from 
neighboring countries, and its favorable refugee protection environment characterized by its 
settlement approach (UNHCR, 2018; Meyer, 2006)42.  
Upon arrival and registration at the transition camps at the Ugandan border, refugees receive 
emergency aid for up to two weeks. They are subsequently allocated to settlements according to 
capacity of the respective camp and potential family bonds (personal interviews, 2018). Here, 
they receive a plot of land for farming activities and material assistance in the form of shelter, 
food rations and facilitated access to public services, like schools and health clinics. The Ugandan 
government follows a self-reliance strategy aiming at the empowerment of the refugees (Meyer, 
2006). By the allocation of agricultural land and basic farming tools, they enable the refugees to 
become independent from food aid and non-food items by generating a surplus that can be 
traded for other goods (Sebba, 2006)43. The main economic activities are farming and livestock 
production by both refugee and host population, and over 80% of the rural Ugandan population 
is employed in the agricultural sector (Sebba, 2006; CAP, 2006). Food assistance is phased out 
after five years after arrival as the refugee should have become self-reliant (Dryden-Peterson & 
Hovil, 2004). Further, the government tries to build integrated public services that are accessed 
by Ugandans as well as by the refugee population (Meyer, 2006; Kreibaum, 2016). In the Refugee 
Act from 2006-09 the Ugandan government officially established freedom of movement of all 
refugees and it allowed them to choose between living in one of the settlements (where they 
receive all the organized assistance) or to move independently to urban centers, like Kampala 
(where they forego this assistance) to self-settle there.  
The number of protracted displacement situations, where at least 25,000 refugees from the 
same country have been displaced for at least five years in a given country of asylum, have 
increased in the past decades. In 2015, there were 32 such incidences, up from 27 in 1993, and 
                                                        
 
 
42 It is important to note that particularly in recent years, several actors have started to criticize this self-
reliance model employed in Uganda as being driven by the interest of donor and host institutions not 
necessarily benefitting the vulnerable refugee population (e.g. Meyer, 2006). 
43 Since 2011/12 the Ugandan government has had difficulties in providing agricultural land to all newly 
arriving refugees due to the lack of sufficient gazetted governmental owned farm land. The scarcity has 
also given rise to land conflicts between host and refugee population (e.g. Refugee Law Project, 2003). 
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their average length increased to 27 from formerly nine years. Overall, 41% of all refugees 
worldwide fall into this category (Sarzin, 2017). Though, initially welcoming the forcibly 
displaced, with the protraction of their stay, the Ugandan society increasingly perceived the 
refugees as a burden and competition in the labor market (Kreibaum, 2016). The Second Congo 
War starting after a coup in 1998, initiated one of those protracted displacement crises. This was 
one of the deadliest conflicts in Africa forcing millions of people to leave their homes, 
particularly, in the east of DRC. A peace agreement in 2003 officially ended this war. But 
particularly in the Eastern Congolese provinces, Kivu and Ituri, an independent conflict among 
militia continued and escalated in the following years, resulting in large waves of displacement 
across and within the DRC borders. In this paper, we focus on these displacement waves of 
Congolese fleeing to Uganda: As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the first major wave of DRC refugees 
came in 2005, which were mainly sent to the refugee settlement Kyaka II, followed by two 
additional waves in 2008 and 2009, where refugees were sent to the settlements Nakivale and 
Kyangwali. Nakivale is the largest settlement with more than 100,000 refugees, followed by 
Kyangwali with more than 40,000 and Kyaka II with almost 30,000 inhabitants. In all 
settlements, Congolese refugees represent the majority (UNHCR, 2015).  
All three settlements are located in the South-West of Uganda in relative remoteness and rural 
places in proximity to the DRC border (see Figure 3.1). They were established in the early 1960s 
for Burundi and Rwandese refugees, of whom most resettled into their country of origin in the 
90s (Refugee Law Project, 2002; UNHCR, 1995). This left the settlements largely vacant until the 
crisis in DRC flared up. The unanticipated, sudden and localized nature of this event provides a 
tool to isolate the effect of the refugee inflows from other factors. As argued in Kreibaum (2016), 
both the Ugandan government as well as aid agencies were unprepared for the sudden influx of 
thousands of refugees.  
Irrespective of their freedom to move out of the settlements, 88% of the Congolese refugees in 
Uganda choose to live in settlements and only 12% live in Kampala (UNHCR, 2014). Betts et al. 
(2014) document the intense economic interaction between host and refugee population. In 
spite of the remote locations of the refugee settlements, they are closely integrated in the local 
economies. Through trading in particular, the settlements are integrated into the wider 
economic system, and refugee and host populations are connected and continuously cross 
national, religious or ethnic lines (Betts et al., 2014). Congolese refugees are mainly active in 
agriculture, cultivating their own land or as agricultural workers, and only a minority own small 
businesses (Betts et al., 2013; UNHCR, 2014).  
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Figure 3.1 UNHCR presence in Uganda as of July 2016 (Note: Rwamwanja Settlement was 
opened in 2012. Source: UNHCR website, accessed February 2nd, 2018). 
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Figure 3.2 Influx of Congolese refugees to three settlements 
 
 
 
3.4 Data and Management 
3.4.1 Refugee Stock and Inflow  
We use UNHCR data collected and provided by Kreibaum (2016) that includes information on 
the yearly stock and arrival of refugee groups in the Ugandan settlements. Following our 
identification strategy (refer to Section 3.5) we focus on the inflow of refugees in three 
settlements (Nakivale, Kyangwali and Kyaka II) that experienced a sudden increase of refugees 
from DRC starting in 2005 up to the year 2009. Previous to this influx the settlements were 
mostly vacant. We have GPS coordinates of each refugee settlement, which we use to calculate 
distances between the households located in the PSUs of the respective dataset and the three 
settlements.  
3.4.2 Female Employment 
We use three survey waves of the Ugandan Demographic Health Survey (UDHS) (years 
2000/2001, 2006, 2011), collected by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Health. The UDHS is a nationally representative survey of households, including 
women in the age range of 15-49, and children born to these women. It provides information on 
female employment as well as a variety of health and household indicators of well-being. The 
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data is collected as repeated cross-sectional data. Our sample includes both married and single 
women, which leaves us with a sample of 18,682 individuals. 
Five districts in the North of Uganda were heavily aff c  d by v  l    c  fl c s  f  h  L rd’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) until 2006. As a consequence, economic activities in this area were 
undermined by violence, as well as characterized by the inability of people to freely interact in 
the market (Refugee Law Project, 2014). They also became dependent on food aid and were not 
self-sustainable due to the inability to engage in farming or participate in economic activities. 
Instead of fleeing to other districts in Uganda, the government began in 1996 to force people to 
m v     s  call d “pr   c  d v lla  s”, ma  ly l ca  d     h  sub-region Lango and Acholi in 
Northern Uganda (Bozzoli et al., 2012). In short, as the economic development of these Northern 
areas is presumably very different from other regions in Uganda, we exclude these conflict-
affected districts from our analysis. In a similar line, we drop the capital district Kampala, as the 
majority of refugees are not registered officially and hence cannot be accounted for (Kreibaum, 
2016). Furthermore, there are a lot of economic opportunities in large urban centers, thus 
crowding out effects may not be so string as to affect livelihood of the majority of the population. 
In any case, the research question of this paper aims at exploring how large numbers of refugee 
inflows affect economic activities and welfare of the host population in less densely populated 
areas (Macchiavello, UNHCR report, 2015).  
Overall, we are left with 46 districts and 701 primary sampling units (PSUs) in our sample and 
refugee settlements ar  l ca  d     hr    f  h m. W  w ll r f r    PSUs as ‘clus  rs’     h  
subsequent sections of this paper.  
3.4.3 Social Cohesion 
Social cohesion is a multi-dimensional concept that lacks a clear-cut definition and established 
practice regarding its measurement. Researchers have developed and applied different 
measures and created multi-dimensional indices proxying different aspects of social cohesion. 
This makes a comparison across empirical studies difficult. Measures often overlap in the 
variables used, which commonly include personal and institutional trust, civic or political 
engagement, and memberships in associations. The data used for these measurements mainly 
comes from secondary multi-purpose surveys, such as the Afro- and Arab-barometer, the 
European and World Value Survey or the Gallup World Poll. We follow the Social Cohesion Index 
(SCI) developed by Langer et al. (2016). It considers three relationships commonly hypothesized 
to determining the degree of social cohesion within a society: bonding (relationships within 
groups of a society), bridging (relationships across groups within a society), and linking 
(relationship between individuals and state institutions). The SCI is operationalized by 
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considering individual perceptions in three dimensions: inequality, trust, and group identities. 
These components are not independent but mutually related (see Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3 Social Cohesion Index developed by Langer et al. (2016) 
 
 
The first component, perceived inequalities, refers to both horizontal (to other members of the 
same social group) and vertical (between groups) inequalities experienced. Particularly in 
multiethnic societies such as Uganda, inequalities between ethnic groups (or e.g., across 
religious lines) can lead to violence and conflict (Langer et al., 2016). According to the authors, 
relevant inequalities include those of political, cultural, social or economic nature. Highly 
unequal societies are hypothesized to be less socially cohesive. The second component describes 
the extent of trust in institutions as well as among people in general terms. Several studies have 
us d  rus  as a   mp r a   m asur  f r  h  ‘ lu ’ w  h    h  s c   y ( . . K ack    al., 1997; Zak 
et al., 2001). Low levels of trust and social cohesion in societies are associates with a larger 
likelihood of conflict and, following a two-way relationship, conflicts also destroy trust (Langer 
et al., 2016). 
Th   h rd c mp       f  h s   d x  s  h  s r    h  f p  pl ’s adh r  ce to their national in 
relation to their group (here ethnic) identity. In particular, in settings with diverse ethnicities 
and artificially created national boundaries, this indicator is important. The authors argue that 
closer adherence to a group identity can trigger conflict between groups while also national 
identities can be used to differentiate oneself from other nationalities, e.g., from a refugee 
population. The relationship between a sense of national belonging and social cohesion between 
refugees a d  h  h s  p pula      s  hus a b   u cl ar. Wh l   h  f  l     f b l             ’s 
nation is considered a characteristic of cohesive societies, increasing the sense of belonging to 
the in-group could also reflect the perception of intrusion by the out-group. Langer et al. (2016) 
have applied the SCI to several African countries using repeated cross-sectional data from the 
Afrobarometer.  
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Following their example, we use five Ugandan Afrobarometer waves (years 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2008, 2012). This public attitude survey is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional 
dataset, which has geo-referenced primary sampling units (PSU) and includes detailed 
information on different dimensions of social cohesion. Each wave approximately contains 2,400 
interviews, leaving us with a pooled sample of 11,902 observations and 1,199 unique PSUs 
where each PSU typically contains eight households. After excluding the five Northern conflict 
affected districts and Kampala region (as conflict and densely populated areas are likely to affect 
s c al     rac    s a d c mmu     s’ p rc p    s as w ll as     s abl sh c mparab l  y     h  
UDHS dataset), we are left with 57 districts in four regions of Uganda.  
Using the Afrobarometer dataset, we then follow Langer et al. (2016) in their specific measures 
of the three components of the SCI.  
 
Figure 3.4 SCI components proxied by Afrobarometer Data 
 
 
All components are perception-based. Inequality is proxied using two variables aiming to 
capture perceived equality among Ugandan hosts. The first measures economic equality and is 
set equal to one if the own living conditions are perceived to be the same compared to other 
Ugandans. The second component aims at measuring equal treatment of important subgroups, 
here the ethnic group, within the larger population. This variable equals one if the respondent 
stated that his or her ethnic group was never treated unfairly by the government. Both 
components of the combined inequality variable are available for all five Afrobarometer waves. 
Identity is measured by a variable capturing the degree the respondent feels closer to the 
national compared to their ethnic identity. It equals one if the respondent feels more or only 
Ugandan as compared to his or her ethnic group. This variable is available starting from 2002. 
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The third SCI component is composed out of two different sets of variables: The first measures 
trust towards different state institutions. Here, we focus on trust towards the police, courts, and 
the electoral commission. All these variables are available in all five Afrobarometer rounds. In a 
robustness check we investigate trust levels towards alternative state institutions. All variables 
 qual      f  rus  l v ls ar  h  h (“ rus s a l  ”). Fur h r, w    v s   a       rp rs  al  rus  by 
using a variable measuring generalized trust levels towards other people. This variable is set to 
one if the respondent stated that most people can be trusted. We have information on this 
variable for the years 2000, 2005, and 2012.  
3.5 Identification Strategy and Methodology 
3.5.1 Treatment Exposure: Refugee Intensity Index 
By using the information on the yearly inflow data per settlement in combination with the 
georeferenced distances to the respective households, we are able to construct a refugee 
intensity index that has been previously implemented in other studies (Baez 2011; Maystadt & 
Duranton, 2014; Maystadt & Verwimp 2014). This refugee index measures the scope of the 
inflows as experienced by each respondent in a given cluster c (georeferenced PSU), by creating 
a distance variable to each refugee settlement that is weighted by the newly arrived refugee 
population in the respective settlement. Here, the location of the clusters throughout Uganda 
enables us to exploit a large heterogeneity in our sample in terms of the distance of respondents 
to the refugee settlements. More specifically, we calculate the refugee index as follows:  
Refugee index i(c), t = log ( 
  
    
 
 
   
  + 1)                         (2) 
where s takes the values of 1 to 3 for the different refugee settlements. P refers to the peak 
refugee inflows into each settlement in the years 2005 (Kyaka II settlement), 2008 (Nakivale 
settlement) and 2009 (Kyangwali settlement). D refers to the distance between a given cluster c 
and each settlement. Following Maystadt & Duranton (2014), α is set to 1 and the resulting ratio 
is transformed into logarithm (and 1 is added to deal with 0 values in pre-shock periods) to 
reduce the importance of some highly refugee-exposed villages.44 
                                                        
 
 
44 This refugee index is similar to a continuous treatment effect in a difference-in-difference estimation 
(Wooldridge, 2002, 132). 
 71 
 
The resulting Refugee Index RI c,,t is continuous, takes the value zero in pre-shock years, and is 
constructed for different treatment periods to adequately capture different timings of the 
inflows into the settlements as shown in Figure 3.1. This specification assigns higher values to 
households living closer to the refugee settlements and lower values to those living farther 
away. At the same time, it increases with the number of refugees arriving in a given location. We 
use different functional forms of this index in the robustness section (see Section 3.7).  
As shown in Figure 3.5, there is a substantial range in our refugee index. Similarly, Figure B 3.2 
(Appendix) displays substantial variation in distance from the cluster location to the refugee 
settlements. Some clusters are situated closer to the refugee settlements while others are farther 
away. 
 
Figure 3.5 Range of values for the refugee shock variable for DHS and Afrobarometer Data 
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S urc : Au h rs’ calcula    s 
 
Rather than focusing on a binary treatment variable, this approach exploits variation in the 
treatment intensity of different locations and thus allows us to analyze the difference between 
“h  h r fu         s  y” a d “l w r fu         s  y” ar as.  
3.5.2 Exploiting a Natural Experiment 
Our identification strategy relies upon the unexpected size and nature of the refugee influxes 
from DRC into Ugandan settlements. While considerations related to economic potentials may 
have played a role when establishing these settlements in the 1960s, as documented by various 
sources (e.g., UNHCR report, 2016), the initial set-up of the location of the settlements in the 
1960s was mainly based on the decision to find large rural areas not invaded by tsetse flies, a 
carrier of the so-called sleeping sickness. Hence, all three settlements had already been set up 
decades before this study’s   flux p r  d w  h requisite provision of basic infrastructure and 
public services as well as an adaptation of neighboring communities.   
We argue that the location of settlements is (sufficiently) exogenous to the economic activities 
and social structures at the time of the Congolese refugee inflows. When the official peace 
agreement was signed in 2003, local and international institutions did not expect another spike 
of violence and subsequent displacements of Congolese populations. As described by Kreibaum 
(2016), particularly, the large number of people arriving within such short period of time was 
unexpected. Another concern is that despite b     f rc bly d splac d, r fu   ’s decision to locate 
in a certain area might be associated with the economic opportunities available at the 
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destination. However, the Congolese refugees themselves chose to seek refuge in Uganda in 
reaction to violent acts within their own country irrespective of economic or social indicators of 
Ugandan areas, which is supported by literature showing that forced migration from armed 
conflicts is not primarily driven by economic considerations (Gracia et al., 2010; Czaika & Kis-
Katos, 2009). Additionally, the allocation of refugees across settlements is randomly decided by 
the Ugandan authorities upon their arrival in transition camps at the border according to the 
s   l m   s’ capac    s (personal interviews, 2018). Hence, the refugees themselves did not have 
the option to choose their long-term settlement. We further argue that the concern on refugees 
locating themselves in more dynamic and economically active regions after their initial 
settlement is negligible in the context of Uganda (Bonfiglio, 2010; Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 
2004). 
Overall, these conditions underline this setting as a suitable natural experiment, where the 
intensity of refugee presence is unrelated to potential determinants of our dependent variables 
(Gerber & Green, 2011).  
3.5.3 Difference-in-Difference Methodology 
Our datasets are uniquely suited to assess the causal impact of three series of refugee inflows 
between the years of 2005-2009 on the Ugandan host population. This is because, first, both 
datasets comprising our dependent variables (DHS and Afrobarometer) contain waves that were 
carried out before the unexpected and large inflows of Congolese refugees took place in 2005 
(see Section 3.3). These can be considered as baseline surveys. Therefore, the data allow us to 
distinguish the impact of the refugee influx from initial differences between households or 
districts (assuming – as we do here – that there were no substantial changes to structural 
differences across locations between our baseline waves and the first treatment years).  
Further, we make use of an earlier DHS survey wave (1995) to analyze the plausibility of the 
common trend assumptions, i.e. that districts with higher and lower refugee intensity would 
have followed similar trajectories in terms of our labor outcome variable (female employment) 
in the absence of the refugee inflow.  
Two assumptions that need to be valid in order for the identification strategy to hold are the 
common trend assumption as well as the conditional comparability of high refugee intense areas 
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vs. low refugee intense areas.45 According to the first assumption, it is assumed that in the 
abs  c   f  h  r fu    sh ck, “h  h r fu         s ” vs. “l w r fu         s ” ar as w uld hav  
developed in similar paths in terms of  h   u c m  var abl  ( . . w m  ’s  mpl ym nt). While 
this assumption –by definition- cannot formally be tested (since we cannot observe a counter-
factual), we examine the plausibility of this assumption using the following strategy: we split our 
sample      “h  h” a d “l w r fu         s  y” d s r c s. H  h r fu         s  y d s r c s ar  
d f   d as d s r c s w  h a “h  h  r a m   ”      s  y,  . .  r u hly all PSUs  ha  ar  ra k d a  
least in the 75th percentile (or higher) of the refugee index. We then use the earliest available 
round of the DHS data of Uganda in 1995, prior to the Congolese refugee inflow, to test if 
districts located closer to the refugee settlements differed from those farther away from the 
settlements. As can be seen in Table 3B.3 (Appendix), the two groups appear to be statistically 
different in terms of individual and district characteristics. This underscores the necessity to 
control for differences in pre-conditions of the treatment and control group, as usually done in 
the difference-in-difference (DID) framework. Regarding conditional comparability, we are left 
with the assumption that our treatment and control groups are not systematically different in 
terms of unobserved characteristics affecting labor market or welfare outcomes.46 
In order to check the credibility of the common trend assumption, we add a second survey wave 
that pre-dated the high refugee inflow, namely data from the year 2000. We then run a placebo 
model using a binary indicator for whether the district will have a high treatment intensity in the 
future and regress this indicator and all control variables on our outcome variable of interest, 
w m  ’s  mpl ym   . I   h s plac b    s , a s    f ca   c  ff c      f  h s b  ary   d ca  r w uld 
suggest that households highly exposed to the refugee inflows (the treatment group) in the 
future were following a different trend, even before the refugees arrived in Uganda. In other 
words, Table 3B.4 (Appendix) presents the results of the placebo test that investigates whether 
differences in employment could be explained by refugee inflows, even when refugees were not 
yet present. However, we do not find that the future status of a high refugee intense district 
significantly affects any of the female employment outcomes Table 3B.4. Hence, the results first 
support the assumption of common trends in the absence of refugees and, second, our refugee 
                                                        
 
 
45 Since we do not aim at establishing causal relationships between the social cohesion measure and 
refugee inflows, we formally analyze the plausibility of the common trend only for the DHS data. 
46 Not all variables included in the baseline specification can be tested here (e.g. distance to border, etc., 
since they appear for the first time in the 2000 round when GPS data became available. 
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index seems to yield the causal effect of the refugee inflows. Additionally, Figure 3B.1 in the 
Appendix provides visual evidence that the trend of both treatment (high refugee intensity 
districts) and control group (low refugee intensity districts) develops in a parallel way before 
the arrival of refugees in 2005. 
3.5.4 Baseline Model 
Our main outcome variables relate to female employment, household welfare, and measures of 
s c al c h s   . W   s  ma  , f r   s a c ,  h   mpac   f r fu      fl ws    w ma ’s w rk    
status controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and other factors. In particular, we 
exploit both time and distance variations to refugee camps to show how women and the 
households they are living in have been affected by refugee inflows originating from DRC 
between 2005- 2009. 
 Th  “r fu      d x” (s   Section 3.5.1) is our treatment variable and we perform a difference-
in-difference analysis on pre- and post-shock data along the following lines (here exemplified 
using the DHS dataset):  
      Wi (c), t = β0 + β1  refugee indexc, t + γ X’i, t + β2 mc, t + δd + δt + ϵc, t       (1) 
Where W i(c), t measures various female employment outcomes. For instance, W i(c), t represents a 
dummy indicating that woman i, living in cluster c, is working or engaged in either agricultural 
self-employed work or agricultural work for the family or others in time period t. An alternative 
categorical outcome variable, type of occupation, is used to further differentiate between 
different sectors in which the female respondent has been engaged (professional/ sales and 
services/agricultural sector). 
 With respect to the regressions focusing on social cohesion, W i(c), t measures, for instance, the 
perceived feeling of equality within the host community or alternatively levels of institutional or 
interpersonal trust. The main coefficient of interest (our treatment variable)  s β1, a measure of 
the refugee index, which estimates the intensity of the refugee inflow experienced in each cluster 
c. 
The adjusted employment regressions control for characteristics of both women and their 
husbands, such as age, age2 and years of education, respectively, which are included in X’. O h r 
household controls include the number of household members, whether the household head is 
female, married and an asset index provided by DHS, which is used as a proxy for household 
wealth. We further add a dummy indicating if the household is located in an urban or rural 
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region, cluster characteristics such as the distance to the DRC border, the distance to the next 
water source and lagged per capita night-time light as a proxy for regional economic activities at 
the district level. Recent research has implemented night-time light data as a proxy for economic 
activity (see for example Kreibaum, 2016; Henderson et al. 2012). Since it can be argued that 
rainfall data are a better proxy for agricultural performance and productivity (Bundervoet et al., 
2015), we use this (lagged) indicator as an alternative to night-time light in a further robustness 
check. In order to capture seasonal effects, which are particularly important for agricultural 
work, mc, t month of interview dummies are included at the cluster level (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 
2017). We refrain from regressions adjusted for further control variables when analyzing 
measures of social cohesion. Here, the literature has not yet developed an accepted set of control 
variables and any choice would be arbitrary.  
Th  c  ff c     δd, represents district dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity, a d δt is 
a time dummy indicating the post-shock treatment periods and likely to capture time-varying 
effects, common to all clusters. The social cohesion estimations are run with region dummies as 
well as year dummies. In all models, we use cluster-robust standard errors at the treatment 
level, which is the cluster (PSU) level in our case, following other studies (Kreibaum, 2016; etc.). 
47 
In line with much of the recent literature (e.g. Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2017; Kreibaum, 2016), we 
opt for a linear probability model instead of logit or probit models, due to advantages such as the 
ease of implementation and interpretability of the results. We do provide evidence in the 
robustness section that our results are robust to the application of non-linear models for our 
binary employment variable (Appendix, Table 3B.1). A full description of the construction of all 
variables included in the regression analysis is provided in the Appendix. 
Descriptive statistics of the DHS and UNHCR are provided in Table 3.1 below48, separated by 
values above the median of the refugee index vs. below the median of the refugee index. 
                                                        
 
 
47 We use the default robust standard errors (SE) in the baseline results since our error terms show a 
normal distribution. However, applying clustered SE at the treatment level (cluster level) does not alter 
our results at all. 
48 Similar descriptive statistics for the Afrobarometer data can be found in the Appendix. 
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The unconditional comparison depicts that individuals and households are quite similar in terms 
of female age, gender of the household head, household wealth and proximity to the water 
source. However, differences occur in our main variables of interest, i.e. female employment, 
working in sales and services or being self-employed, as well as distance to the border of the 
DRC, which is slightly higher for high refugee intense districts.49 This is in line with the 
argumentation above, as refugee-hosting settlements are closer to the DRC border and mostly 
located in urban areas. Moreover, all these indicators are included in the regression analysis as 
controls. In addition, it can be observed that numbers of female employment, working in the 
agricultural sector and being agricultural self-employed, are slightly higher in districts with high 
refugee intensity. This correlation is later confirmed in our regression analysis. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics DHS and UNHCR 2000-2011, comparing characteristics in districts above 
vs. below the median of the refugee index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample 
Above median of 
refugee index 
Below median 
of the refugee 
index 
T-
statistic 
Log(RIc,t +1) 2.37 2.85*** 2.20*** -21.71 
 (1.805) (2.095) (1.664)  
Individual and hh characteristics 
W m  ’s employment 0.75 0.77*** 0.74*** -3.83 
 (0.432) (0.420) (0.436)  
Type of occupation     
Not working 0.20 0.19 0.20 1.04 
 (0.399) (0.395) (0.400)  
Professional 0.05 0.06 0.05 -1.04 
 (0.224) (0.230) (0.222)  
Sales and Service 0.14 0.11*** 0.15*** 7.10 
 (0.344) (0.309) (0.355)  
Agricultural Work 0.61 0.64*** 0.60*** -5.38 
 (0.488) (0.479) (0.490)  
Agricultural Work     
Agric. self-employed 0.49 0.55*** 0.47*** -8.54 
 (0.500) (0.498) (0.499)  
Agric. work for family 0.22 0.20*** 0.22*** 3.59 
 (0.412) (0.397) (0.417)  
Agric. work for others 0.05 0.05 0.05 1.05 
 (0.224) (0.217) (0.226)  
Female education (years) 4.91 5.09*** 4.85*** -3.59 
                                                        
 
 
49 It should be noted though that we excluded the capital Kampala from our analysis. 
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 (3.876) (3.714) (3.927)  
Female age (years) 28.03 27.94 28.06 0.73 
 (9.399) (9.285) (9.437)  
Female age2 (years) 873.82 866.83 876.18 0.97 
 (574.4) (566.8) (577.0)  
Married 0.65 0.63*** 0.66*** 3.53 
 (0.478) (0.484) (0.475)  
Household size 6.36 6.16*** 6.42*** 5.02 
 (3.067) (2.883) (3.124)  
Female household head 0.30 0.30 0.30 -0.34 
 (0.459) (0.460) (0.459)  
Wealth poorest 0.19 0.09*** 0.23*** 20.28 
 (0.396) (0.292) (0.420)  
Wealth poor 0.18 0.15*** 0.19*** 6.19 
 (0.385) (0.358) (0.393)  
Wealth middle 0.19 0.26*** 0.16*** -14.81 
 (0.391) (0.439) (0.370)  
Wealth rich 0.20 0.25*** 0.19*** -9.54 
 (0.402) (0.434) (0.390)  
Wealth richest 0.23 0.24 0.23 -1.75 
 (0.423) (0.429) (0.421)  
Husba d’s a   37.22 36.77*** 37.37*** 2.40 
 (11.88) (11.28) (12.07)  
Husba d’s  duca     1.48 1.53*** 1.47*** -2.15 
 (1.429) (1.561) (1.381)  
District/cluster level characteristics 
Rainfall (mean at district 
level) 
0.41 0.40*** 0.42*** 4.69 
 
Lagged (Night-time light) -19.36 -18.90*** -19.51*** -5.10 
 (7.052) (6.252) (7.296) 
Distance to water source 44360.41 44890.79 44181.99 -1.12 
 (37658.9) (22318.1) (41564.9)  
Distance to DRC border(km) 184.66 110.33*** 209.67*** 54.38 
 (116.7) (62.32) (120.1)  
Urban 0.19 0.15*** 0.20*** 8.82 
 (0.391) (0.352) (0.403)  
N 18723 4713 14010  
Mean coefficients; (standard deviations in parentheses). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
3.6 The Impact of Hosting Congolese Refugees 
3.6.1 Baseline Results- Female Employment 
W    w  xam     h  p      al l  ks b  w     h  r fu      d x a d w m  ’s  mpl ym    
outcomes by conducting linear probability models.  
Table 3.2 r p r s  h  bas l    r sul s     h   ff c   f  h  r fu      d x    w m  ’s  mpl ym    
outcomes over the period 2001-2011. Overall, a higher refugee index, that is, a higher intensity 
of refugee inflows seems to increase the likelihood of female employment. In column (3), which 
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includes all control variables, we can observe that greater exposure to the inflow of refugees 
leads to a higher probability of women employed. However, the effect of the coefficient on the 
refugee index (which can be interpreted as an elasticity) is rather small, around 0.058, but 
significant. Economically, an increase by 100 refugees per settlement corresponds to a 0.02 
percentage point (2.6%) increase in the probability of women being employed. Accordingly, an 
increase by 1000 refugees per settlement is associated with a 0.07 percentage point (9.3%) 
increase in the likelihood that the woman is working. 
Taking into account the difficulty of transportation due to poor road networks and 
infrastructure in the region (Betts et al., 2014), we expect that our effects of the refugee 
settlements are somewhat localized.50 Looking at the spatial distribution of the refugee effect, 
women living in clusters with an average distance to all three settlements between 85- 100km, 
are 0.09 percentage points more likely to be engaged in employment (compared to the mean 
valu   f w m  ’s  mpl ym   ). However, the minimum average distance to all three 
settlements is 85 km, which is already a long distance, especially if the infrastructure is poor. If 
women live within an average distance between 100- 120 km away from all three settlements, 
they experience an increase in the probability to work by 0.04 percentage points (again 
compared to the mean). Possible scenarios are that the inflow of refugees leads to greater 
economic activities, which might generate new working opportunities for women or, 
alternatively, they substitute males who switch to better-paid jobs. 
Turning to the control variables, higher education increases the likelihood of female 
employment, as expected, and according to recent literature (e.g. Baah-Boateng, 2013). 
Interestingly, the binary variable measuring if the household head is female is positively affects 
the likelihood of female employment, consistent with a financial necessity to participate in the 
labor force. Women living in richer households are less likely to work, which corresponds to 
DHS reports (DHS, 2012).  A possible reason is mentioned by Bbaale et al. (2014), in the context 
of Uganda, arguing that richer women have a tendency of searching longer for more decent jobs, 
and hence remain unemployed for longer periods compared to poorer women. Other factors 
decreasing the likelihood of employment include longer distances to a water source and living in 
urban regions. The latter finding may indicate that labor market opportunities for women are 
                                                        
 
 
50 Since our GPS coordinates measure the distance starting from the centroid of the refugee settlement, 
we can assume that the distance from cluster to settlements are quite close to the borders of the 
settlements, given that the settlements have a considerable size of e.g. 185km2 for Nakivale. 
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particularly pronounced in the agricultural sector. With respect to distance to water sources, a 
study by Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2017), found similar results as women who need to invest more 
time to daily housework tasks, such as fetching water or collecting firewood, can dedicate less 
time to outside employment. Lagged night-time light data, our indicator of regional economic 
activity is not significant, and neither is distance to the DRC border. Yet, the latter is correlated 
to the refugee index as can be seen in Table 3.1. 
 
 
Table 3.2 The effect of refugees on w m  ’s  mpl ym   , l   ar pr bab l  y models, 2001-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
No controls 
(2) 
Individual level controls 
(3) 
Full Sample 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.0610*** 0.0611*** 0.0580*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0112) 
Individual level    
Female educ.(years)  0.00184* 0.00206** 
  (0.000944) (0.000944) 
Female age  0.0479*** 0.0481*** 
  (0.00227) (0.00227) 
Female age2  -0.000618*** -0.000622*** 
  (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) 
Married  0.0360*** 0.0346*** 
  (0.00804) (0.00805) 
HH size  -0.00709*** -0.00785*** 
  (0.00104) (0.00104) 
Female HH head  0.0273*** 0.0289*** 
  (0.00751) (0.00751) 
Wealth poor  -0.0150 -0.0124 
  (0.00979) (0.00978) 
Wealth middle  -0.0267*** -0.0215** 
  (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Wealth richer  -0.0530*** -0.0416*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0108) 
Wealth richest  -0.0995*** -0.0668*** 
  (0.0121) (0.0132) 
  (0.00293) (0.00298) 
Cluster/district level    
Lagged (Night-time light)   -0.000163 
   (0.000812) 
Distance to next water source (km)   
-3.24e-07* 
(1.80e-07) 
Km to DRC boarder   -0.000102 
   (0.000173) 
Urban   -0.0611*** 
   (0.0108) 
Year=2006 0.210*** 0.224*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0491) (0.0496) 
Year=2011 0.242*** 0.234*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0205) 
Constant 0.545*** -0.246*** -0.197*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0648) (0.0731) 
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3.6.2 Different Types of Occupation 
Since agriculture is the primary source of employment in Uganda, we want to shed light on how 
the impact of refugee inflows differs by type of occupation. Hence, we further distinguish 
between three different sectors, i.e. professional (e.g. teachers); sales and services; agricultural 
sector. The results of the multi-nominal logit regression in Table 3.3 reveal that our positive 
overall effects presented in the baseline results are primarily driven by women working in the 
agricultural sector. The marginal effect implies that, on average, a 1% increase in the refugee 
index is associated with a 10.2 percentage points higher probability of women working in the 
agricultural sector. Other employment categories, i.e. sales and services, and professional work, 
which require higher levels of education or may be characterized by higher entry barriers 
compared to the agricultural sector, do not seem to be affected by the refugee inflows. 
Highly educated women are less likely to engage in agriculture for work as shown by the 
   a  v  c  ff c      f f mal   duca        c lum  (3), wh l      s surpr s     ha  w m  ’s 
education has no impact on being employed in the sales and services sector (column (2)). 
Since narratives from the settlements in Nakivale and Kyaka II hint to an increase in self-reliance 
and self-employment activities among refugees and between refugees and host communities 
(Betts at al. 2014, personal interviews, 2018), we test this hypothesis by looking at women 
working in agricultural self-employment, working in agriculture for the family, and working in 
agriculture for others.  The results in Table 3.4 suggest that women are less likely to be 
( xclus v ly)    a  d    a r cul ur . Th s c uld ac ually p        a   mpr v m       w m  ’s 
situations, as e.g. women who previously exclusively worked for their family have now some 
extra food to sell in self-employment. Lastly, as can be seen in column (3), the probability of 
women working for others is not affected by the sudden inflow of refugees, probably because 
only a small share of women (5 %) are represented in this category and because refugees 
themselves are a valuable source of agricultural labor if labor demand increases, e.g. in 
harvesting seasons. 
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The magnitude of the effect is not negligible, since women exposed to the refugee inflow are 
3 percentage points more likely to be self-employed in the agricultural sector, compared to the 
base category (not working and working in agriculture for the family or for others). In other 
words, if we compare the 90th percentile (clusters very closely located to the settlements) to the 
50th percentile of the refugee shock variable, women are 2.5 percentage points more likely to 
work while keeping all other variables constant. The number of household members is 
positively associated with the probability of being engaged in agricultural family work and 
changes the sign for the probability of being self-employed or working for others. As women fill 
the role of primary car  ak rs  f  h  r fam ly’ m mb rs    U a da, a d a    cr as     h us h ld 
m mb rs pu s c  s ra   s    w m  ’s   m ,  h y ca  d d ca   l ss   m     w rk  u s d   r 
engage in self-employment activities. 
Table 3.3 Typ   f w m  ’s  ccupation, multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression, 2001-2011. 
 
                  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Professional/ 
technical/managerial 
Sales and  
Services 
Agricultural 
Sector 
Log(RIc,t+1) 0.173 0.108 0.677*** 
 (0.220) (0.188) (0.161) 
Individual level    
Female educ.(years) 0.300*** 0.00225 -0.0569*** 
 (0.0156) (0.00982) (0.00874) 
Female age 0.500*** 0.406*** 0.245*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0235) (0.0177) 
Female age2 -0.00650*** -0.00547*** -0.00299*** 
 (0.000589) (0.000375) (0.000285) 
Married 0.306*** 0.0455 0.234*** 
 (0.107) (0.0825) (0.0644) 
HH size -0.0986*** -0.0859*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0116) (0.00881) 
Female HH head 0.540*** 0.464*** 0.0811 
 (0.102) (0.0720) (0.0587) 
Wealth poor 0.537** 0.206 0.0660 
 (0.223) (0.128) (0.0961) 
Wealth middle 0.416* 0.370*** -0.128 
 (0.242) (0.134) (0.103) 
Wealth richer 0.610** 0.572*** -0.315*** 
 (0.242) (0.146) (0.111) 
Wealth richest 0.553** 0.864*** -0.823*** 
 (0.238) (0.156) (0.123) 
Cluster/district level    
Lagged log (Night- time light) -0.0297 0.0187 -0.00218 
 (0.0185) (0.0160) (0.0162) 
Distance to next water source (km) 2.54e-06 -1.81e-06 -1.40e-06 
 (3.63e-06) (2.99e-06) (2.74e-06) 
Km to DRC boarder 0.00413 -0.00175 -0.000375 
 (0.00360) (0.00293) (0.00265) 
Urban -0.207 0.439*** -0.814*** 
 83 
 
 (0.146) (0.117) (0.131) 
Year=2006 1.577 -0.0120 3.020*** 
 (0.959) (0.805) (0.714) 
Year=2011 2.591*** 0.115 2.333*** 
 (0.447) (0.365) (0.334) 
Constant -15.31*** -5.941*** -5.091*** 
 (1.377) (1.146) (0.979) 
Observations 18,695 18,695 18,695 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2494 0.2494 0.2494 
Marginal effects:    
Log(RIc,t+1) -0.00753 -0.0031  0.102*** 
(z-value) (0.00707) (.01489) (0.0207) 
Base category (0): Not working. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District, year 
and month of interview dummies included. 
Table 3.4 Women working in agriculture: Self-employed /work for the family/others, linear probability 
model, 2001- 2011 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Agri. Self -employed Agri. Family Agric. Others 
Log(RIc,t+1)  0.136*** -0.127*** -0.0125 
 (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.00856) 
Individual level    
Female educ.(years) 0.00122 0.00315** -0.00414*** 
 (0.00150) (0.00142) (0.000941) 
Female age 0.0457*** -0.0499*** 0.00466** 
 (0.00318) (0.00301) (0.00187) 
Female age2 -0.000568*** 0.000648*** -8.25e-05*** 
 (4.99e-05) (4.69e-05) (2.90e-05) 
Married 0.204*** -0.125*** -0.0713*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.00714) 
HH size -0.00870*** 0.0123*** -0.00303*** 
 (0.00151) (0.00144) (0.000893) 
Female HH head 0.0533*** -0.0473*** -0.00344 
 (0.0104) (0.00993) (0.00610) 
Wealth poor -0.0145 0.0206 -0.00642 
 (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.00722) 
Wealth middle -0.00922 0.0326** -0.0219*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0134) (0.00738) 
Wealth richer 0.00692 0.0146 -0.0207*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.00799) 
Wealth richest -0.0506*** 0.00602 0.0268** 
 (0.0188) (0.0178) (0.0118) 
Cluster/district level    
Lagged log (Night-time light) -0.00573*** 0.00641*** -0.00196*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00117) (0.000654) 
Distance to next water source 
(km) 
5.22e-08 2.49e-07 -1.41e-07 
 (2.45e-07) (2.35e-07) (1.28e-07) 
Km to DRC boarder -0.000210 1.87e-05 0.000120 
 (0.000228) (0.000214) (0.000126) 
Urban -0.0527*** -0.0962*** 0.132*** 
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 (0.0176) (0.0153) (0.0146) 
Year=2006 0.554*** -0.471*** -0.0992*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0653) (0.0385) 
Year=2011 0.266*** -0.197*** -0.0755*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0277) (0.0165) 
Constant -1.070*** 1.901*** 0.108* 
 (0.101) (0.0954) (0.0586) 
Observations 11,478 11,480 11,474 
R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District and month of interview dummies 
included. Base group column (1): not working, work for family/others; base group column (2): not working, self-
employed, working for others; (3) base group: self-employed, not working, work for family. 
3.6.3 Effects on Household Wealth and Children’s Health 
In order to establish that changes in employment for women in fact contribute to welfare effects 
for households (and to refute the possibility that a woma ’s d c s       w rk  s pur ly dr v   by 
poverty and may be needed to counter-act labor market deteriorations for other adult 
household members), we test if the inflow of refugees affects the overall welfare status of the 
household. To do so, we regress a binary variable, which assigns the value one to the poor 
households of the asset index (and 0 if they belong to >=middle categories) on the refugee inflow 
and similar control variables used in Table 3.1.51 We do find positive welfare effects specifically 
for households in the poorest/poor wealth quintiles, as a negative coefficient in Table 3.5 
suggests that households affected by the refugee inflow are less likely to become poor. This 
result also holds if we take the subsample of currently married women as often done in labor 
market studies (column 2).  
As a further attempt to shed light on the overall welfare effect experienced by households, we 
investigate changes in the nutritional status of children below the age of five, born to the women 
    ur sampl . W  a m a  subs a   a      h   d a  ha  ch ldr  ’s h al h  mpr v s as a 
c  s qu  c   f w m  ’s   cr as d    a  m        mpl ym   , which is expected to work 
through the channel of greater bargaining power within the household. Thus, in Table 3.6 using 
subsampl s  f ch ldr   b l w  h  a    f f v  w    v s   a   ch ldr  ’s a  hr p m  r cs      rms 
of wasting, stunting, and underweight. In line with the positive effects on wom  ’s  mpl ym    
found in the previous regressions, our results indicate that households who are more exposed to 
 h  r fu      fl w ar  b    r  ff      rms  f ch ldr  ’s  u r     al s a us. Th s ma ch s w  h 
studies indicating that an increase in household income allows a more diverse intake of food 
                                                        
 
 
51 The asset index is divided into five wealth categories: poorest, poor, middle, richer, richest. 
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(Doan, 2014), especially if the income is put into the hands of women. For instance, Ornaheim 
(2016) f  ds  ha   r a  r   c m  fr m m  h rs’ employment translates to higher consumption 
of market-purchased inputs such as food, which in turn improves nutritional outcomes. Overall, 
these results support the notion that a temporary refugee inflow induces a positive impact on 
b  h  h  w lfar  s a us  f  h  h us h lds a d ch ldr  ’s h al h  u c m s. Y  ,  h y d        ll us 
anything about potential underlying mechanisms, which we discuss in the subsequent Section 
3.9. 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Binary outcome – Households of low/lowest wealth quintiles (poor/poorest==1), 2001-2011 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Poor/Poorest HH 
(Full sample) 
Poor/Poorest HH 
(Sample: 
Currently married) 
Log(RIc,t+1) -0.0909*** -0.100*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0146) 
Female age 0.000818 -0.0131*** 
 (0.00240) (0.00339) 
Female age2 -6.32e-05 0.000132*** 
 (3.85e-05) (5.12e-05) 
Female educ.(years) -0.0355*** -0.0344*** 
 (0.000814) (0.00105) 
Husba d’s a    -0.00186*** 
  (0.000460) 
Husba d’s  duca      -0.0249*** 
  (0.00333) 
Log (Night-time light) -0.00210* -0.00163 
 (0.00117) (0.00142) 
Distance to next water source (km) -1.23e-07 -6.86e-08 
 (1.83e-07) (2.24e-07) 
Km to DRC boarder 0.000275 0.000132 
 (0.000181) (0.000216) 
Year=2006 -0.432*** -0.483*** 
 (0.0507) (0.0638) 
Year=2011 -0.155*** -0.172*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0253) 
Married 0.0502***  
 (0.00740)  
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Constant 1.297*** 1.723*** 
 (0.0800) (0.102) 
Observations 18,682 12,079 
R-squared 0.318 0.318 
Base category (0): Middle, Richer, Richest. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
District and month of interview dummies included in all specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Health undernutrition outcomes of children below the age of 5 years, 2001-2011 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Stunted Wasted Underweight 
Log(RIc,t+1) -0.0412* -0.0249** -0.0511** 
 (0.0249) (0.0112) (0.0201) 
Female education(years) -0.0144*** -0.00231** -0.00928*** 
 (0.00185) (0.000944) (0.00166) 
Female age -0.0102 -0.00167 -0.00515 
 (0.00707) (0.00391) (0.00644) 
Female age2 0.000150 2.73e-05 0.000100 
 (0.000116) (6.45e-05) (0.000107) 
Log (Night-time light) 0.00600*** -0.000504 0.00238 
 (0.00225) (0.00155) (0.00226) 
Distance to next water source 
(km) 
-1.80e-08 2.02e-07 -9.76e-08 
 (4.28e-07) (2.11e-07) (3.91e-07) 
Km to DRC boarder 0.000354 0.000218 -1.94e-05 
 (0.000412) (0.000198) (0.000375) 
Urban -0.0701*** -0.0115 -0.0892*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0104) (0.0162) 
Year=2006 -0.124 -0.0959* -0.172** 
 (0.107) (0.0492) (0.0870) 
Year=2011 -0.00103 -0.0520** -0.0248 
 (0.0420) (0.0223) (0.0362) 
Constant 0.884*** 0.161 0.716*** 
 (0.184) (0.103) (0.166) 
Observations 4,958 4,962 4,958 
R-squared 0.058 0.027 0.052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District and month of  interview dummies 
included in all specifications. 
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3.6.4 Social Cohesion Among the Host Population 
Using the same treatment indicator as applied in Section 3.6.1, we find that an increase in the 
refugee index is associated with higher levels of the equality index, i.e. with higher levels of 
perceived equality b  w    r fu   ’s own ethnic group and fellow Ugandans. As described in 
Section 3.5.1, the index is composed of two variables, one indicating perceptions regarding equal 
treatment of the ethnic group by the government and the second variable measuring economic 
equality of the household in comparison to other Ugandans. Households with more exposure to 
refugees have slightly higher levels of adherence to their national identity over their ethnic 
group. This variable is positive and significant at the 10% level. Differentiating between trust 
towards state institutions and generalized interpersonal trust, we do not find significant results 
for any indicator. While the variables included in the institutional trust index are generally 
positively related with greater exposure with refugee settlements52, this is not the case for the 
interpersonal trust variable. Here, our results are not significant at conventional levels. All 
regressions include regional and year fixed effects. We used various different treatment 
indicators53 as robustness check, which give similar results to the ones reported here. In order to 
keep the interpretation simple and be able to differentiate across the different social cohesion 
components, we refrain from constructing an aggregated SCI index, which is done by Langer et 
al. (2016).  
 
Table 3.7 Social Cohesion Indicators measured at the individual level 
Langer et al. 
dimension 
Inequality Identity Trust 
 
Perceived 
equality 
Adherence to national 
identity 
 
Institutional 
trust 
Interpersonal 
trust 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.0616*** 0.0452* 0.0034 -0.0246 
p-value (0.00000) (0.06190) (0.76959) (0.13601) 
N 10,776 9,398 10,593 6,987 
Regional FE yes yes yes yes 
                                                        
 
 
52 See Table 3B.2 (Appendix) for the results of the individual variables included in the aggregated 
measures.  
53 This included peak population data vs. peak inflows as well as constant treatment indicators focussing 
on the distance to refugee settlements. 
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Year FE yes yes yes yes 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values in parentheses, robust standard errors clustered at PSU level.  
 
The reference frame for interpreting social cohesion indicators is mostly not adequately defined. 
Oftentimes it is measured at the individual level, yet social cohesion generally is a group 
phenomenon. To account for this, we also collapse the data to the next higher level, the PSU. 
R sul s a   h s ‘    hb rh  d’ l v l ar  v ry s m lar     h    d v dual level results (refer to Table 
3.8). 
For the period of 2005 to 2012, Langer et al. (2016) have shown that social cohesion in Uganda 
seems to have decreased after 2005 and slightly increased from 2012 onwards without reaching 
the initial levels. Our results differ from those reported by Langer et al. (2016). We find that an 
increase in the refugee index seems to foster the perception of economic equality among the 
host population. While Langer et al. (2016) argued that the negative change in social cohesion 
was in line with an increased ethnicization of politics, it is possible that relative equality is 
associated with aid money following the inflows of refugees. To the extent that international 
donors follow area- rather than group-specific targeting and to the extent that respondents do 
not differentiate between services provided by the government and international donors, our 
refugee index may plausibly be associated with increased perceptions of equality among the 
host population. Also increasing economic opportunities for all households in closer proximity 
to refugee settlements might have supported equality. As described in Section 3.3, refugee 
camps have been set up in rural and less advanced areas of Uganda. Hence, economic 
possibilities might have been less pronounced, feeling communities left behind. Refugee 
presence and well documented increases in economic activities (e.g., Betts et al., 2014) might 
have led to welfare gains within these communities, resulting in a feeling of greater equality. 
Presence of different nationalities within the communities might have also deflected attention 
away from ethnic groups. The increased perceived equality in ethnic group treatment as well as 
the increase of adherence to the national (Ugandan) identity points towards this direction. On a 
positive note, identification with the nation state is a positive characteristic of a coherent 
society, which in the case of Uganda has often been challenged by ethnic conflicts. On the other 
hand, this result might hint at the fact that the host population aims at differentiating themselves 
fr m  h  ‘  wly arr v d   h rs’, wh ch w uld     rally b      rpr   d as a l w r l v l  f s c al 
cohesion. Hence, besides strengthening ties among the host population, this finding might 
simultaneously point towards discrimination against other nationalities. Neither trust in 
institutions nor in people is significantly associated with the refugee index.  
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Table 3.8 Social cohesion indicators collapsed to the PSU level 
 Inequality Identity 
Trust 
 
Institutional Interpersonal 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.0622** 0.0316 0.0079 -0.0332 
p-value (0.01232) (0.43334) (0.58577) (0.14527) 
N 1,396 1,104 1,389 840 
Regional FE Yes yes yes yes 
Year FE Yes yes yes yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values in parentheses, robust standard errors clustered at district level.  
 
 
 
3.7 Robustness of Results and Study’s Limitations 
3.7.1 Robustness Checks  
The above regression results are based on several identifying assumptions and specification 
choices. Therefore, we examine their robustness regarding a number of possible threats to our 
identification strategy, such as (1) DHS sampling design and seasonality effects; (2) a potential 
endogenous refugee index and alternative calculations of the index related to stock vs. inflow 
numbers; (3) different samples. 
3.7.2 DHS Sampling Design and Seasonality effects? 
One concern in our analysis is related to the sampling design of the DHS data, which may 
potentially lead to spurious seasonality effects in our results. While DHS interviews are 
conducted during different times throughout the year, seasonality patterns differ throughout 
Uganda. Thus, monthly interview dummies might not sufficiently capture differences in 
seasonality. If the DHS data sampling procedure in those years with high refugee inflows 
happened to occur when the South-Western region was in planting or harvesting season while 
the remaining districts were sampled in lean season, we would find a highly significant spurious 
effect on female work in agricultural households, particularly those that are subsistence 
oriented. Yet, this scenario is very unlikely as the DHS intended to implement a random 
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sampling of the clusters.54 We nevertheless implement different strategies to prove that our 
results are not biased by sampling procedures and seasonality patterns of the data. First, Figure 
3B.3 provides evidence that the average distance from clusters to settlements is comparable for 
all three DHS rounds. Only the first wave (2000) includes more clusters located closer to the 
settlements, which would mean that our impacts may actually be underestimated (lower bound 
estimates).55 Moreover, there is no huge variation across regions in Uganda regarding crop-
growing times except for the fact that the Northern part (which is largely excluded) has only one 
growing season. As the lean period (months characterized by little or no harvest) lasts from 
April to June for all regions, the majority of the DHS interviews were conducted during 
harvesting seasons from August to February (FAO GIEWS, 2018). We further test the assumption 
that our coefficients are not biased by seasonality patterns by including a proxy for droughts, 
which is the length of the growing season. If farmers experience a prolonged drought period, 
growing times will be substantially reduced (Kansiime et al., 2016). Table 3B.5 depicts that our 
employment outcomes are robust to both the length of the harvesting season in a district, as well 
as the inclusion of seasonal/occasional work at the regional level. A further test of restricting the 
sample to the Western and Central region supports our central findings, as shown in Appendix 
Table 3B.8, column (3). 
3.7.3 Alternatives to the Refugee Index and Potential Endogeneity 
A further concern relates to the potential endogeneity of the refugee inflows used in the 
construction of our refugee index. It could be the case that despite strict governmental rules 
regarding the allocation to settlements, refugees systematically self-selected into certain 
settlements due to e.g., higher expectations of job opportunities. This would lead in turn to 
spurious estimates. We therefore substitute our refugee inflow figures with one for all three 
settlements in the treatment period, as already briefly described in Section 3.5. This alternative 
calculation reduces de facto our treatment variable to the distance to settlements. Table 3B.7 
(Appendix), column (1) shows that there are no significant changes to our results, suggesting 
                                                        
 
 
54 If there is no systematic bias in selecting DHS clusters within districts, i.e. if the selection of clusters is 
random, there should not be any problem about seasonality issues. 
55 If we assume that sampled clusters are overall located closer to settlements in the pre-shock period, this 
would lead to a higher refugee index for the post-shock waves. This in turn might narrow down the gap 
between (treatment and control) pre-and post-shock period, which  suggests a downward bias 
(underestimation) of the reported effects.  
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that our estimates do not suffer from any endogeneity bias and simultaneously indicating that it 
 s pr x m  y      w  c   m c  pp r u     s ra h r  ha   h  r la  v  s z   f  h  “sh ck”  ha  
matters most in our case. 
Next, we compute several alternatives to the treatment variable to prove the robustness of our 
main coefficient of interest. First, we include the refugee inflow/distance component of all three 
camps separately into the regression, to reject the risk that one specific refugee settlement is 
driving our results. Table 3B.7 (row 4) confirms that all three settlements have an almost equal 
 ff c      ur  u c m  var abl , w m  ’s  mpl ym   , w  h Nakivale (which experienced the 
largest refugee inflow) having the largest impact.  
Following Baez (2011) and Maystadt & Verwimp (2014), we test if our treatment variable, 
Refugee shock  
  
    
 
 
   
   , remains robust to the use of different spatial weights in the 
 r a m    r fu      d x var abl , w  h α  qual    0.5, 1, 2, 3. Pu  s mply,  f w  cha    α fr m 1    
2, i.e. if we place a higher weight on the distance, the effect of refugee numbers is diluted by 
distance.56 As expected, the regression coefficients of our treatment variable are larger for 
smaller weights (e.g. 0.5), and smaller for larger weights (e.g. 2) (again at the median value of 
the refugee shock). 
In the baseline regression, we model the inflows of refugee settlements as linear effects and 
assum   ha  w m  ’s  xp sur      h  r fu      fl ws  s a fu c      f b  h pr x m  y     h  
settlements and the number of inflows. However, other studies (Maystadt & Verwimp, 2014, 
etc.) find a non-monotonic relationship between refugee inflows and their outcome variable, 
consumption. To contribute to that discussion, we introduce the squared term of the RI index to 
our regression in Table 3B.7. Indeed, the significant coefficient of the squared RI hints to a 
nonlinear relationship and diminishing returns between refugee inflows and female 
employment. We do expect the women living very close to the settlements to be the ones most 
positively affected by the inflow and the economic opportunities created by an increased 
demand for agricultural products and other services, while the benefits vanish with an 
increasing distance to the settlements.  
                                                        
 
 
56 For instance, for 100km distance and α=2, the effect of the same number of refugees is weighted by 
1002=10,000km, which means that refugee inflows are diluted more by distance. If we take alpha=0.5, the 
effect of the same number of refugees does not dilute that fast, since we have 1000.5=10km. 
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We also implement alternative versions of our treatment variable by substituting the inflow 
refugee values with a level of the settlement population variable (by adding up the different 
inflow years from 1995 onwards), measuring the stock of the refugee population, rather than 
inflow figures.57 Again, we obtain similar coefficients compared to our baseline results.  
We also provide evidence that the effect of the Congolese refugees on our outcome variables is 
not altered significantly by adding the stock of refugees in the three settlements originating from 
other countries (such as Burundi, Rwanda or Sudan) to the specification. This would rather 
reflect the long-term effects of refugee presence (also see Kreibaum, 2016). In the main 
specification (column 1) of Table 3B.1, the coefficient is statistically significant, but the size of 
the effect is extremely small. However, one would expect business opportunities to continuously 
exist, and last over time. This means that in our case, the effect is driven by large numbers of the 
refugee inflow, i.e. new economic opportunities rather than established ones.  
3.7.4 Robustness to Geography and Different Sample Size 
We now explore the robustness of our estimation results to changes in the sample. First, we 
exclude all remaining Northern districts from the sample (eight in total), which have been 
occasionally affected by the conflicts of the LRA during 2008-2011 (UNHCR, 2018).58 Second, we 
further restrict the sample to the Central and Western regions only, in order to see if our results 
change remarkably after removing all households in districts with large distance to our 
settlements. However, we do not observe any qualitative changes in our results after adjusting 
the sample in Table 3B.8 accordingly. We do find a slight increase of the coefficient when 
reducing the sample to the Central/Western regions, which is as expected since the included 
clusters are in closer proximity to the settlements.  
3.8 Limitations 
The variety of robustness checks above document that our results hold in terms of different 
samples and alternative specifications of our treatment variable. Further, we successfully 
tackled potential endogeneity issues. However, some limitations of our analysis remain.  
                                                        
 
 
57 We recognize that this is a rather weak measure since we lack data on outflows of the settlements. 
58 Five Northern districts (Moyo, Adjumani, Kitgum, Pader and Gulu) were heavily affected by conflicts 
and are therefore dropped from the entire sample (see Section 5.4). 
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One main concern is that we cannot test if our estimates are confounded by internal migration, 
since we lack data whether women have moved away from their initial location/place of 
residence. However, we came across neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence for substantial 
migratory movements of this kind. This is also supported by Kreibaum (2016), who also does 
not find an indication for large scale migration between districts in Uganda.  Our consistent 
results across a variety of robustness checks provide an example for the beneficial impact of 
refugee settlements on economic and selected welfare indicators of the host population. Yet, it is 
worth mentioning that our observed results are only average effects, which could potentially 
mask interesting heterogeneity in welfare changes. Therefore, we test for various interaction 
effects in Appendix Table 3B.9, which provide evidence that our effects do not significantly vary 
by w m  ’s  duca      r by  h  w al h s a us  f h us h lds. Als , w  ca     f  d  v d  c   ha  
female headed households are differently affected by the refugee numbers, as the respective 
coefficients in column 5 are not significant.59 
Our study sheds light upon potential impacts of refugee inflows within a setting  characterized 
by relative strong interaction between refugee and host population. Hence, we fully 
acknowledge that our results are context-specific and might not apply to more isolated refugee 
situations. As Ugandan settlements are marked by an intensive interaction between locals and 
refugees in various economic and social activities, this allows for a more direct impact on local 
markets and societies. We expect, however, that previous exposure to high refugee numbers has 
contributed to this interaction between the host population and new arrivals. Due to data 
constraints, we also recognize that our estimates are not able to shed light on the effects on the 
male population in terms of labor market outcomes. Further, due to data constraints we are 
limited to the perspective of the host population, and we therefore cannot draw any conclusions 
about the welfare status of the refugees themselves. 
3.9 Discussion 
Using insights from qualitative interviews that we conducted in the Nakivale settlement in 
201860 (supported by other reports), we hypothesize some possible channels through which the 
inflow of Congolese refugees may have positively influenced female employment, particularly in 
the self-employed agricultural sector. The first potential channel relates to increased access to 
                                                        
 
 
59 Regression results are shown in Appendix Table 3B.9, column 3-5. 
60 See Appendix for qualitative data (personal interviews) that was collected.  
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agricultural markets in proximity to the settlements and changes in the sales structures. 
Previous to the refugee inflows, there existed no systematic structure for small scale producers 
to sell their surpluses generated by agricultural activities. Travelling themselves to markets 
within and outside the settlements was often assessed to be prohibitively expensive, particularly 
for those situated in remote places. However, increased refugee inflows lead to an increasing 
population within the camp and to more people producing small surpluses across the 
settlements. As a result, a middle-men trading structure was established over time, such that so-
call d “m ddl m  ” buy pr duc  fr m small farm rs a d  h   s ll  h m a  lar  r mark  s w  hin 
and outside the settlements otherwise too far to be easily reached by the farmers themselves.61 
This offered new opportunities to sell surplus from agricultural products for people living in 
rural areas both within and around the settlements. In other contexts, such as Kenia, Alix-Garcia 
et al. (2017) describe that market structures for trading of services and goods are better 
developed within the camp than in neighboring towns. Similar mechanisms are reported in 
Tanzania, where the arrival of refugees triggered remote villages to become integrated into a 
trading regime and improved transportation network (Landau, 2002). Maystadt & Duranton 
(2014) suggest increased road construction and herewith reduced transportation costs among 
the effects of the refugee influx.  
Second, population growth triggered by the inflow of refugees generates increased economic 
potential in general. Given that the refugee population is approx. 1/5 of the overall district 
population (100,000/500,000), it creates more demand for agricultural products. While this 
could potentially overburden local economies in the short-run, and while we cannot disentangle 
temporal dynamics involved, we see beneficial net effects for the period under consideration. An 
additional avenue for beneficial welfare effects among host populations is related to increased 
labor supply as refugees work as cheap laborers on the farms of Ugandans. Particularly, in a 
situation of high demand for agricultural produce, this enables the host population to increase 
the potential of their agricultural land to the extent that previously human resources might have 
                                                        
 
 
61 Nak val  a d Kya  wal  r fu    s   l m   s ar  b  h l ca  d    U a da’s rural c u  rys d , s para  d 
by long distances and poor roads from their nearest urban commercial centers of Mbarara and Hoima, 
respectively (Betts et al, 2014). For instance, the market in Mbarara is around 42 km away from the 
Nakivale settlement, which takes approx. 1.5 hours by car. 
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been a limiting factor and crowding out effects of local populations are limited in size.62 Further 
anecdotal evidence from Nakivale and Kyangwali settlements report that aid organizations such 
as UNHCR, OPM, etc. provide specific trainings for women deliberately including both host 
population and refugees. These trainings generate knowledge to improve farming, skills training 
on crops and livestock production, as well as enabling participants to start farming activities 
while fostering inter-group relations (UNHCR, 2013; personal interviews 2018). Hence, host 
community women might now be more skilled to generate and sell agricultural surpluses.  
A further possible scenario is that host community males in particular are switching to better-
paid jobs in the formal sector offered by nongovernmental organizations or public services, 
which were created due to the increased presence of refugees (UNHCR report 2017), while 
w m   m  h  subs   u   mal s’ lab r f rc      h  a r cul ural s c  r. Th s  s r la  d    a  
  s d r’s adva  a    ha  all ws  h m    ‘cl mb  h  ladd r’     h  l cal lab r f rc . 
Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow us to investigate these mechanisms quantitatively and 
disentangle the driving mechanism of the observed improvement in our estimation results. 
3.10 Conclusion 
While the public debate is currently dominated by the economic and social costs of hosting 
refugees, our study draws a more nuanced picture. Uganda has been praised as a country that 
offers refugees the opportunity to participate economically and socially by allowing them to e.g., 
work and own businesses and to further foster interaction between host and refugee population 
by establishing joint public services. We find that women living in households that experienced a 
higher refugee intensity in terms of living in close proximity to refugee settlements and in terms 
of increased inflow of refugees show higher employment rates particularly in agricultural self-
employment compared to women living farther away. Moreover, we observe beneficial effects 
on household welfare and nutritional outcomes of children proxied by reduced wasting, stunting 
                                                        
 
 
62 Another potential mechanism relates to price stability and increased demand. In Uganda, each arriving 
household has received a plot of land and a starting kit for agricultural production. In the short-run, an 
exogenous rise in demand by refugees is expected to increase prices in local markets (though this can be 
reduced by food aid providing in the short-run). In the medium-term and longer-run, providing refugees 
with these assets serves to stabilize agricultural prices surrounding the camp due to the refugees` 
potential to trade their surplus for other goods and also creates demand for non-agricultural products 
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). 
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and underweight. A battery of robustness checks confirms that the results are persistent for 
different specifications, samples, and after addressing potential endogeneity issues. Hence, more 
intense refugee presence is related to positive economic outcomes for females, their children 
and households more generally.  
B s d s a   c   m c  mpac , w  als  s udy  h   ff c       d v duals’ a d c mmu     s’ 
indicators of social cohesion –  h  ‘ lu ’  ha  h lds a s c   y      h r. Th  r sul s ar  amb  u us 
and not straightforward to interpret. While we find no effect on different aspects of trust, we do 
find our refugee index to be associated with an increased perception of equality among the host 
population. This might be related to greater economic opportunities and herewith, labor force 
participation. Further, we see an increased adherence to the Ugandan nationality. While this can 
be positively interpreted as a support for the nation state over ethnic identities, this might also 
hint at the fact that the host population uses this to differentiate themselves from the refugee 
population. This could potentially lead to or reflect discrimination and should be regarded 
carefully.  
We acknowledge that due to data constraints we cannot exactly verify the channels through 
which the improvement of female employment and household welfare took place. Nevertheless, 
we present several potential mechanisms based on qualitative interviews that we conducted in 
Nakivale, the largest of the three refugee settlements in our study, and further qualitative 
reports. Factors that might explain the results include greater demand induced by refugees, 
improved trading-structures established in reaction to more agricultural small-scale production 
within the settlements, and increased skills and knowledge acquired through trainings in 
farm    ac  v    s. Our r sul s ar     l    w  h  h  r c   ly ra s d  arra  v   f ‘r fu    
 c   m  s’ – describing refugees as economic actors and herewith changing the obsolete picture 
of the reducing refugees to being dependent human being (Betts et al., 2014). Important policy 
implications resulting from these narratives and our results are that international organizations 
and governments should further support the ability of the host population to exploit the 
increased demand and business potentials provoked by refugees and to lift labor market 
restrictions. Fostering economic activities between refugees and host populations is expected to 
ensure and may further increase economic benefits induced by the inflow and presence of 
refugees. At the same time, the social impact of large numbers of newly arriving populations on 
hosting communities has to be carefully observed to safeguard social cohesion.  
Overall, this study shows economic benefits to local population when the host country facilitates 
labor market access and self-sufficiency of refugees. The progressive refugee laws in Uganda 
further supported interactions between refugees and the host population by various strategies 
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e.g., providing joint trainings in agricultural skills to strengthen the socioeconomic status of both 
the refugees and local population. Yet, the Ugandan refugee policy has been recently criticized, 
as an essential part of the Refugee Law, the land plots allocated to refugees, have shrunken 
substantially over the last years due to land scarcity. Further, changing rainfall patterns due to 
climate change have deteriorated harvest outcomes. These factors endanger the self-reliance 
approach of the Ugandan government, which implies that new strategies need to be developed 
and rolled-out to facilitate the economic participation of refugees and to avoid secondary 
conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.11 Appendix 
Table 3B.1 Non-linear (logit) models for binary outcomes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Women's 
employment 
Agri. Self -
employed 
Agri. Family Agric. others 
Log(RIc,t+1) 0.236*** 0.704*** -0.541*** -0.118 
 (0.0803) (0.0831) (0.0999) (0.179) 
Stock of refugees 2.20e-05*** 1.19e-05** -1.73e-05** 7.32e-06 
 (5.81e-06) (4.95e-06) (7.49e-06) (8.81e-06) 
Female education(years) 0.00657 -0.0731*** -0.0234*** -0.115*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00591) (0.00745) (0.0132) 
Female age 0.262*** 0.125*** -0.284*** -0.00214 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0170) (0.0287) 
Female age2 -0.00329*** -0.00142*** 0.00372*** -0.000238 
 (0.000244) (0.000236) (0.000273) (0.000465) 
Married 0.168*** 0.788*** -0.556*** -1.035*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0514) (0.0584) (0.0981) 
Female HH head 0.170*** 0.0215 -0.334*** -0.200** 
 (0.0480) (0.0476) (0.0593) (0.100) 
HH size -0.0430*** -0.00625 0.0726*** -0.0223 
 (0.00627) (0.00673) (0.00763) (0.0155) 
Wealth poor -0.0886 -0.130** 0.109 -0.176 
 (0.0726) (0.0639) (0.0708) (0.129) 
Wealth middle -0.152** -0.174*** 0.111 -0.484*** 
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 (0.0738) (0.0668) (0.0754) (0.141) 
Wealth richer -0.283*** -0.265*** -0.0623 -0.530*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0692) (0.0811) (0.148) 
Wealth richest -0.412*** -0.956*** -0.376*** -0.290* 
 (0.0846) (0.0859) (0.105) (0.171) 
Lagged log (Night-time light) 0.00206 -0.0107 -0.0229*** 0.0190 
 (0.00727) (0.00746) (0.00845) (0.0182) 
Distance to next water 
source(km) 
-2.17e-06* 7.00e-07 1.16e-06 -1.12e-06 
 (1.29e-06) (1.17e-06) (1.55e-06) (2.54e-06) 
Km to DRC border -0.00114 -0.00177 0.00119 0.00282 
 (0.00122) (0.00111) (0.00134) (0.00231) 
Urban -0.291*** -0.858*** -1.079*** 0.735*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0704) (0.103) (0.136) 
Constant -3.468*** -5.927*** 4.885*** -0.577 
 (0.539) (0.539) (0.625) (1.168) 
Observations 18,682 15,023 15,025 15,019 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.12 
 
 
 
Table 3B.2 Separate indicators of the Social Cohesion Index measured at the individual level 
 
 
Inequality Institutional Trust 
 
=1 if own econ 
condition is same 
compared to 
others 
=1 if own 
ethnicity was 
never treated 
unfairly by 
government 
=1 if trusts 
police a lot 
=1 if trusts 
courts a lot 
=1 if trusts 
electoral 
commission a 
lot 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.0399*** 0.0838*** 0.0204 0.0185 -0.0265* 
p-value (0.00850) (0.00000) (0.20037) (0.17933) (0.05595) 
N 11,425 11,198 11,867 11,891 11,248 
Regional FE yes yes yes yes 
 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values in parentheses, robust standard errors clustered at PSU level.  
 
 
Table 3B.3 Two-group mean comparison test in 1995, low refugee intensity districts (control) 
vs. high refugee intensity districts (treatment) 
 
Differences in means 
[mean(control)–
mean(treatment)] 
T-statistic 
W m  ’s  mpl ym    -0.0664*** (-4.80) 
Sector occupation -0.354*** (-6.71) 
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Agri. Self -employed -0.133*** (-7.69) 
Agri. Work for family 0.0194 (1.46) 
Agri. Work for others -0.00328 (-0.67) 
Female educ in years 0.401*** (3.76) 
Female age in years -0.801** (-3.17) 
Female age in years2 -48.46** (-3.18) 
Currently married 0.0548*** (4.12) 
Number of hh members 0.405*** (4.13) 
Female hh head -0.0446*** (-3.53) 
HH Wealth 0.108* (2.53) 
Urban 0.132*** (9.71) 
Observations 6227  
T-statistics in parentheses,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
Table 3B.4 Placebo Model, 1995/2000- Treatment if the d s r c  w ll hav  a “high refugee 
intensity”     h  future 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Women's 
employment 
Agric. Self-
employed 
Agric. work 
for family 
Agric. Work 
others 
Treatment if district will have a  
“h  h r fu         s  y”     h  fu ur  
0.0010 
(0.98159) 
-0.0237 
(0.64107) 
0.0354 
(0.46382) 
0.0007 
(0.93885) 
Female educ.(years) 0.0058*** -0.0136*** -0.0027* -0.0038*** 
 (0.00678) (0.00000) (0.05855) (0.00341) 
HH size -0.0080*** -0.0108*** 0.0120*** 0.0006 
 (0.00297) (0.00418) (0.00003) (0.59314) 
Female age in years 0.0112*** 0.0080*** -0.0062*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00069) 
Female hh head 0.0545*** -0.0600*** -0.0208 0.0179*** 
 (0.00098) (0.00023) (0.20361) (0.00502) 
Wealth poor 0.0641* 0.0101 -0.0193 0.0002 
 (0.06223) (0.62654) (0.31141) (0.98147) 
Wealth middle 0.0474 0.0114 -0.0298* 0.0070 
 (0.15811) (0.61668) (0.09817) (0.36725) 
Wealth richer 0.0063 0.0124 -0.0907*** 0.0059 
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 (0.87336) (0.67961) (0.00031) (0.52027) 
Wealth richest -0.0394 -0.1156*** -0.1604*** 0.0306 
 (0.31312) (0.00480) (0.00000) (0.15800) 
Urban -0.0991*** -0.2791*** -0.0727*** 0.0171 
 (0.00040) (0.00000) (0.00062) (0.13376) 
Constant 0.4050*** 0.4998*** 0.4092*** 0.0666*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00134) 
Observations 12,622 8,717 8,746 8,722 
R-squared 0.076 0.185 0.085 0.013 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B.1 L   ar  r  d  f f mal  lab r f rc  par  c pa     ra  s (m a )    “h  h      s ” r fu    
d s r c s vs. “l w      s ” r fu    d s r c s b f r  a d af  r  h   r a m    period 
 
 
S urc : Au h rs’ calcula    s. 
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Figure 3B.2 Average distance from clusters to refugee settlements (km) for DHS and Afrobarometer 
Data 
  
S urc : Au h rs’ calcula    s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B.3 Kernel density estimates of cluster to settlements average distance for all three waves 
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Table 3B.5 Controlling length of the growing season and seasonal work per district 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
W m  ’s 
Employment 
Status 
W m  ’s 
Employment 
Status 
Agricultural self-
employed 
Agricultural self-
employed 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) 
District level     
Length of Growing Season 0.06***  -0.02  
 (0.019)  (0.024)  
Seasonal/Occasional Work  -0.28***  0.11 
  (0.089)  (0.111) 
Observations 12,079 12,079 10,352 10,352 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. District and month of interview dummies 
included in all specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3B.6 Descriptive statistics: Afrobarometer Data 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Full 
sample 
Above median 
of the refugee 
index 
Below median 
of the refugee 
index 
Difference 
(3)-(2) 
T-
statistic 
Log(RIc,t +1) 2.27 3.14 2.10 -1.05 -22.04 
SCI inequality component 0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.01 -0.74 
"=1 if own economic condition 
is the same compared to 
others" 
0.25 0.23 0.25 0.02 1.50 
"=1 if own ethnicity was never 
treated unfairly by 
government" 
0.25 0.28 0.25 -0.03 -3.06 
SCI identity component 0.37 0.29 0.39 0.10 7.84 
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SCI institutional trust 
component 
0.21 0.23 0.20 -0.03 -3.33 
"=1 if trusts electoral 
commission a lot" 
0.21 0.23 0.21 -0.02 -2.34 
"=1 if trusts police a lot" 0.17 0.19 0.16 -0.02 -2.36 
"=1 if trusts courts a lot" 0.24 0.28 0.24 -0.04 -3.88 
"=1 if thinks most people can 
be trusted" 
0.16 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.92 
N 11902 1924 9978   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3B.7 Robustness to alternatives to the refugee index (summary), 2001-2011 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Women’s 
Employment 
Women agricultural self-
employed 
Constant refugee inflow (=1) for each camp   
log ( 
 
    
 
 
   
  + 1    
2.596*** 
(0.493) 
 
Refugee Settlements separately included:   
Kyaka II settlement      ( 
          
           
    
0.0240* 
(0.0122) 
 
Nakivale settlement       
          
           
  ) 
0.0498*** 
(0.0113) 
 
Kyangwali settlement ( 
           
            
  ) 
0.0395*** 
(0.0124) 
 
Spatial weights:   
A. RI w  h α=0.5 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
B. RI w  h α=2 0.0165*** 0.0234*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
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C. RI w  h α=3 0.2120*** 0.3235*** 
 (0.072) (0.076) 
D. RI w  h α=1 a d w  h u  l   0.0009*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
U-shaped relationship:   
E. Log(RIc,t+1) -0.2117*** -0.1016*** 
 (0.033) (0.043) 
F. Log(RIc,,t)2 0.0341*** 0.0324*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
G. Level of settlement population 
log( 
                 
    
 
 
   
  + 1    
0.106*** 
(0.0150) 
0.181*** 
(0.0231) 
District, year dummies  Yes Yes 
Month of interview dummies Yes Yes 
Note: Only the coefficient for the Refugee Index (RIc,t) is reported. All control variables are included. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 3B.8 Alternative samples– Married sample; Northern and Western regions excluded, 2001-2011 
 
VARIABLES (1) 
Married Sample 
(2) 
Northern Districts 
excluded 
(3) 
Central and Eastern 
District 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.0792*** 0.0582*** 0.0795*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0130) (0.0184) 
Stock of refugees -2.92e-07 1.91e-06**  
 (1.19e-06) (7.62e-07)  
Female education(years) 0.00765*** 0.00245** 0.00366*** 
 (0.00113) (0.00102) (0.00129) 
Female age 0.0281*** 0.0577*** 0.0591*** 
 (0.00335) (0.00235) (0.00296) 
Female age2 -0.000319*** -0.000752*** -0.000760*** 
 (4.94e-05) (3.75e-05) (4.74e-05) 
Household size -0.00491*** -0.00882*** -0.00765*** 
 (0.00148) (0.00115) (0.00138) 
Female household head 0.0171* 0.0206*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.00926) (0.00741) (0.00962) 
Wealth poor -0.00669 0.00526 0.0111 
 (0.0123) (0.0115) (0.0155) 
Wealth middle -0.00859 -0.00803 0.0100 
 (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.0160) 
Wealth richer -0.0362** -0.0272** -0.00953 
 (0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0158) 
Wealth richest -0.0602*** -0.0522*** -0.0231 
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 (0.0168) (0.0145) (0.0184) 
Husba d’s a   -0.00102**   
 (0.000478)   
Husba d’s  duca     0.00117   
 (0.00314)   
Lagged Log (Night-time light)  -0.00383*** -0.00355** 
  (0.00141) (0.00153) 
Distance to next water source (km) -3.98e-07 -2.24e-07 -1.28e-07 
 (3.05e-07) (2.46e-07) (3.30e-07) 
Km to DRC boarder 0.000303 0.000191 0.000211 
 (0.000316) (0.000197) (0.000271) 
Urban -0.0901*** -0.0558*** -0.0302** 
 (0.0177) (0.0121) (0.0147) 
Year=2006 0.293*** 0.178*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0580) (0.0776) 
Year=2011 0.258*** 0.250*** 0.304*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0218) (0.0295) 
Constant 0.0493 -0.593*** -0.793*** 
 (0.124) (0.0932) (0.128) 
Observations 12,079 14,713 9,771 
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.183 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. District and month of interview dummies 
  clud d    all sp c f ca    s. D p  d    var abl : w m  ’s  mpl ym   . 
Table 3B.9 Controlling for unobserved district effects and testing interactions between the refugee index 
and female education/ HH wealth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
W m  ’s 
Employme
nt Status 
W m  ’s 
Employme
nt Status 
W m  ’s 
Employment 
Status 
W m  ’s 
Employment 
Status 
W m  ’s 
Employment 
Status 
Log(RIc,t +1) 0.0736** 0.0677** 0.0500** 0.0566** 0.0520** 
 (0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0209) (0.0219) (0.0210) 
Female educ. (years)  0.00188* -0.00428**  0.0524*** 
  (0.00105) (0.00187)  (0.00236) 
  (0.00881)   -0.000685*** 
HH head  0.0278*** 0.0124* 0.0135* (3.58e-05) 
  (0.00787) (0.00719) (0.00725) -0.00806*** 
HH wealth poor  0.000606  0.00133 (0.00117) 
  (0.0105)  (0.0201) -0.0146 
HH wealth middle  -0.00476  -0.0203 (0.0125) 
  (0.0110)  (0.0198) -0.0251** 
HH wealth richer  -0.0238*  -0.0614*** (0.0123) 
  (0.0124)  (0.0212) -0.0517*** 
HH wealth richest  -0.0459***  -0.117*** (0.0137) 
  (0.0147)  (0.0249) -0.0976*** 
Log(RIc,t +1)* Female educ.(years)   0.000876  (0.0157) 
   (0.000584)   
HH wealth poor*Log(RIc,t +1)    -0.00570  
    (0.00674)  
HH wealth middle* Log(RIc,t +1)    -0.00145  
    (0.00679)  
HH wealth richer* Log(RIc,t +1)    0.00476  
    (0.00720)  
HH wealth richest* Log(RIc,t +1)    0.0107  
    (0.00773)  
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Selected Personal Interviews:  
Nakivale Camp, Uganda conducted by Jana Kuhnt from 19.-27.04.2018 
 
Interview with William, from DRC. Arrived in 2006, Refugee Welfare Council 
(RWC) Leader 
 
 When Congolese refugees arrive at the border they go to registration center located at the 
border 
 Within mostly 2 weeks they are then distributed to a camp (priority is given to camps where 
family members are already living), refugees themselves are not able to select a camp 
 After registration in camps, thy receive basic items (towels, blankets etc.) and poles to build 
a house, also seeds for land to produce agricultural products 
 The starting point was farming for economic activities, as well as income generation 
 They mostly produce beans and maize (corn), similar to DRC agricultural production (in DRC 
additionally produced rice) 
 Select their agricultural production according to possibilities of land (what is possible to 
cultivate on this land) 
 There is little competition with the host population 
 Sells his surplus to middle men (which can be refugees and Ugandans) who then sell it at the 
larger markets in e.g. Mbarara 
 No price differences across host or refugee population, same prices in whole camp 
 Agricultural production as food security 
 First wave of refugees in 1990s and then 2006/2008 and since then no possibility to return 
due to continued conflict in DRC 
 Children attend school at camp (joint attendance with host population)  
 Children learn English and sometimes local Ugandan language (Anchovi) 
 English as common language and all live together in one community, children go to same 
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school, use same health center...no open conflicts apart from re-occurring land conflicts 
 
Interview with Thomas, Team Leader UNHCR Nakivale Camp 
 Distribution of refugees at the border (from registration points): according to free capacity 
in camps – good to concentrate on camps with large influx (other small influx might be due 
to family members already present in camp) 
 
Interviews at Market in Nakivale Camp (New Congo) 
 Rwandese refugee women with shops for potatoes 
 Buys potatoes outside of camp from Ugandan farmers and sells it within camp 
 Rwandese refugee family (woman: Ivonne, man: al nur) have small shop for vegetables 
 Vegetables are mostly bought at middlemen who get their products from Ugandans and 
refugee farmers 
 Opened shop in 2002, stable income flows but then 3-4 years ago less agricultural products 
available as land that is located close to Nakivale lake has been captured by Ugandans and 
agricultural production was disabled.  
 Uganda women that opened shop within camp at market to gain from new business 
opportunities 
 Wholesaler for beans 
 Buys from host and refugee farmers 
 Prices are generated by supply  
 Congolese business women, wholesaler for beans 
 Buys from Anchovi (Ugandans) beans and then sells it at market 
 Did not receive any land when arrived in 2011, so had to find alternative business 
opportunities  
 Overall a lot of business in market areas with large economic activity, communication in 
Kiswahili among refugees 
 
Interview with Wholesaler, Active Since 2015 
 Buys sorghum, maize, beans from farmers 
 Host and refugee get same price from him 
 Started with small shop but then is now more middlemen as he then sells the products to 
Ugandans outside of camp 
 Several Ugandans employ refugees outside camp for farm work 
 Agricultural production very dependent upon land availability – decreased in the last years 
due to the fact that a smaller plot of land was distributed to newly arriving refugees  
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4 Does Women’s Labor Force Participation Reduce Domestic 
Violence? Evidence from Jordan 
This article is joint work with Stephan Klasen and has been published in  
Feminist Economics, 2017, 23(1). doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2016.1211305. 
 
Abstract 
E ha c    w m  ’s lab r f rc  par  c pa      s s    as a way    pr m     h  r 
empowerment and improve their well-being and the well-being of their children. The 
empirical literature on the relationship betwe   w m  ’s  mpl ym    s a us a d d m s  c 
violence is less clear-cut. Using quantitative data from Jordan in 2007, this study explores 
 h   ff c   f w m  ’s  mpl ym   , as m asur d by  h  r par  c pa        pa d w rk  u s d  
the home, on reported domestic violence, controlling for the potential endogeneity of 
w m  ’s  mpl ym   , wh ch m  h  b as  h  r la    sh p b  w     mpl ym    a d 
domestic violence. Without taking endogeneity into account, the regression results suggest 
 ha  a w ma ’s par  c pa        paid work enhances violence by her husband. After 
controlling for endogeneity, these results turn out to be insignificant, which suggests that 
w m  ’s w rk s a us has    causal   flu  c     mar  al v  l  c . D ff r    a     b  w    
various types of domestic v  l  c  pr v d s w ak  v d  c   ha  w m  ’s  mpl ym    
lowers sexual violence. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the Middle East, women are about 28 percent of the working population while in comparable 
middle-income countries the proportion is about 43 percent. In 2005, w m  ’s lab r f rc  
participation in Jordan was 14.9 percent, far below regional rates and other lower middle-
income countries (Economic and Social Council 2008; World Bank 2004, Gaddis & Klasen, 2014).  
W m  ’s  mpl ym     s d s rabl        r  s c a d   s rum   al  r u ds.  F ll w    S  ’s 
capab l  y appr ach, w rk c  s   u  s a   mp r a    l m     f w m  ’s w ll-being and 
empowerment (Sen, 1999). Empirical studies indicate that women who have access to economic 
r s urc s   v s      h  r ch ldr  ’s  duca ion and nutrition and preventative healthcare, and 
have lower fertility rates (for example, Vyas & Watts, 2009).  I  fac , w m  ’s  mpl ym    has 
been found to be a robust factor reducing fertility, child mortality, and gender bias in mortality 
(for example, Murthi, Guio & Dreze, 1995; Klasen & Wink, 2003).  Reducing gender gaps in 
employment has also been seen as a determinant of economic growth using cross-national and 
cross-regional studies (Esteve-Volart 2004; Klasen & Lamanna, 2009). 
However, there may als  b     a  v   mpac s  f w m  ’s  mpl ym        h  r w ll-being due to 
an increased risk of domestic violence. Moreover, the link between domestic violence and a 
w ma ’s   v lv m       pa d w rk  s u cl ar. S m  s ud  s f  d a “pr   c  v ”  ff c  s  c  
earned income promotes empowerment, which leads to a better household bargaining 
position.63 O h r s ud  s   d ca    ha  w m  ’s  mpl ym      cr as s sp usal v  l  c , s  c  
husbands see their role as breadwinners undermined.  
A key concern is the potential   d       y  f w m  ’s w rk    s a us a d v  l  c , du     
reverse causality or omitted variable bias. It may be the case that domestic violence leads 
w m      s  k  mpl ym   ,  r  ha  u  bs rv d fac  rs dr v  w m  ’s d c s       fav r  f w rk 
and their husba ds’ v  l  c . F r   s a c ,     h  f rm r cas , a r c    s udy     h  I d a  
context by Bhattacharya 2015 finds that women who experienced spousal violence are more 
likely to be employed than women who are not exposed to violence. To address these issues, 
several linear probability models and probit regressions using instrumental variables are 
                                                        
 
 
63 Incidentally, this is also the implicit position taking by the summary document of the Committee on the 
S a us  f W m    ha  s  s w m  ’s  c   m c  mp w rm    as a cr   cal m a s    r duc  domestic 
violence (United Nations 2013). 
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implemented. While our regular results without controlling for endogeneity indeed show that 
employment outside of the home increases domestic violence, we find a statistically and 
economically insignificant effect of employment on domestic violence in the IV specification, 
suggesting that endogeneity bias is indeed a problem and leads to spurious positive relationship 
between employment and domestic violence. When we disaggregate by different forms of 
domestic violence, these results are replicated for emotional and physical violence. In the case of 
sexual violence, we actually find a weak protective  ff c   f w m  ’s  mpl ym   .  
 
4.2 Theoretical Background: Theories of Domestic Violence 
4.2.1 Bargaining Model 
Non-cooperative bargaining models of domestic violence, such as Farmer & T  f   hal r’s 
(1996), f r cas   ha  a    cr as     w m  ’s  c   m c  mp w rm     hr u h  ar  d   c m   r 
financial support from outside the marriage will lower the level of spousal violence within 
h us h lds. Impr v m   s    w m  ’s f  a c al s a us w ll increase their probability of leaving 
an abusive relationship, which may lead either to the end of the partnership or a decrease in 
violence. Tauchen, Witte & Long (1991) developed a Nash-bargaining model of domestic 
violence to represent the effect of changes in income on domestic violence. In their model, every 
spouse has a specific level of the threat-point which should provide the minimum level of 
w lfar     b  h sp us s w  h    h  r la    sh p. Th  w ma ’s  hr a -point indicates the level of 
violence she is willing to accept without leaving the marriage given a specific amount of financial 
 ra sf rs fr m h r husba d. Th  m d l pr d c s  ha  a    cr as      h  ma ’s   c m    abl s 
h m    “buy” m r  v  l  c  by   cr as     h  f  a c al  ra sf rs    h s w fe. On the other hand, 
a    cr as      h  w ma ’s   c m  c  s ra  s h m    r duc  v  l    b hav  r. S m larly,    
r s urc   h  ry, w m  ’s   c m  l ads    a h  h r h us h ld   c m . Th s r s urc   ff c  
decreases household economic stress and thereby reduces spousal violence (Gelles, 1997). All of 
 h s  m d ls pr d c  a pr   c  v   ff c  f r w m  ’s  mpl ym   . 
4.2.2 Male-backlash models 
S c  l   cal “mal -backlash” m d ls pr d c   h   pp s   . As w m  ’s wa  s   cr as , v  l  c  
against them will be triggered as well, since men consider their traditional gender role to be 
threatened. According to a study of Macmillan & Gartner (1999), marital relationships are 
d m  a  d by s c ally a d cul urally pr scr b d    d r r l s. T   h   x      ha  w m  ’s 
independence changes these roles, women experience more violence since men try to 
compensate for lost authority.  
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As argued by Aizer (2007), male-backlash  h  r  s d      c  s d r w m  ’s ra    al  y 
constraint and ignore the possibility that women can choose to end the relationship (Aizer, 
2007). In Jordan, women do not have attractive outside options. The divorce rate is quite low, 
around 1.96 percent. The legal system, based on Sharia, impedes divorce since separating from 
   ’s husba d  s acc mpa   d by s    f ca   s c al s   ma a d  c   m c d s r ss. I   h s c    x , 
the threat of ending the marriage may not be credible and a bargaining model may not be 
appropriate (Bhattacharya, Bedi, & Chhachhi, 2011). The most frequent divorce procedure is the 
talaq (“arb  rary” d v rc ),  h  r  h     d v rc  w  h u  pr v d    a y l  al r as  s wh ch  s 
exclusively reserved for the husband. The law prescribes  h  w f ’s r  h     f  a c al 
compensation after an arbitrary divorce, and she gets compensated for at least one year and a 
maximum of three years. However, if the wife is seeking a divorce in Jordan, she gives up all her 
financial marital rights and may face an insecure economic situation after divorce (El Azhary, 
2003).  
4.2.3 Previous Empirical Findings 
Th  r c     mp r cal  v d  c      h   ff c s  f w m  ’s  c   m c  mp w rm    is not clear-
cut. Macmillan &  ar   r (1999)   v s   a    h  l  k b  w    w m  ’s  mpl ym    a d 
d m s  c sp usal abus     Ca ada. Th  r f  d   s su   s   ha   h   ff c   f w m  ’s  mpl ym    
   mar  al v  l  c  d p  ds    m  ’s w rk    s a us. If  h  husba d  s u  mpl y d,  h  r sk  f 
violence increases if the woman works, whereas it decreases for working women when the 
husba d  s  mpl y d. Bha  acharya    al. (2011)  xpl r   h  l  k b  w    w m  ’s w rk s a us 
and property ownership and domestic violence in India. Taking into account the potential 
  d       y  f  h s r la    sh p,  h y   s rum    w m  ’s  mpl ym    s a us by  h  
membership in a specific caste.64  
Th   s  ma     r sul s sh w  ha  w m  ’s par  c pa        pa d w rk  s ass c a  d w  h a sharp 
reduction in spousal violence. A further qualitative study by Vyas, Mbwambo & Heise (2015) 
 xpl r s  h  l  k b  w    w m  ’s pa d w rk a d     ma   par   r v  l  c      h  c    x   f 
Tanzania. Focusing on semi-conductive interviews on women engaged in informal-sector 
trading activities,  h y f  d    ass c a     b  w    w m  ’s   d p  d      c m  a d par   r 
                                                        
 
 
64 It is unclear whether this instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction as there might be caste-related 
norms that affect domestic violence directly.   
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violence. Yet, the results suggest that women were able to spend their earned income according 
to their needs, which in turn reduced conflict due to negotiations over money.  
Atkinson, Greenstein & Lang (2005) support the male-backlash theory. They analyze the 
incidence of violence under consideration of cultural variables and traditional gender roles. 
Using an index of traditionalism, the effect of the relative income on the incidence of violence is 
  s  d. Th   s  ma     r sul s   d ca    ha   h  shar   f w m  ’s   c m   s   ly p s   v ly 
correlated with spousal violence if the husband has a traditional ideology. Bloch & Rao (2002) 
use survey data from three villages in India, finding that the risk of spousal violence is higher for 
women from rich households. The regression results suggest that dissatisfied men inflict 
v  l  c      x rac  m r  m   y fr m  h  r w v s’ fam l  s.  
Not many studies are available from Middle Eastern countries. Kishor & Johnson (2004) find a 
p s   v  r la    sh p b  w    w m  ’s pa d w rk a d  h    c d  c   f v  l  c     Iran, and a 
negative significant effect in Egypt. Y u   (2005)   v s   a  s  h  r la    sh p b  w    w ma ’s 
socioeconomic dependence and physical abuse among married women in Egypt. Multivariate 
f  d   s su   s   ha   r a  r d ff r  c s b  w    a w ma  a d h r husba d’s s c   c   m c 
status are associated with a higher probability of physical abuse.  
With the exception of the study by Bhattacharya et al. (2011), none of these studies controls 
 xpl c  ly f r  h    d       y  f w m  ’s  mpl ym   , wh ch may b as  h  r sul s.  
4.3 Data 
The analysis in this paper is based on the household- and women-only questionnaire of the 2007 
Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (JPFHS). The data were collected by Measure DHS 
initiated by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide data for 
demography, health, and nutrition for children and women in developing countries. A nationally 
representative sample of 14,564 households in Jordan were interviewed, including 10,867 ever-
married women in ages 15–49. The nonresponse rate is less than 1 percent. All twelve 
governorates of Jordan are included as well as urban and rural areas and the Badia desert region 
in the south. 
The women-only questionnaire includes a special section regarding domestic violence and 
w m  ’s  mp w rm   . I   rd r     d    fy  f  h  w ma   xp r   c d emotional violence, the 
following questions were asked: Does/did your husband ever: say something to humiliate you in 
front of others/ threaten to hurt or harm you or someone close to you? 
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To reveal the extent of physical violence, they asked: Does/did your husband ever: push you, 
shake you, or throw something at you/ slap you or twist your arm/punch you with his fist or 
with something that could hurt you/ kick you, drag you or beat you up/ try to choke you or burn 
you on purpose/threaten you with a knife, gun, or any other weapon/ attack you with a knife, 
gun, or any other weapon? 
To identify if the women experienced any sexual violence, they asked: Does/did your husband 
ever physically force you to have sexual intercourse with him even when you did not want to? 
These three different kinds of violence, emotional, physical, and sexual, were summarized to an 
index of spousal violence that represents the dependent variable in our regression analysis. If 
any of the three questions are answered with a yes, the variable is one. In a robustness check, we 
also use the three indicators separately. The dependent variable, domestic violence, is a binary 
variable that can only take the values zero or one. A linear probability model is implemented to 
estimate the probability of a woman experiencing domestic violence. As a great proportion of 
predicted probabilities falls between zero and one, the estimates are expected to be unbiased 
and consistent (Horrace & Oaxaca, 2006).65   
4.4 Empirical Specification 
The linear probability model includes socioeconomic characteristics, household data, and 
regional components. The presence of domestic violence is modeled as, 
         DV = β0+ β1 woman’s working status+ β2 Characteristics 
                   Husband/Wife+  β3 HH- Characteristics+ β4 Region+ ϵ i      
 
 
                  
(1) 
 
The dependent variable domestic violence captures the incidence of emotional, physical, and 
s xual v  l  c      h  h us h ld. Th  k y   d p  d    var abl , w ma ’s w rk    s a us, 
indicates whether the woman is involved in paid work outside the home. We also add a range of 
                                                        
 
 
65 It turns out that the predicted probabilities of domestic violence from the main specification all lie in 
the interval (0.017, 0.609) and thus, a linear probability model is expected to yield consistent estimates.   
Moreover, we also estimate a probit model to check for the robustness of the results and found them to be 
virtually identical.  Results are available on request.   
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c   r l var abl s,   clud    charac  r s  cs  f husba d a d w f , such as  duca    , husba d’s 
employment status, age difference between the spouses, and household characteristics, 
including the number of household members as well as economic status.  
Other control variables include the number of co-wives and, given the prevalence of kinship 
marriages in Jordan, the degree of kinship between spouses. Since there are vast differences in 
the economic and social structure of the different governorates of Jordan, they are captured by 
regional dummy variables. ϵi  represents other unobservable factors that are captured by an 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term. 
4.5 Endogeneity Issues 
A k y c  c r      h s r  r ss     s  h  p      al   d       y b  w    w m  ’s w rk    s a us 
and domestic violence. Endogeneity can have several sources, two of which may be present in 
this model, namely simultaneous causality and omitted variables. The presence of violence may 
lead a woman to increase or decrease her willingness to work. Most studies suggest that 
v  l  c  r duc s w m  ’s  mpl ym    du     m   al a d phys cal health consequences (Staggs 
& Riger, 2005; Tolman & Wang, 2005), increasing tardiness and absenteeism (Lloyd, 1997; 
Riger, Ahrens & Blickenstaff, 2000). On the other hand, women who are suffering from abuse 
might be more likely than non-abused women to seek paid work (Narayan et al., 2000). Studies 
from developing countries find mixed results as regards the probability that an abused woman 
works outside the home, since abused women are both more likely and less likely to work 
(Morrison & Orlando, 1999). In this case, causality would run both ways, leading to a biased 
coefficient on women’s  mpl ym   . 
Work status and domestic violence are driven by a third unobserved factor, traditionalism. 
These two possibilities of endogeneity suggest that in equation (1) the observed relationship 
b  w    w m  ’s w rk    s a us a d d m s  c v  l  c  may be biased or even spurious. 
However, the direction of bias can be ambiguous. Although employment status and 
traditionalism is likely to be negatively correlated, the effect of traditionalism on violence could 
be positive or negative. Under the assumption that the incidence of violence is positively 
correlated with the degree of traditionalism (assuming that a more traditionally socialized 
spouse does not allow his wife to work), we may have a downward bias, finding a spurious 
negative correlation. Of course, if traditional husbands beat their wives less (and ensure that 
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they work less), there could be a spurious positive correlation, leading to an overestimate of the 
coefficient on the employment status.66  I   h s cas ,  h  c  ff c      f w m  ’s  mpl ym    
status is underestimated. With respect to reverse causality, the bias is hard to quantify.  If 
violence causes women to work less, it may lead to a downward bias of the coefficient (an 
underestimation); if it causes women to work more, it would lead to an upward bias. Existing 
l   ra ur  su   s s  ha   s  ma  s  f  h   ff c   f w m  ’s  mpl ym    ar  m r  l k ly  o be 
underestimated (Farmer  & Tiefenthaler, 2004; Johnson, 1995). 
To tackle the issue of endogeneity through omitted variables and reverse causality, a two-stage 
linear probability model is implemented. Specifically, the first stage is defined by 
Working status= Π0 + Π1z1 + Π2 z2 + υi (2) 
where working status is predicted by the exogenous instruments z1  and the control variables z2 
(which overlap with the variables in (1)). The error term υi captures the remaining variance of 
working status, which is not explained by the covariates (including the instrument) in equation 
(2). In the second stage, the outcome, domestic violence, is regressed on the predicted value of 
the endogenous variable, working status, from the first stage along with other exogenous 
variables. Several studies have shown  ha   s  ma     a l   ar pr bab l  y m d l v a “ w -stage 
l as  squar s” pr v d s a    d  s  ma    f  h  av ra    ff c , mak     h  ma    ud   f  h  
coefficients easier to obtain (Miguel et al., 2004; Wooldridge, 2002; Angrist & Pischke, 2009).67 
As there are questions regarding the consistency of these IV estimation techniques when there is 
a limited dependent variable in both stages, we also estimate the model using the two-stage 
residual inclusion method (2SRI) as a further robustness check.68 As wife’s working status is a 
binary endogenous regressor, this method delivers consistent estimates in nonlinear models 
(Wooldridge, 2002). In the first stage, the auxiliary equation (2) is estimated as a probit model. 
                                                        
 
 
66 For example, one may argue that in these traditional families, gender roles are clearly delineated with 
 ach “k  w     h  r plac ,” l ad       l ss c  fl c  a d v  l  c .  Th s abs  c   f violence would not mean 
that there is no inequality, but could be a result of both partners accepting the unequal family situation.    
67 Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that linear probability models (LPM) are a good option for different 
kinds of limited dependent variables. 
68 This method was first suggested by Jerry Hausman (1987). Consistent 2SRI methods for nonlinear 
models have been developed by Richard W. Blundell and Richard J. Smith (1989) or Whitney K. Newey 
(1987). 
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In the second stage regression, the endogenous variable wife’s working status is not replaced. 
Instead, the residual term (υi) of equation (2) is included as an additional regressor in equation 
(1), which is estimated by a probit model as follows: 
 
DV=  β0 + β1 woman’s working status + β2 Characteristics 
Husband/Wife + β3 HH- Characteristics+ β4 Region+ γ   1+ ϵi 
 
 
(3
) 
 
Testing the coefficient γ of  1 in   equation (3) evaluates whether working status is indeed 
endogenous.69 A key issue in this estimation is the validity of the instruments. A valid instrument 
should fulfill two conditions: First, it should be strongly correlated with the endogenous 
variable. Second, it should be exogenous in the basic model. In the current case, there are a few 
potentially strong candidates that could serve as good instruments, for instance type and size of 
the family or currently pregnant. These variables are already used in other studies to instrument 
w m  ’s w rk s a us (Bhattacharya et al. 2011; Chin, 2007). However, the results of appropriate 
tests indicate that in this case only the variable cluster average of working status constitutes a 
valid instrument. The variable is constructed in such a way that we always use the cluster 
average excluding the woman being considered in each observation to avoid an in-built 
correlation. The cluster average of working status has a strong  mpac     w m  ’s  w  
 mpl ym    s a us, bu  sh uld     b  d r c ly c rr la  d w  h husba d’s v  l    b hav  r,   h r 
than through its impact on women's own employment. Hence, the conditions necessary to be a 
valid instrument should be fulfilled in this case. 
In the empirical analysis several specifications are estimated and the validity and strength of the 
instruments are tested. 
                                                        
 
 
69 The coefficient of υ  1 is significant at the 5 percent level and thus, the null hypothesis of exogeneity of 
working status in equation (1) can be rejected.  Therefore, using standard LPM regression models is not 
appropriate. 
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4.6 Descriptive Statistics and Variables 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
According to the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2007, one in five ever-married 
Jordanian women reported that they suffered from physical violence at the hands of their 
husband during their lifetime. Around 12 percent of women documented that this abuse took 
place within the year before the survey. With respect to the type of violence, eight percent of 
ever-married women experienced sexual violence by their husband. Emotional violence is 
prevalent as well, as one in five women suffered from emotional abuse by their husband. Overall, 
28.1 percent of ever-married women reported ever having experienced emotional, physical or 
sexual violence by their husbands. These are large shares of women, particularly if one allows 
for the possibility of underestimation of domestic violence in such a survey setting. 70 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Incidence of domestic violence in Jordan (%) 
 Type of violence  
W f ‘s age Emotional Physical Sexual Domestic violence 
15–29 14.91 16.98 7.31 25.14 
30–39 19.05 19.63 8.49 28.86 
40–49 20.07 18.54 8.35 30.55 
Overall 17.79 18.49 8.07 28.11 
Note: Sample Size N= 2,283 
 
Table 4.2 Incidence of domestic v  l  c  by w f ’s w rk    status in Jordan (%) 
Type of Violence 
Not working 
(wife’s working status=0) 
Working 
(wife’s working status=1) 
 
                                                        
 
 
70 These shares are close to the rates reported by the World Bank (2014) for the Middle East as a whole of 
40 percent.   
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Emotional violence 18.16 16.81  
Physical violence 18.41 19.00  
Sexual violence 8.14 7.64  
Domestic violence 28.14 27.95  
Note: Sample Size N= 2,283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women with lower levels of education and those living in poorer households are more likely to 
report domestic violence than women with more education or those living in wealthier 
households. Table 4.2 shows that reports of physical/sexual/emotional violence also vary by 
w f ’s w rk    s a us, h w v r  h  d ff r  c s ar  ra h r small. Ar u d 19 p rc     f  h  
women who were working reported being a victim of physical violence compared to 18 percent 
of women who were not working Domestic violence is also more common in situations where 
the husband is better educated than the wife and in households where the wife is significantly 
older or younger than her husband. Table 4.3 further reports lower rates of domestic violence 
for women who are living in a kinship marriage compared to those who are not married to a 
relative. These correlations are interesting, but of course do not necessarily imply a direction of 
causality. 
 
 
Table 4.3  Incidence of domestic violence in Jordan by background characteristics (%) 
 
 Type of Violence  
Variables Emotional Physical Sexual Domestic violence 
W f ’s  duca         
0 years of schooling 26.74 25.63 13.37 37.33 
1–6 years of schooling 19.36 21.63 8.48 31.31 
6–12 years of schooling 17.10 14.72 6.93 24.46 
12–18 years of schooling 12.97 12.76 6.02 21.47 
Husba d’s  duca         
0 years of schooling 19.44 20.37 9.26 26.85 
1–6 years of schooling 22.32 21.87 11.39 33.49 
6–12 years of schooling 18.55 20.05 8.50 29.79 
12–20 years of schooling 14.02 12.66 5.09 21.34 
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Spousal age difference 
Wife older 16.83 19.80 9.90 28.71 
Wife is same age 13.20 17.26 5.08 24.37 
W f ’s 1–4 years younger 17.68 18.16 7.34 27.73 
W f ’s 5–9 years younger 17.46 17.14 8.49 27.08 
W f ’s 10 + y ars y u   r 21.41 21.73 8.82 31.86 
Wealth quintile     
Lowest 20.89 22.49 9.25 31.96 
Second 16.84 18.96 8.01 28.15 
Middle 16.18 18.24 10.00 27.21 
Fourth  17.38 14.58 5.42 25.23 
Highest 17.78 13.70 5.54 24.49 
Kinship marriage     
Kinship marriage = 0 19.66 20.56 8.35 29.82 
Kinship marriage = 1 17.39 18.28 8.66 27.84 
Spousal education difference     
Husband better educated 20.14 20.59 9.94 31.15 
Wife better educated 17.71 18.96 8.23 29.02 
Both equally educated 15.40 14.78 5.22 22.36 
Note: Own Calculations, Sample Size N= 2,283 
4.6.2 Independent Variables 
W f ’s w rk    s a us  s a b  ary var abl   ak     h  valu   f      f  h  w ma   s    a  d    pa d 
work outside the home. If the variable takes the value zero, the woman is unemployed or works 
  s d  h r h m . S m larly,  h  var abl  f r husba d’s  mpl ym     ak s  h  valu       f h  
worked during the last twelve months. Since education might have a nonlinear effect on 
violence, the squared term is included in the model as well. Since age of men and women shows 
a high correlation, the variable age difference between the two spouses is included in the 
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model,71 also to indicate differences in bargaining power.72  Generated with the principal 
components analysis, the wealth index places individual households on a continuous scale of 
relative wealth. No further variables concerning the economic status of the household are 
available in the dataset. Household size reports the number of persons living in the household. 
The variable kinship marriage indicates if the wife is related to her current husband.  The 
variable takes the value one if a woman is married to her first cousin, second cousin, or other 
relative. Moreover, number of co-wives represents a polygamous union and measures the 
number of other wives up to three as a continuous variable. 
Location effects are measured by the variable urban and the capital city Amman. The latter is 
included in the regression in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity between urban and 
rural areas. Similarly, the Badia region is included separately as it involves different forms of 
cultural life and traditions than the rest of Jordan. Descriptive statistics on these variables are 
shown in Appendix Table C4.1. 
4.6.3 Instrument 
As  h  ma     s rum   , w    clud  clus  r av ra    f w m  ’s w rk    s a us     h  regression 
model. The Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) are divided into geographical units, so called 
“clus  r” wh ch ar  usually c  sus   um ra     ar as  r v lla  s    rural ar as (DHS, 2010). By 
using the cluster average of working status, we capture the effects of the average employment 
rate in the vicinity of the woman on her own employment performance. This may proxy for 
employment opportunities for women in the area, unmeasured values and attitudes affecting 
w m  ’s  mpl ym   , a d    w rk  ff r s   abling women to find employment.73 
                                                        
 
 
71 Th  var abl  a   d ff r  c   s m d l d by sub rac     w f ’s a   fr m husba d’s a  . W  als    clud d 
w f ’s a   as a  add     al c   r l var abl      h  r  r ss    m d l, bu   h  c  ff cient has no effect and is 
not statistically significant. 
72 Th  var a c    fla     fac  r (VIF) s    f ca  ly d cr as s fr m 3.42 (husba d’s a  ) a d 3.23 (w f ’s 
age) to 1.21 (age difference) demonstrating that age difference indeed reduces the problem of collinearity. 
73 In a robustness check, we also add the presence of children under 3 as an additional instrument which 
has b    f u d     h  l   ra ur     aff c  w m  ’s  mpl ym    (Mar    Br w     1992; Raqu l Carrasc  
2001). 
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4.7 Estimation Results 
4.7.1  Linear Probability Model Estimation 
Table 4.4 presents the estimation results of equation (1), measuring the probability of a woman 
experiencing some kind of violence from her husband. Following the narrative provided in the 
 arl  r s c    s,  h  d scuss    f cus s     h  r l   f w m  ’s w rk s a us   flu  c     h  
probability of experiencing violence. Most of the other variables have already been tested before 
in other studies on domestic violence (for example, Flake, 2005; Rao, 1997; Jejeebhoy, 1998; 
Panda & Agarwal, 2005).  
Table 4.4 reports in the first column the results of a linear probability model (LPM) of the 
aggregated domestic violence measure that does not consider the endogeneity  f w m  ’s w rk 
s a us.  I  sh ws  ha  w m  ’s lab r f rc  par  c pa     has a small, bu  s    f ca   p s   v   ff c  
on the probability of spousal violence. If a woman is involved in paid work, the probability of 
spousal violence increases by 0.076 (p<0.01), holding everything else constant. This result 
would seem to support the Male-backlash theory (Bhattacharya, Bedi & Chhachhi, 2011).74 
A    cr as     husba d’s  duca     has a    l   ar  ff c     d m s  c v  l  c . A  l w l v ls  f 
education, the incidence of violence increases, while at high levels, it decreases with the turning 
point being at about eight years of education. 75 
Husba d’s  mpl ym    s a us has a s    f ca      a  v   mpac     v  l    b hav  r su   s     
that regular employment decreases stress and frustration. The age difference between the 
spouses is positively linked to violence, but the effect is not statistically significant. Household 
size also displays a positive effect on violence, statistically significant at the 1 percent 
significance level.  Consistent with expectations, wealth, reflecting the economic status of the 
household, reduces violence, as poor households are more prone to violence since the lack of 
financial resources might cause economic stress. 
                                                        
 
 
74 W  als  add d w f ’s a   as a control variable to the regression model in order to test if the effects vary 
 v r d ff r    s a  s  f a w ma ’s l f , bu        f  h  r  r ss    r sul s cha   d s    f ca  ly. 
75 According to the DHS report, ten years of education correspond to incomplete secondary education, 
and twelve years of education correspond to complete secondary education.  
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In order to shed light on whether the coefficients differ significantly for different types of the 
dependent variable, domestic violence, we further report in Table 4.4 column (2-4) the 
probability of a woman experiencing emotional, physical, and sexual violence. The estimated 
regressions deliver similar results regarding the sign and magnitude of the main covariates in 
column (1). However, the coefficient of working status is not statistically significant for sexual 
violence; thus the overall results appear to be driven by the correlation between work status 
a d  h  l k l h  d  f  xp r   c    phys cal a d  m     al v  l  c . M r  v r, husba d’s 
education, up to eight years, appears to have an enhancing effect on the incidence of all three 
types of violence and a protective effect beyond eight years; yet, again, this is not significant for 
 h    c d  c   f s xual v  l  c . Th  c  ff c    s  f husba d’s  mpl ym    s a us a d a   
difference show signs similar to the main specification in column (1), however, none of them are 
statistically significant. All of these results have not considered the potential endogeneity of 
women's work. 
The overall fit of the main regression model in column (1) has a likelihood ratio of 57.44 and a p-
value of 0.00, both indicating, that the model is significant as a whole, compared to a model that 
includes only the constant. The R2 of 0.03 is quite low, however, R2 is generally not considered as 
an accurate measure of overall fit in the case of a linear probability model (Studenmund, 2011). 
A fur h r   s  d a   s  c,  h  “p rc    c rr c ly pr d c  d”  f  h  m d l, r p r s a   v rall 
correct prediction rate of 75.5 percent, R2 suggesting that we are able to account for the key 
drivers of reported domestic violence reasonably well. But as the regression results might be 
inconsistent in the presence of endogeneity bias, we focus in the next section on the IV estimates 
in Table 4.5 for a more detailed interpretation of the coefficients.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4  LPM of experiencing domestic violence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Table 4.5 2SLS- Probability of experiencing violence and working instrumental variable: second stage 
estimates 
 
 
Domestic 
violence 
 
Emotional 
violence 
 
Physical 
violence 
 
Sexual violence 
Intercept 0.249*** 
(0.0548) 
0.221*** 0.116** 0.0710** 
 (0.0474) (0.0488) (0.0359) 
Working status 0.0755*** 0.0384* 0.0751*** 0.0167 
 (0.0245) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0157) 
Husba d’s  duca     0.0220*** 
(0.00832) 
0.0122* 0.0148** 0.00550 
 (0.00720) (0.00735) (0.00580) 
Husba d’s duca    2 -0.00143*** 
 
-0.000804** -0.000898** -0.000380 
 (0.000416) (0.000355) (0.000364) (0.000278) 
Husband employed -0.0401* 
(0.0222) 
-0.0264 -0.00273 -0.0164 
 (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0145) 
W f ’s  duca     0.00244 
(0.00738) 
-0.00166 0.00448 -0.00556 
 (0.00651) (0.00659) (0.00527) 
W f ’s  duca    2 -0.000632 
(0.000402) 
-0.000387 -0.000656* 0.000186 
 (0.000350) (0.000348) (0.000276) 
Age difference 0.00112 
(0.00151) 
0.000710 0.000527 0.000311 
 (0.00133) (0.00135) (0.00101) 
Household size 0.00915*** 
(0.00334) 
0.00133 0.00963*** 0.00625*** 
 (0.00279) (0.00294) (0.00225) 
Wealth -1.11e-07 
(1.08e-07) 
4.01e-08 -3.09e-07*** -8.63e-08 
 (9.46e-08) (9.08e-08) (5.67e-08) 
Urban -0.0326* 
(0.0180) 
-0.0150 -0.0297* -0.0132 
 (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0108) 
Badia region -0.0109 
(0.0251) 
-0.0149 -0.00120 0.0152 
 (0.0214) (0.0221) (0.0160) 
Amman 0.0738*** 
(0.0257) 
0.0853*** 0.0549** 0.0123 
 (0.0234) (0.0226) (0.0153) 
Number of co-wives 0.133*** 
(0.0383) 
0.145*** 0.124*** 0.0691** 
 (0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0287) 
Kinship marriage -0.0264* 
(0.0159) 
-0.0261* -0.0279** 0.00414 
 (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.00972) 
R2 0.033 0.030 0.033 0.017 
Number of observations 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
Source: DHS 2007. LPM coefficients are shown in column (1-4). However, probit regression models yield similar 
results. 
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 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
 Domestic Violence 
Emotional 
Violence 
Physical 
Violence 
Sexual Violence 
 
Intercept 0.278*** 
(0.0951) 
0.235*** 0.106 0.146** 
 (0.0811) (0.0817) (0.0637) 
Working status -0.0808 -0.0391 0.132 -0.388 
 (0.423) (0.360) (0.363) (0.283) 
Husba d’s 
education 
0.0208** 
(0.00876) 
0.0116 0.0152** 0.00244 
(0.00747) (0.00753) (0.00587) 
Husba d’s 
education2 
-0.00137*** 
(0.000448) 
-0.000775** 
(0.000382) 
-0.000920** 
(0.000385) 
-0.000225 
(0.000300) 
Husband employed -0.0466* 
(0.0278) 
-0.0297 -0.000343 -0.0334* 
 (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0186) 
W f ’s  duca     -0.00553 
(0.0226) 
-0.00561 0.00739 -0.0262* 
 (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0152) 
W f ’s  duca    2 7.39e-05 
(0.00195) 
-3.65e-05 -0.000914 0.00202 
 (0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00130) 
Age difference 0.000576 
(0.00208) 
0.000440 0.000725 -0.00110 
 (0.00178) (0.00179) (0.00140) 
Household size 0.00901*** 
(0.00331) 
0.00127 0.00968*** 0.00590*** 
 (0.00282) (0.00285) (0.00222) 
Wealth -7.14e-08 
(1.52e-07) 
5.96e-08 -3.23e-07** 1.54e-08 
 (1.29e-07) (1.30e-07) (1.02e-07) 
Urban -0.0297 
(0.0201) 
-0.0135 -0.0308* -0.00564 
 (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0134) 
Badia region -0.00896 
(0.0255) 
-0.0139 -0.00191 0.0203 
 (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0171) 
Amman 0.0670** 
(0.0310) 
0.0819*** 0.0574** -0.00537 
 (0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0207) 
Number of co-wives 
0.141*** 
(0.0414) 
0.149*** 0.121*** 0.0902*** 
(0.0353) (0.0356) (0.0277) 
Kinship marriage -0.0265* 
 
-0.0262* -0.0279** 0.00383 
 (0.0160) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0107) 
R2 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.028 
Number of observ. 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283 
 
F-test of joint 
significance 
11.58 11.58 11.58 11.58 
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4.7.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
As d scuss d     h  pr v  us par s,  h  var abl  w m  ’s w rk    s a us  s   s rum    d w  h 
 h  var abl  clus  r av ra    f w m  ’s w rk    s a us     h  bas l   -IV regression model in 
Table 4.5.  
The instrument cluster average of working status is expected to have a significant impact on 
w m  ’s  mpl ym    s a us bu   s   d p  d     f husba d’s v  l    b hav  r as    lar  ly 
r fl c s l cal lab r mark   c  d     s f r w m   a d a    ud s   ward w m  ’s  mpl ym    
that are unlikely to directly affect male violence. Thus, we consider the cluster average as a 
su  abl    s rum    f r w m  ’s w rk    s a us. 
The first stage of the IV estimation at the bottom of Table 4.5 indicates that, as expected, the 
cluster average of working status increases the probability that the woman works. This effect is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. A one-unit increase in the variable cluster average 
increases the probability of the women working by 0.14, holding everything else constant. In the 
second stage of the IV estimation, shown in Table 4.5 column (1), the coefficient of work status 
now turns out to have a negative but highly insignificant effect on violence, with the point 
estimate being relatively close to zero. Thus, the variable work status appears to have no causal 
effect on violence, in contrast to the basic model that did not consider endogeneity. This result 
su   s s  ha   h  p s   v  r la    sh p b  w    v  l  c  a d w ma ’s  mpl ym        h  bas c 
First-stage results-instrument 
Cluster average working 
status 
0.140*** 
(0.0413) 
0.140*** 
(0.0413) 
0.140*** 
(0.0413) 
0.140*** 
(0.0413) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
l v ls, r sp c  v ly. Th  c  ff c    s  f clus  r av ra   w rk    s a us d  ’  cha        h  f rs -stage, as the 
sample size remains the same for all regressions.  The first stage additionally includes all covariates included in 
the second stage.  Full first-stage results are available on request.  
Source: DHS 2007.   
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model is likely to be driven by omitted variables or reverse causality, rather than by male 
backlash.76 
This result is confirmed in column (1) of Table 4.6 where we report the results of the two-stage 
residual inclusion model. The marginal effects in the second stage show that work status is not 
significantly associated with the probability of domestic violence; this statistical insignificance is 
mostly due to a very small coefficient, which is close to 0 (rather than due to a particularly large 
standard error) suggesting that there really is no relationship between the two variables.77 
S m larly, w f ’s  duca     l v l  s     r la  d     h    c d  c   f v  l  c      h  s c  d s a    f 
the IV estimation reported in Table 4.5. Similar to the linear probability model in Table 4.4 
husba d’s  duca      x r s a    linear effect on the prevalence of domestic violence, 
statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. The measure of differences in 
empowerment between the spouses, age difference, shows the expected positive direction of the 
effect, but is again not statistically significant. A higher number of household members increases 
the incidence of violence, statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. This 
estimation result is consistent with the idea that more people in the household cause more social 
stress, as is found in several other studies (Jewkes et al., 2002; Salam et al., 2006).  
The economic status of the household, proxied by the wealth index, displays the expected sign 
but is again not significantly associated with husba d’s v  l    b hav  r. 
Both indicators for urban regions, Urban and Amman, show opposite signs regarding the 
incidence of violence. Yet, the coefficient of urban turns out to be insignificant as compared to 
the baseline regression in Table 4.1 column (1). The variable Amman has a positive sign, going 
against the empirical literature that suggests a negative link between urban areas and domestic 
violence. This result may be driven by the fact that flight from the countryside leads to a higher 
population share of traditional and rural families in the capital. Urban living conditions are 
especially stressful for migrants, and leaving their rural environment might have put pressure 
                                                        
 
 
76 When we include children under age 3 as an additional instrument, the results are the same. With the 
two instruments, we are able to perform an over identification restriction test, which is passed. Results 
are available on request. 
77 The coefficient of the first stage-residual added to the second stage is significant at the 5 percent 
significance level, indicating that working status is indeed endogenous. 
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on already poor coping mechanism (Al-Nsour et al., 2009). Furthermore, Amman represents a 
modern urban area at first glance, yet, at the micro level traditional and informal structures 
become more visible (Abu-Dayyeh, 2004). Therefore, increased violence could also point to 
tensions and clashes of values and attitudes associated with urban living, often in cramped living 
quarters. The negative, but insignificant, sign of Badia region might reflect the social system in 
rural areas which is largely based on tribalism, leading to higher social control and sanctions 
against spousal violence (Rowland, 2009).  
The coefficient of number of co-wives has a positive sign suggesting that women experience more 
violence if they live in polygynous marriages. This is consistent with some other theoretical and 
empirical models.  For example, Hassouneh-Phillips (2001) finds that women of polygynous 
marriages experience higher levels of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse relative to women of 
monogamous marriages. Violent behavior is often used by a husband as a source of controlling 
wives within the marriage. The addition of wives causes significant stress as it constitutes a 
change in family and economic structure (Hassouneh-Phillips, 2001; Al-Krenawi, 1999). The first 
wife is forced to share existing resources with the new families of the husband and competition 
b c m s s r    s       rms  f a husba d’s   v s m       h al h,  duca    , a d   h r 
expenditures for their children (Bledsoe, 1993; Al-Krenawi, 1999). Further empirical support is 
given by a cross-sectional study in South Africa, finding that polygyny is correlated with higher 
levels of domestic physical and sexual abuse (Jewkes et al.,  2002). 
Consanguinity marriages could be a relevant factor as they are relatively common in Jordan, 
with 43 percent of marriages taking place between relatives (mostly first or second cousins, DHS 
Report, 2010). The coefficient of kinship marriages appears to have a negative and significant 
effect on violence. According to the Gendered Resource Theory of Atkinson, Greenstein & Lang 
(2003), a more traditional ideology is accompanied with a higher probability of violence. The 
negative relation of violence and traditionalism in this model might, however, reflects higher 
family control and sanctions facing the husband in case of violence towards his wife (Counts, 
Brown, & Campbell, 1999; Erchak, 1984). Empirical evidence is given by Stieglitz et al. (2011) 
who found a negative impact of kinship marriage on marital violence due to the principle of 
deterrence and control of the family.  
We now turn to the IV regression results separated by each type of domestic violence. Few 
studies examine the risk factors for different types of domestic violence independently. One 
problem in analyzing domestic violence is the lack of a unique definition in research, specifically 
with respect to sexual and emotional violence. The majority of studies limits the term intimate 
partner violence to the inclusion of physical violence, neglecting other forms of violence (Jewkes, 
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2001). However, a small strand of literature investigates specifically the incidence of sexual 
violence irrespective of physical violence (Naeemah et al., 2004; Jewkes, 2001).  
Consistent with results of the baseline IV regression in column (1), none of the coefficients of 
working status is significant at conventional significance levels.  One should note, however, that 
the impact of working status on sexual violence is negative, empirically sizable, and approaches 
statistical significance at conventional levels.   
 Husba d’s  duca     has a nonlinear and significant impact on physical violence while the 
coefficients for emotional and sexual violence are not significant at conventional significance 
levels. One possible explanation for the differenc      ff c s  s   v      H  s ’s conceptual 
framework (1998). Important factors at the societal or community level are cultural norms and 
attitudes prescribing how more educated men should behave in a more controlled way in public, 
and may influence such men against physically and emotionally abusing their wives. However, 
     l m     v r h s w f ’s b dy r ma  s a pr v l        h  husba d (Go et al., 2003), the only 
sphere where they have complete control over their wife. This might be a likely explanation of 
finding educational attainment to be independent of sexual violence. 
Surpr s   ly, w f ’s  duca     d cr as s  h    c d  c   f s xual v  l  c  wh l      b     
associated with the prevalence of emotional and physical violence.78 Other studies find a 
protective effect on sexual violence as well, specifically in patrilinear societies (Abrahams, 2001; 
Kinsaha, 1998). Yet, according to a WHO recent study it is not known, whether the U-shape 
relationship as found between education and physical violence is also the case for sexual 
violence (WHO Report, 2010). 
Moreover, the negative impact of wealth, the economic status of the household in Table 4.5 is 
primarily related to physical violence, as none of the coefficients for emotional and sexual 
violence are significant. The variable capturing the differences in bargaining power between the 
spouses, age difference, is not significant for any type of violence, as is the case for the 
aggregated domestic violence results in column (1).  
                                                        
 
 
78 The F -test of joint significance of both the linear and the squared term fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that both coefficients are significantly different from 0. Thus, we  xp c   h   ff c   f w f ’s  duca        b  
linear. 
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The prevalence of emotional and physical violence appears to be higher amongst households 
with more co-wives. Various studies on co-wife relationships in polygynous families find the 
relationships to be emotionally unsatisfactory for the majority of family members. This often 
results in increased stress levels, triggering emotional and physical violence by the husband (Al-
Krenawi, 1999; Al-Krenawi & Graham, 1999; Chisholm & Burbank, 1991). 
The negative relationship between violence and traditionalism in this model, as reported by the 
negative coefficient of kinship marriage, might reflect higher family control and sanctions facing 
the husband in cases of violence towards his wife in the case of emotional and physical violence 
(Counts, Brown & Campbell, 1999; Erchak, 1984). H w v r, as      l m     v r a w m  ’s b dy 
is the primary domain of the husband, social control through family might not take effect in the 
case of sexual violence (Chibber, Krupp,  Padian & Madhivana, 2012).  
 Overall, further research is required to examine the overlap in different types of domestic 
violence and disentangle the differences in risk factors. In this study, the co-occurance is quite 
low, as only 10.6 percent reported to experience both sexual and physical violence at the same 
time, which further emphasizes the need for more in-depth research in terms of differences in 
risk factors. 
To support these estimation results, formal tests are implemented to analyze the validity and 
strength of the instrument. The predictive power or relevance of the instruments is tested via 
the F- statistics for joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regressions. The F-
statistic records a value of 11.58, which indicates a strong correlation of the instrument with 
w m  ’s w rk status. According to Stock, Wright & Yogo (2002) the F- statistic should be higher 
than 10 for the instruments to be truly valid. Moreover, the strength of the instrument is tested 
by the weak instrument robust test of Finlay & Magnusson (2009). The confidence intervals of 
the weak-instrument robust test are significantly smaller than the confidence intervals of the 
Wald Test, indicating that the instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor. 
Based on these tests and the theoretical justification, cluster average of working status appears 
to be a valid instrument.  
In order to test the robustness of the results to possible estimation problems of using linear 
probability models in our IV estimation, we also estimate the IV regressions using a two-stage 
residual-inclusion estimation. The results, shown in Table 4.6, confirm our findings from the 
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two-stage least squares linear probability estimations. If endogeneity is not considered, the 
working status of the wife appears to increase domestic violence.79 In the IV model, cluster 
average of working status appears as a valid instrument and the work status of the wife is no 
longer significant. Moreover, the coefficients of the first-stage residuals, which capture the 
remaining variance in working status not explained by the instruments considered, are positive 
and statistically significant in all specifications on domestic violence. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of working status in equation (1) can be rejected in all cases, implying that a 
standard LPM is not consistent.  
But note that we find that working status now has a statistically significant negative impact on 
sexual violence when using the residual inclusion method, while no such effect is found for 
physical and emotional violence.  We interpret this as weak evidence suggesting that working 
status generates a protective effect reducing sexual violence.  
We also experimented with various interaction terms to see whether the impact of paid work 
d p  ds    w m  ’s  duca    , m  ’s  duca    , m  ’s  mpl ym   ,  r k  sh p marr a   (as 
suggested in some of the literature discussed above); yet, none turned out to be significant, so 
 ha  w  d      f  d a   ff c   f w m  ’s pa d w rk    d m s  c v  l  c   ha   s c  d      d by 
other factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
79 In the specification of sexual violence, the coefficient of work status is not significant. 
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Table 4.6 2SRI- Domestic violence separated by each type of violence (emotional/physical/sexual) 
 
  Probit  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Domestic 
violence 
Emotional 
violence 
Physical 
violence 
Sexual violence 
     W f ’s w rk    s a us 0.0110 0.00814 0.0733 -0.253** 
 (0.199) (0.172) (0.172) (0.120) 
Husba d’s  duca     
0.0216*** 0.0116* 0.0155** 0.00350 
(0.00836) (0.00700) (0.00725) (0.00509) 
Husba d’s  duca    2 
-0.00144*** -0.000792** -0.000964** -0.000302 
(0.000432) (0.000362) (0.000380) (0.000267) 
Husband employed -0.0402* -0.0247 -0.00151 -0.0253* 
 (0.0224) (0.0189) (0.0193) (0.0132) 
W f ’s  duca     0.00134 -0.00104 0.00648 -0.0141** 
 (0.0108) (0.00912) (0.00914) (0.00632) 
W f ’s  duca    2 -0.000479 -0.000377 -0.000786 0.00109** 
 (0.000859) (0.000734) (0.000730) (0.000511) 
Age difference 0.000835 0.000514 0.000543 -0.000658 
 (0.00160) (0.00134) (0.00138) (0.000974) 
Household size 0.00880*** 0.00112 0.00931*** 0.00515*** 
 (0.00321) (0.00273) (0.00271) (0.00187) 
Wealth -9.32e-08 5.09e-08 -3.22e-07*** -3.06e-08 
 (1.20e-07) (1.02e-07) (1.06e-07) (6.77e-08) 
Urban -0.0319* -0.0153 -0.0304* -0.00902 
 (0.0186) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0111) 
Badia region -0.00904 -0.0131 -0.00128 0.0161 
 (0.0246) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0139) 
Amman 0.0682*** 0.0762*** 0.0531** 0.00101 
 (0.0255) (0.0209) (0.0222) (0.0155) 
Number of co-wives 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.0999*** 0.0657*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0284) (0.0294) (0.0197) 
Kinship marriage -0.0271* -0.0266* -0.0291** 0.00259 
 (0.0159) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.00956) 
Residual 0.0339* 0.0416* 0.258** 0.737** 
 (0.0116) (0.0278) (0.107) (0.325) 
N 3,283 3,283 3,283 3,283 
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.029 0.036 0.031 
First-stage results-instrument 
Cluster average 
working status 
0.112*** 
(0.0373) 
0.112*** 
(0.0373) 
0.112*** 
(0.0373) 
0.112*** 
(0.0373) 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The coefficients of cluster average working status do 
not change in the first stage, as the sample size remains the same for all regressions. The first stage additionally 
includes all covariates included in the second stage.  Full first-stage results are available on request. 
Source: DHS 2007. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
Us    a r pr s   a  v   a    al h us h ld surv y, w   xpl r   h  l  k b  w    w m  ’s pa d 
work and spousal violence in Jordan. Once we control for endogeneity, there is no significant 
impact of wife's employment status on domestic violence. When we disaggregate domestic 
violence into different types of violence, these results hold for emotional and physical violence. 
M r  v r, w  f  d a w ak pr   c  v   ff c   f w m  ’s  mpl ym    s a us    s xual v  l nce in 
some specifications. Thus, the hypothesis of Vyas & Watts (2003), stating that women entering 
the labor market in regions where traditional attitudes prescribe women to the domestic sphere 
ar  m r  pr       v  l  c  du      h  r “p     r r l ,” ca  ot be confirmed. 
The weak protective effect of employment on sexual violence gives support for theories that 
pr d c  a    cr as     w m  ’s bar a      p w r  hr u h  h  r    a  m       pa d w rk. Th  
results have further consequences, suggesting that policies addressing job opportunities in the 
labor market for women in order to reduce violence as advocated recently (UN 2013) may be 
successful in Jordan at least for sexual violence. As discussed in World Bank (2014), supportive 
policies (including education and training programs and policies promoting safety and security) 
ar     d d      sur   ha  w m  ’s  mpl ym    r duc s d m s  c v  l  c . Th  ma   pr   c  v  
fac  rs a a  s  d m s  c v  l  c     J rda  ar  husba d’s  duca     a d  mpl ym    s a us. 
These findings demonstrate that the World Bank policies mentioned above should also promote 
m  ’s  duca        J rda .  
This study showed that it is important to control for unobserved factors and reverse causality. 
Estimates which do not account for the possibility of both reverse causality and omitted 
var abl s ar  m r  l k ly    draw  h  c  clus     ha  w m  ’s w rk s a us  s   d  d ass c a  d 
with an increased incidence of violence.  
These results are surely not the last word on this important and difficult subject. Data 
concerning domestic violence suffer from underreporting and may cause measurement errors. 
The insignificant effect of employment might arise due to the difficulty of encompassing the 
phenomenon of violence as well as the different levels at which factors might operate. Data 
restrictions do not allow us to include factors at the community level, such as weak community 
sanctions against domestic violence or social norms that restrict wom  ’s publ c par  c pa     
(Heise & Moreno, 2002). Possibilities for further research include tackling the remaining 
methodological issues and distinguishing between different forms of domestic violence. 
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4.9 Appendix 
Table 4C.1 Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Domestic violence 0.28 0.45 0 1 
(Domestic violence=1)     
W f ’s w rk    s a us 0.14 0.35 0 1 
(Wife working=1)     
W f ’s  duca     (   y ars) 10.57 4.04 0 18 
W f ’s a   34.11 7.77 16 49 
Husband employed 0.82 0.39 0 1 
(Husband employed=1)     
Husba d’s  duca     (   years) 10.35 3.84 0 20 
Husba d’s a   39.85 9.57 15 91 
Age difference 5.95 5.53 -31 49 
Household size 6.16 2.54 1 26 
Number of children  < 3 years 0.56 0.67 0 4 
Wealth 7820.70 88499.36 -345913 467690 
Number of co-wives 0.071 0.29 0 3 
Kinship marriage 0.422 0.48 0 1 
(Kinship marriage=1)     
Urban 0.307 0.46 0 1 
(Urban=1, Rural=0)     
Badia region 0.14 0.35 0 1 
(Badia region=1)     
Amman   0.119 0.324 0 1 
(Amman=1)     
Cluster average of working status 0.14 0.13 0 1 
Source: DHS 2007, own calculations. Sample Size N= 3,283. 
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Table 4C.2 Frequency distribution of selected background characteristics (%) 
 
 Percentage Frequency 
Household size   
1 0.03 1 
2-5 42.48 1,393 
6-8 40.59 1,331 
9-14 16.50 541 
15+ 0.40 13 
Number of children < 3 years   
0 52.03 1,706 
1 38.12 1,250 
2 9.55 313 
3 0.27 9 
4 0.03 1 
Spousal age difference 
Wife older 6.16 202 
Wife is same age 5.98 196 
W f ’s 1-4  years younger 31.53 1,034 
W f ’s 5-9  years younger 37.72 1,237 
W f ’s 10 + years younger 18.60 610 
Wealth quintile   
Lowest 26.68 875 
Second 25.86 848 
Middle 20.74 680 
Fourth  16.29 534 
Highest 10.43 342 
Number of co-wives   
0 93.90 3,079 
1 5.34 175 
2 0.55 18 
3 0.21 7 
Kinship marriage 
Kinship Marriage = 1 42.09 1,380 
Kinship Marriage = 0  57.91 1,899 
Source: DHS 2007, own calculations. Sample Size N= 3,283.  
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